



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

MONDAY, 10 AUGUST 2009
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr Simon Meisenberg
Ms Sidney Thompson

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Ms Maja Dimitrova

**For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:**

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Mr Morris Anyah
Mr Silas Chekera
Ms Salla Moilanen

1 Monday, 10 August 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:31:40 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearances,
6 please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution Mohamed A
9 Bangura, Brenda J Hollis and our case manager, Maja Dimitrova.

09:32:02 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Yes, Mr Griffiths.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,
12 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself, Courtenay
13 Griffiths, assisted by my learned friends, Mr Morris Anyah and
14 Mr Silas Chekera. Also with us today is our case manager,

09:32:23 15 Ms Salla Moilanen, and we're also joined by one of our interns,
16 Amelia Montgomery, who has not been with us before.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Welcome to the Court,
18 Ms Montgomery.

19 Mr Taylor, before you're asked any further questions, I'll
09:32:41 20 remind you that you are still on your declaration to tell the
21 truth.

22 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

23 [On former affirmation]

24 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

09:32:50 25 Q. Mr Taylor, on Thursday last we were looking at events in
26 the immediate aftermath of the Freetown invasion. Do you recall
27 that?

28 A. Yes, I do.

29 Q. And we had looked at, amongst other things, a letter which

1 you had written to the President of the Security Council.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Is that right?

4 A. That is correct.

09:33:13 5 Q. We'd also examined the newspaper article published in the
6 Washington Post, written by one James Rupert, making certain
7 allegations about Liberia's involvement in the Sierra Leonean
8 crisis, yes? Do you recall that?

9 A. Yes, I do.

09:33:34 10 Q. That article being dated 10 January 1999. Now, by the end
11 of January, Mr Taylor, would it be fair to say that your
12 government was under enormous pressure in terms of allegations
13 about your involvement in Sierra Leone?

14 A. That is correct. We were by that time under enormous
09:34:02 15 pressure, but some of the principal things that we had done was
16 not being stated. It was very sad, but we were under pressure to
17 continue to demonstrate - and this is, you know, it's typical in
18 diplomatic circles where - that's where courtrooms and
19 diplomacy - I think courts and diplomacy are two separate things
09:34:33 20 because you hear accusations, you see we are acting, because if I
21 recall very well what is still not stated is that by 7 January,
22 the day right after the so-called Freetown invasion, what is not
23 still stated in the records is that there are discussions. In
24 fact, as I recall now, I had to speak to President Kabbah around
09:35:12 25 the 6th or 7th because the committee responsible for Sierra Leone
26 at that time, I being very key on that, there was a meeting
27 between President Kabbah and Foday Sankoh, if my recollection is
28 correct, about 7 January. There was a meeting with Sankoh and
29 Kabbah right after the Freetown invasion.

1 In fact, that meeting - we were briefed of that meeting. I
2 don't know why it has not come out in the records yet. And our
3 participation continued up until around about 12 January, I had
4 successfully negotiated a ceasefire with the RUF and the
09:36:02 5 Government of Sierra Leone, and that's not even reflected. So
6 there is an ongoing situation at this particular time where
7 Kabbah has met with Foday Sankoh, Foday Sankoh has met with
8 senior members of the RUF right after that Freetown invasion, the
9 committee is working, we secure a ceasefire, I announce publicly
09:36:26 10 to the world that we had secured a ceasefire by 12 January.
11 There's constant communication between President Kabbah and
12 myself and other members of - now it's the Committee of Six. And
13 so I don't understand why there is all this pressure going on,
14 but there is pressure going on constantly right after this time,
09:36:51 15 yes.

16 Q. Now, when you say "we were briefed", who is "we"?

17 A. Members of the Committee of Six. I mean, everybody was
18 aware that President Kabbah met Foday Sankoh right after the
19 Freetown invasion on 7 January or thereabout. We were all - I
09:37:05 20 was told. I'm sure Eyadema was told that a meeting had been
21 successful. And Kabbah, in that meeting from briefings that the
22 committee received, had agreed that Foday Sankoh, if things got
23 to a point where discussions could be held, could travel to
24 wherever there would be a peace process.

09:37:28 25 And, in fact, we were looking at two areas. We were
26 looking at Togo and we were looking at Accra at that time. So
27 between that 6 January and going on there were massive
28 communication, consultations across the board, and we were all
29 kept in the loop on it including the agreement to permit Foday

1 Sankoh to travel. That happened immediately after the 6 January.
2 I don't know how it got lost in all of these discussions, but
3 there were meetings and we secured a ceasefire on the 12th. And
4 I announced it personally from Monrovia that we had obtained a
09:38:07 5 ceasefire. So all was left now was where. And after we accepted
6 that Togo would be the place, we started the whole process now of
7 putting it together and putting the final touches to it.

8 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you accept that your government was under
9 enormous pressure.

09:38:28 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Now, did you feel as a consequent move to respond to that
12 pressure?

13 A. Definitely. We could see - a situation had developed where
14 no matter what we said, it didn't make any difference. I had
09:38:47 15 even some pressure myself on the special representative of the
16 Secretary-General in Monrovia.

17 Q. Who is that?

18 A. Mr Felix Downes-Thomas. I was - I had pressure on my
19 colleagues in ECOWAS. I said, "Well, listen, you guys, you know
09:39:04 20 what's happening. You've got to help to get this, you know,
21 story corrected." So I put a lot of pressure. I wrote a letter
22 to the Secretary-General stating that there were all these issues
23 that no one had presented any evidence to and that, you know -
24 and demanding that something be done about it. So later on in
09:39:37 25 January I can remember there was a report done by the special
26 representative of the Secretary-General in Liberia,
27 Downes-Thomas, that noted to the Secretary-General that he was
28 under pressure in Monrovia to provide evidence as to what they
29 were talking about, and it still was not forthcoming.

1 Q. Well, let's take things in stages. Let us, first of all,
2 look at a document which we briefly introduced last Thursday but
3 didn't examine in detail. It's behind divider 4 in the
4 disclosure for week 32. Do you have the document, Mr Taylor?

09:40:37 5 A. Yes, I do.

6 Q. Now, do you recall this document?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. Now, taking things slowly, we see that the document is
9 headed "Liberia's response to allegations of her involvement in
09:40:57 10 the Sierra Leone civil war and dismisses such accusations as an
11 international conspiracy spearheaded by the United States and
12 Britain in an attempt to internationally isolate, economically
13 destroy and politically destabilise the government of the
14 Republic of Liberia". Let's pause there. That title suggests a
09:41:30 15 note of defiance, doesn't it, Mr Taylor?

16 A. Well, defiance maybe, but also frustration, anger.

17 Q. But, Mr Taylor, did you think it was wise for you, David,
18 to be adopting such a tone against Goliath?

19 A. Well, there are times in life that things may not appear
09:42:06 20 wise but they may be prudent, and what do you expect from a
21 little country that is attacked so seriously by major nations of
22 the world without presenting an iota of evidence? I mean, it is
23 frustrating. We are coming from a war. Our people are hungry.
24 We still have hundreds of thousands of internally displaced. We
09:42:51 25 are getting all of these accusations. First I'm about to attack
26 Sierra Leone with 5,000 troops. It's investigated, it's not
27 true. We come forward. Early in January there is an attack on
28 Freetown. A major US paper, the Washington Post, that is really
29 a signal of - for those of us that have been in government, it's

1 a signal of what to expect from the United States government.
2 There are these phantom officials that are speaking out that you
3 never get to know their names. There are phantom accounts of
4 arms crossing the border. There are phantom accounts of Taylor
09:43:44 5 doing things. No shred of evidence.

6 So at this particular time what do you expect from a
7 President, who is desperate, is to challenge them for whatever it
8 may mean, and that's what I did to really to begin to challenge
9 these people to say "Well, listen, bring some evidence." You are
09:44:07 10 speaking about this publicly. Here is this little general who
11 gets thrown out of Liberia. In fact, he doesn't stay on the job
12 in Sierra Leone even long. The people that are saying things -
13 and this is the problem that I'm having with this case - where
14 there's a lot of people saying, and nobody is bringing any
09:44:27 15 physical evidence. The United States did not do it at that
16 particular time. We challenged them. They haven't done it now.
17 We are behind them. We go all the way now to Britain, to London,
18 to the Foreign Office. Listen, we respect you. What do you
19 have? So, yes, it may be unwise, but it is an act of anger and
09:44:54 20 frustration.

21 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, why choose to have this statement announced
22 in London?

23 A. Well, look, let's - you know, when it comes to the very
24 close cooperation between the British and the Americans, nobody
09:45:13 25 will ever question that. This Sierra Leone was a British - this
26 is a British operation, Sierra Leone. We are at a time in the
27 world where this is that period of regime change. So America is
28 busy with Iraq and helping Britain out, but this is a British
29 operation and so we go to them, because we know that if and when

1 the British decide that there is nothing credible about this,
2 they will do something about it. But this was their little pet
3 project, Sierra Leone. That's why we went directly to them. Not
4 to say that we had not confronted the United States also, but we
09:46:00 5 decided to take it to them in London to challenge what they had,
6 if they had anything at all, and we still did not get anything.

7 Q. Now, we need to pause and appreciate the date on which this
8 statement was read. This was 26 January 1999?

9 A. That is correct.

09:46:19 10 Q. And in light of some of the content of what comes after,
11 Mr Taylor, can I ask you this: When you authorised this
12 statement to be announced in London, did you anticipate that you
13 would be on trial before this document was taken seriously?

14 A. Oh, no, no. That was the last thing on my mind, trial, or
09:46:41 15 being indicted and all of that. All I was doing as President of
16 Liberia at that time, I was faced with a situation where, with
17 these accusations out there and the war in Sierra Leone, the
18 United States on the one side, the British on the other side
19 slinging out these accusations, any little country in any part of
09:47:07 20 this globe will know what that means. What does it mean? Don't
21 even talk to the World Bank. Don't even talk to the IMF. Don't
22 even talk to any Bretton Wood Institution. Don't talk to the
23 European Union. Don't talk to anybody. You will get nowhere.

24 So what I'm really thinking about now is what do I do to clear up
09:47:30 25 this mess so that I can begin to bring relief to my people that
26 are just coming from war. That's what I'm doing at this time.

27 Q. But did you anticipate at this time that you would have to
28 be explaining yourself about your activities during this period
29 in a court of law?

1 A. No, not at all. Never occurred to me. For me this was
2 political, it was diplomatic, and if I got it cleared up at that
3 time, as I'm saying, I would have had access to know some of our
4 donors that wanted to give money that we were not going to get
09:48:01 5 money from, including - when I talk about the Bretton Wood
6 Institutions, World Bank, IMF, some of the major other financial
7 institutions. You get nowhere with them with these two major
8 countries. Who controls the World Bank? The World Bank is
9 controlled by the United States. Who controls the International
09:48:22 10 Monetary Fund? Europe controls the International Monetary Fund.
11 When you're in trouble with Europe and the United States you're
12 in trouble with the World Bank and IMF. It's as simple as that,
13 and every present in the world knows this. If he doesn't know,
14 then he's heard it. That's how it works.

09:48:40 15 Q. Let's move on, Mr Taylor, and have a look at the first
16 paragraph of this document, please:

17 "The Government of the Republic of Liberia has, over the
18 past few months, come under intense international pressure
19 largely spearheaded by the governments of the United States and
09:48:59 20 Britain asserting, inter alia, that Liberia is fuelling the
21 Sierra Leonean crisis by supplying arms to the AFRC/RUF rebels
22 fighting to overthrow the government of President Tejan Kabbah.
23 Liberia has also been accused of secretly committing fighting
24 forces on the side of the rebels and has allegedly granted safe
09:49:21 25 haven to some top AFRC/RUF officials in Monrovia."

26 Let us pause. Now, do you see, Mr Taylor, that in effect
27 you're setting out the allegations being made by certain
28 countries about Liberia?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. Now, let's just see what the allegations being made are in
2 January 1999. One, that you're supplying arms to the AFRC/RUF
3 rebels; do you see that?

4 A. Yes, I do.

09:50:01 5 Q. Secondly, that you've secretly committed fighting forces on
6 the side of the rebels; do you see that?

7 A. I see that.

8 Q. And thirdly, that you've allegedly granted safe haven to
9 some top RUF/AFRC officials in Monrovia. Those are the three
09:50:21 10 allegations you identify as Liberia in January 1999. Is that
11 correct?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. Now, let's examine each of those in turn. Bearing in mind
14 this is January 1999, first of all, the allegation of supplying
09:50:41 15 arms to the AFRC/RUF. Now, in terms of that allegation,

16 Mr Taylor, do you recall making a speech in late December 1998?

17 A. Oh, definitely. In fact, to be exact, at the end of -
18 that's about December 28, 29 I made that speech. It was a major
19 policy speech dealing with this matter of arms, okay, and in that
09:51:18 20 speech --

21 Q. And what was the information available to your government
22 then as to United States research regarding the supply of arms?

23 A. Well, we had had at our disposal a report that had been
24 done jointly by the United States, represented by a situation
09:51:43 25 that came before us here, Colonel Dempsey, along with the United
26 Nations and ECOMOG, that had stated in fact that there was some
27 evidence of a little amount of arms going across the border, but
28 that it was not an official transaction because it was just a
29 trickle amount of arms going across the border. So to see this

1 same arms issue festering, I mean, we had to raise it here
2 because it just seemed not to go away. I thought it had gone
3 away after a senior army officer representing the American
4 government at the embassy had gone there and had written a report
09:52:26 5 saying, "Look, we haven't seen any evidence of this." The United
6 Nations personnel had gone there and said, "We see no evidence of
7 this." ECOMOG personnel had been there and said there is no
8 evidence. So to see this same thing festering and festering, I'm
9 shocked by it.

09:52:44 10 Q. But you recall that on 10 January, James Rupert had
11 suggested that the - Washington had solid evidence. Had you seen
12 any?

13 A. Nothing. Not even - nothing. Absolutely nothing, and
14 that's the problem when you hear me talking about phantom
09:53:13 15 reports. An official who decides that because of security reason
16 his name cannot be called, and you go from now until hell freezes
17 over, you never get to know the official because there is no such
18 thing. They write these things. You know, it's almost like,
19 your Honours, what happens in certain intelligence scenarios, you
09:53:36 20 know, people - intelligence experts sit down and they write
21 scenarios. It's almost like you write a script for a film. They
22 write these scenarios and then they're played out later. They
23 find the actors and they play it. This is what it is. I just
24 got burned in this process where this Rupert writes - and maybe
09:53:59 25 just as a mischief somebody said, "Well, put it out there and let
26 Taylor fight it out. You know, if he can clear himself, he will;
27 if he can't, he'll have to keel with this for several months and
28 years." That's what they do. This is what that Rupert did.
29 This is mischief. Pure mischief.

1 Q. Let's look at the second allegation which you'd identified:
2 That you'd been accused of secretly committing fighting forces on
3 the side of the rebels. Now, do you recall mention being made of
4 an allegation of 5,000 Liberians massing on the border to invade
09:54:37 5 Sierra Leone?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And we dealt with the fact that that had been investigated
8 by the United Nations, didn't we, Mr Taylor?

9 A. That is correct.

09:54:47 10 Q. And what was the upshot of that?

11 A. It ended up with there were no fighters, there is no such
12 thing. President Kabbah and I exchanged telephone conversations.
13 It lasted for about 48 hours, and then he announced that it was a
14 big mistake and it stopped right there.

09:55:10 15 Q. And again on the same topic, we have dealt more than once
16 with the role of the STF in Liberia, haven't we?

17 A. In Sierra Leone.

18 Q. In Sierra Leone, haven't we?

19 A. That is correct, yes.

09:55:29 20 Q. So had you, in line with this allegation, secretly
21 committed fighting forces on the side of the rebels?

22 A. Never. Never. They knew that there were Liberians, but
23 all they did was to attribute them to me. They knew that
24 Liberians were there. They had been dealing with them, but when
09:55:47 25 it came time to, quote unquote, put pressure - and quite frankly,
26 this case is a highly technical case. It's not just one of these
27 normal legal things, because there's a whole blend of diplomacy
28 in this whole situation here. This is what you call pressure.
29 We are putting pressure, and these pressures that come from

1 countries have nothing to do with fact. They have nothing to do
2 with fact. In diplomacy, what you do, let's take two - or maybe
3 one example happening in the world right now. Let's look at the
4 - a typical example of the pressure that is on Iran right now
09:56:46 5 about Iran's, quote unquote, desire, which is spiritual, to
6 develop nuclear weapons. Now, for those of the world that are
7 following this, the International Atomic Energy Agency is
8 publishing reports that they have no evidence of Iran moving
9 towards the production of a nuclear bomb, but that's the
09:57:21 10 International Atomic Energy Agency. But the West - United
11 States, Britain, are the major countries - are still saying what?
12 That Iran harbours the desire to build a weapon. What you call
13 this - this is what you call diplomatic pressure.

14 Now, if you took that case into a court of law, you would
09:57:40 15 get nowhere because while the International Atomic Energy Agency
16 is saying one thing, political pressure is dictating that
17 pressure must be put that even if they harboured this issue, not
18 have it - this is the type of situation that we have here with
19 Liberia. They know that I do not have fighters in Sierra Leone.
09:58:03 20 They know that these people are STF.

21 Q. Just STF?

22 A. Well - and they know that these are Liberians that are
23 coming from ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K and the AFL, but any attempt to
24 so-call keep the pressure on Taylor, they repeat it, and they
09:58:23 25 repeat it and repeat it. I'm only trying to give you an example
26 of what's the difference between these diplomatic and other
27 military pressures as we compare it to factual evidence. Where
28 it does not exist, you put out these things as pressure. And at
29 times, if you're not careful, they can be construed as fact if

1 they are repeated sufficiently over time.

2 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, the third allegation identified was that
3 you had allegedly granted safe haven to some top AFRC/RUF
4 officials in Monrovia. Was there any truth to that?

09:59:09 5 A. None whatsoever. And if there were any truth, at least
6 they would have said that X is there, Y is there, Z is there. I
7 mean, you will just hear that people are there. No one has ever
8 come up and said, "At this time, this accusation against
9 Mr Taylor, John Brown is there, Peter Doe is there." No. Names,
09:59:34 10 they would never come up with a name because no such individuals
11 are there at this time.

12 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you had set up a guesthouse in Monrovia in
13 November of the previous year, hadn't you?

14 A. That is correct.

09:59:49 15 Q. Yes?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. And you'd been visited by, amongst others, Sam Bockarie,
18 hadn't you?

19 A. That is correct. But they were not living there, and they
10:00:02 20 knew that they were coming and going.

21 Q. But what about any AFRC members coming to Monrovia. Did
22 any come to Monrovia in that period, in the period we're talking
23 about?

24 A. In this period, no. Let's not forget, there is no reason
10:00:21 25 before this Court that I should deny if AFRC people came to
26 Liberia. Number one, let me remind the Court, my government,
27 along with la Cote d'Ivoire and others, were authorised to speak
28 to the AFRC and the RUF. That evidence is before this Court. At
29 this time we had not established any contact with the AFRC

1 individuals. The contact before had been established with the
2 RUF where the guesthouse had been set up.

3 Q. Now, let's move on:

4 "The Liberian government has categorically and repeatedly
10:01:11 5 denied any military involvement in Sierra Leone. Liberia has
6 also rejected and described as ridiculous the notion that she
7 will be involved in attempts to destabilise any of her neighbours
8 including Sierra Leone. The Liberian government has gone beyond
9 mere denials and has proposed numerous options by which the
10:01:31 10 allegations of her involvement could be disproved including,
11 among other things, the constitution of a joint UN/ECOMOG border
12 patrol contingent to monitor troops movements and the setting up
13 of an international board of inquiry by the United Nations
14 Secretary-General to investigate these accusations."

10:01:53 15 Now, Mr Taylor, for how long had you been asking for a
16 joint UN/ECOMOG border patrol?

17 A. This goes back I would say as late as probably late '97.
18 In fact, many of the reports of the Secretary-General that have
19 come before this Court, the Secretary-General has mentioned
10:02:18 20 several times that we've requested this. We've been very
21 constant about this request to try to clear it up, and it doesn't
22 go anywhere.

23 Q. Was that request ever acted upon?

24 A. No, never acted upon, and we did not cease requesting it
10:02:38 25 again and again and again.

26 Q. What about an international board of inquiry, was such an
27 investigation ever set up?

28 A. Never. No one wanted to set up one because they knew the
29 results. The results would be in our favour, a negative, but the

1 whole point of this exercise was to make sure that there was no
2 objective results, because, like I say, this was not an issue of
3 law, this was an issue of pressure. And at that point, sometimes
4 at the end of the day an accusation would just fade away, so no
10:03:15 5 inquiry was ever set up. Not in ECOWAS, not in the OAU, not in
6 the United Nations, even though we had been pushing at all
7 levels. It was just not necessary, according to them.

8 Q. "At the core of the onslaught against Liberia by the
9 United States and Britain is the demonstrated failure and
10:03:39 10 unquestionable inability of the two countries to evidentially
11 prove their allegations against Liberia."

12 When you say "evidentially prove", Mr Taylor, what were you
13 talking about?

14 A. We were expecting - let's take arms. Arms were supposed to
10:04:02 15 be going across the border. We expected for maybe a truck number
16 or maybe a satellite photo, contacts, we expected radio
17 intercepts or telephone intercepts where they will say, "Here you
18 are, Mr Taylor. On this date, you said this, or an official of
19 the Liberian government said this. Here is the intercept. What
10:04:28 20 do you have to say about it?" And no one should tell me this
21 nonsense about secrecy because at this particular level, when it
22 comes to secrecy, this kind of information is not top secret,
23 because if you're talking about top secret, there were things
24 that were more sensitive than this that Presidents got to know in
10:04:50 25 dealing with these governments and dealing with intelligence,
26 there are certain things that you know.

27 So bring in an intercepted telephone conversation or a
28 radio conversation or a photo or an individual where you say,
29 "Well, look, Mr Taylor, this particular army officer or this

1 official has said this. What do you have to say?" There's
2 nothing secret about that, that it is so complicated that you
3 cannot expose it. That's what I'm talking about.

4 So what I was looking for from them was physical evidence
10:05:22 5 in terms of intercepts, in terms of photography, in terms of
6 documents. That's what I was looking for. There was none
7 forthcoming.

8 Q. Mr Taylor, you were requesting such proof 10 years ago?

9 A. That is correct.

10:05:39 10 Q. In the decade since, have you seen any?

11 A. I haven't and I'm still waiting for them.

12 Q. "Despite repeated challenges to authenticate their claims,
13 the British and Americans have only relied on rumours,
14 speculations and a massive disinformation campaign intended to

10:05:59 15 internationally isolate, economically strangulate and
16 diplomatically destroy Liberia and by so doing to successfully
17 disintegrate ECOMOG which has earned its success story of an
18 African capacity to solve an African military problem in Liberia,
19 culminating in the ushering in of a broad-based democratically
10:06:26 20 elected government headed by Charles Taylor as President."

21 What are you suggesting in those last few sentences?

22 A. Well, there are some catch things in here.

23 "Internationally isolate" is the first one. When you have these
24 issues globally where you have a war, a whole world is involved
10:06:49 25 in trying to bring peace. But you have the major players saying
26 in the news all of the time, "There is one country that is being
27 obstructionist to the process." That will internationally
28 isolate you because no one wants to do business with you because
29 that means that you are a warmonger.

1 Now, let's look at the other one, "economically
2 strangulate". We are coming out of a seven-year war. Again,
3 these accusations, especially by these two countries, will put us
4 in a position where we will not get any assistance from anybody.
10:07:32 5 Who wants to help Liberia when Liberia is supposed to be opposed
6 to peace, Liberia is sending soldiers to fight in Sierra Leone,
7 Liberia is causing the war in Sierra Leone to continue when
8 everyone wants it stopped? So, well, if you have means to have
9 perpetuate a war in Sierra Leone, then you don't need anything
10:07:55 10 from us. So you can't talk to anybody. All of the donor
11 countries just don't help you, and you've got billions of dollars
12 owed to the international financial institutions, nobody's going
13 to talk to you. So economically you are finished.

14 To diplomatically destroy Liberia. Again, you know, you
10:08:18 15 have a situation where you become a pariah state and nobody wants
16 to deal with you. And this is the typical strategy that people
17 deploy against little countries. It's very simple to destroy a
18 small country. Very simple. Countries like ours that depend on
19 the so-called international community for, really, what I will
10:08:43 20 call sustenance, where 40 per cent - some little countries, 50
21 per cent of your budget is being financed by goodwill from them,
22 you are in trouble. So any little problem that you have, you
23 will run into difficulties. So diplomatically you are destroyed.

24 And the last one dealing with disintegrate ECOMOG, look, I
10:09:20 25 cannot and don't speak for any leader of West Africa at that
26 time. That's what they're going to have to do for themselves.
27 But I can tell you, from where I sat, there was frustration in
28 our little discussions. First you had joy and people were elated
29 that Liberia was a good example of ECOWAS and ECOMOG working.

1 Now, here we have a situation where everything that is happening
2 in Sierra Leone is not going well.

3 First of all, when I talk about Britain, when President
4 Kabbah went into exile, Britain spent a lot of money. Britain
10:10:09 5 covertly built an FM station, financed it. So when President
6 Kabbah was in Guinea, he had a broadcast in a radio station going
7 that had been funded by Britain, so the entire budget spent on
8 the Kabbah government in exile was paid by Britain. So Britain
9 had her own interest, okay.

10:10:31 10 So if you look at what happened, I did mention to this
11 Court that it was very clear to me and many other leaders that
12 there was more - this tussle between Britain and the - and
13 Nigeria, where Britain appeared determined not to - permitting
14 Nigeria to dominate Sierra Leone. And so, remember I had
10:10:58 15 mentioned that they had made it very clear that a resolution to
16 use force in Sierra Leone was not going to be forthcoming, and
17 I've also mentioned to this Court that the intervention of 1998,
18 February, was an ECOWAS intervention and it was not done under
19 Chapter 7.

10:11:21 20 So when you put all of this together there was this fight
21 going on and some of us were so frustrated, feeling that
22 everything was being done to stop ECOMOG from making Sierra Leone
23 the second success story. And if you go a little further to
24 remind the Court, what happens, a Nigerian officer is put in
10:11:42 25 charge of the Sierra Leonean armed forces. That eventually
26 changes and then it is then controlled by what? A British
27 officer. And then the police again is controlled by a British
28 officer. So what I am saying here? I'm saying here that there
29 is a lot of power play going on, so ECOMOG and the success of

1 ECOWAS is in trouble. So there is this power play going on.
2 There are obstacles being placed here, obstacles being removed,
3 and there was a lot of frustration on all of our parts who are
4 determined to making sure that this was an ECOWAS programme and
10:12:21 5 that whatever happened in Sierra Leone would be the success of
6 ECOWAS through ECOMOG.

7 Q. "Interestingly, the Americans and the British have depended
8 only on the unsubstantiated accounts of Sierra Leonean government
9 officials, especially her finance minister James Jonah, a
10:12:43 10 well-connected veteran of the United Nations system who
11 meticulously uses his connections in the world body to scapegoat
12 Liberia by deliberately ignoring the irrefutable evidence of
13 American and British complicity calculated to destabilise Sierra
14 Leone by the use of private firms and individuals."

10:13:07 15 Let's unpack that paragraph, please. Why is James Jonah
16 being targeted in this way?

17 A. You know, I happen to know James Jonah very well. James
18 Jonah served for a long time as Undersecretary-General of the
19 United Nations, and then he comes back to Sierra Leone and he is
10:13:29 20 just - and he becomes what, finance minister. So you know what
21 James Jonah - I met James Jonah so many times. I know him very
22 well even before he came to Sierra Leone while he was still
23 Undersecretary-General of the United Nations. So he just - he
24 was not someone that was constructive. And if you go back to the
10:13:56 25 Okelo report - and who is Okelo? Remember that Okelo, Mr Okelo,
26 the special representative of the Secretary-General assigned in
27 Sierra Leone at that time was the individual, if I remind the
28 Court, that wrote the first letter, a very good friend of Jonah,
29 told the Security Council - telling them what? That most of the

1 individuals that were involved in Sierra Leone after the
2 intervention that were caught, arrested, or killed, were
3 Liberians.

4 So James Jonah, Okelo are then working together on
10:14:39 5 something that probably Jonah doesn't know, because Jonah is not
6 in Sierra Leone at the time to know who these Liberians are - or,
7 may I say, were - neither can I say Okelo probably knew properly,
8 but they have planted this first major seed of trouble. And
9 that's why James Jonah is dealt with here, and he is very well
10:15:03 10 known in UN circles and he knows his way around the United
11 Nations circles. And so when we come down to private firms, what
12 are we talking about? We're talking about Sandline. We're
13 talking about other individuals that are involved in Sierra Leone
14 at the time, even though they are in direct violation of Security
10:15:25 15 Council resolutions. So that's what we're talking about here.

16 Q. Which Security Council resolution?

17 A. About an arms embargo on Sierra Leone. But they go ahead
18 and Sandlines - and we get to see later that it's approved by the
19 British government to provide arms. So I'm just trying to
10:15:48 20 explain here that these are deliberate attempts on the part of
21 these people to hide their hands, but try to put somebody else's
22 in front that is not right.

23 Q. Now, let's go over the page, please. Now, we see this
24 subheading, don't we, "Objectives of Document":

10:16:18 25 "Fundamentally the purpose of this document is to carefully
26 provide a detailed account of Liberia's efforts, nationally and
27 internationally, to bring peace to the government and people of
28 Sierra Leone and remove the existing notion that Liberia is
29 providing arms to the AFRC/RUF rebels. Further, the document

1 intends to undermine future efforts by western countries,
2 especially Britain and the United States, aimed at playing one
3 ECOWAS country against the other so that ECOWAS, as a
4 sub-regional economic and political organisation, is
10:16:57 5 substantially diminished in its future capacity to cohesively
6 deal with subsequent political and/or military problem in any
7 member state."

8 Now, we've dealt with that, haven't we?

9 A. Yes, we have.

10:17:12 10 Q. "Also, the document attempts to expose the extent to which
11 international conspiracy of disinformation, lies and deceit,
12 spearheaded by stronger powers, can destroy smaller and weaker
13 countries, even in the face of the lack of material evidence of
14 any kind to prove their allegations against the weaker and
10:17:33 15 smaller nations."

16 Again, we've dealt with that, haven't we?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. "And finally, the document seeks to call the attention of
19 some liberal and reasonable members of the international
10:17:54 20 community to the need to pressure the countries accusing Liberia
21 to go beyond empty, circumstantial and unsubstantiated
22 accusations by providing material evidence in support of their
23 allegations.

24 Who is supplying arms to the AFRC/RUF rebels in Sierra
10:18:21 25 Leone?

26 As far as physical evidence available to the international
27 community is concerned, it is Britain, the former colonial master
28 of Sierra Leone, that is supplying arms to the forces seeking the
29 ouster of the Kabbah government through private British companies

1 and individuals. Using plausible deniability, however, the
2 British government has successfully disassociated itself from any
3 involvement in the shipment of arms to the Sierra Leonean rebels.
4 Specifically involved in the arms trade on behalf of the British
10:19:00 5 government are two British firms owned and operated by retired
6 British military generals who, it is alleged, have strong
7 connections with the British foreign secretary Robin Cook. Sky
8 Air Cargo of London and Occidental Airlines, partly owned by a
9 British pilot, are at the centre of supplying arms to the
10:19:25 10 AFRC/RUF rebels."

11 Let's pause and deal with this. First of all, are you
12 suggesting in that paragraph that British companies were
13 assisting the rebels to oust the Kabbah government?

14 A. Well, in a way, yes. They may not be aware of it, but yes,
10:19:50 15 if they are supplying the arms - and this is based on British
16 government reports, that these companies have supposedly been
17 violating the law. I mean, Britain is too big a country to
18 permit these things to happen right out of Britain so - but the
19 very arms that they're supplying at the time to the AFRC, okay,
10:20:13 20 are the very arms that are being used to fight Kabbah. So in a
21 round about way they may be giving the arms for a different
22 purpose, but it is working against Kabbah.

23 Q. Now, what do you mean by "plausible deniability"?

24 A. Well, that's - plausible deniability deals with another
10:20:38 25 aspect of diplomacy also where you don't have to directly say no.
26 You come up with an account, for example, that would not tie you
27 to the issue. And what Britain is saying, "No, no, no, there may
28 be some things going in, but the British government is not
29 responsible." But Britain is a responsible member of the

1 international community and things flying in and out of Britain,
2 especially with a major firm like Sandlines and others, Britain
3 can hardly say that it cannot trace it.

4 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, where did you get these particular
10:21:27 5 companies from, Sky Air Cargo London and Occidental Airlines?
6 Where did that information come from?

7 A. There are reports published by the British government in
8 dealing with this particular issue and Robin Cook's own
9 involvement done by the British government.

10:21:54 10 Q. "It must be noted that Mr Robin Cook's involvement in arms
11 trade has a history. Last year Robin Cook quickly came to the
12 defence of Sky Air Cargo when that company was implicated in arms
13 trafficking to government forces for the restoration of President
14 Kabbah. Mr Cook has always been the first in the British
10:22:18 15 government to put up defence for private arms dealers to the
16 rebels in Sierra Leone whenever such practice became scandalous
17 and publicly embarrassing.

18 Is Liberia supporting the AFRC/RUF rebels?

19 The Government of Liberia has consistently and
10:22:46 20 categorically denied providing any form of support, military,
21 political, or otherwise, to the AFRC/RUF rebels fighting the
22 government of President Tejan Kabbah. As a matter of fact,
23 Liberia, at many international forums, has repeatedly declared
24 that it recognises the Kabbah administration as the sole
10:23:12 25 legitimate and constitutional political authority of the Republic
26 of Sierra Leone and, as such, would do nothing to thwart and/or
27 overturn the democratic will of the Sierra Leonean people by
28 subverting their choice of government.

29 Additionally, except for colonial boundaries dividing

1 Liberia and Sierra Leone, Liberia has consistently maintained
2 that the people of the two countries are one and identical,
3 politically and culturally. The traditional relationship between
4 Liberians and Sierra Leoneans was so vividly manifested by Sierra
10:23:58 5 Leone's acceptance of thousands of Liberian refugees during the
6 Liberian conflict, reciprocated by Liberia's acceptance of
7 thousands of Sierra Leonean refugees over the past months."

8 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

9 A. That is true.

10:24:16 10 Q. "Have the Americans and British provided any evidence that
11 Liberia supports the AFRC/RUF rebels? The governments of the
12 United States and Britain, despite international pressure
13 demanding material evidence to substantiate their allegations
14 against Liberia, have been unable to back their charges. For the
10:24:47 15 United States and Britain, providing material evidence to prove
16 an allegation has been effectively replaced by misinformation,
17 propaganda and war of words. They are attempting to reinvent the
18 universal wheels of justice by replacing the provision of
19 evidence to back allegations by the use of propaganda and
10:25:21 20 disinformation. They believe that might makes right.

21 Realistically, Liberia is being scapegoated by Britain and
22 America, masking their involvement by using private British firms
23 and secret American military advisers to fuel the war in Sierra
24 Leone."

10:25:35 25 What evidence did you have of secret American military
26 advisers, Mr Taylor?

27 A. When you see a few marines or special ops people, you know
28 that they are on the ground.

29 Q. Now, let's pause for a moment, please, Mr Taylor, and can I

1 invite your attention to exhibit D-27. Do you recall this
2 document, Mr Taylor?

3 A. I can't really - yes. Yes, I do.

4 Q. You remember this?

10:26:56 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. This is a New York Times article dated, note, 13 May 1998.
7 So from the previous year.

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. "A British mercenary force that helped carry out military
10:27:13 10 operations in Sierra Leone this year kept the Clinton
11 administration fully informed of its activities and had its tacit
12 support, the military group and a senior administration official
13 said.

14 The operation was successful from the perspective of
10:27:36 15 Washington and London helping to restore to power an elected
16 President of Sierra Leone, Ahmad Kabbah, who been ousted by a
17 brutal group of army officers in a coup a year earlier.

18 But in accomplishing its mission, the private army,
19 Sandline International, which was paid \$10 million on behalf of
10:27:58 20 Mr Kabbah to arm and train a force to return him to power,
21 reportedly brought in plane loads of assault rifles, mortars and
22 ammunition, more than a 100 tons altogether, all in violation of
23 a United Nations arms embargo on Sierra Leone.

24 In Britain, the disclosure about Sandline which first came
10:28:18 25 to light in March in Africa Confidential, a newsletter here, have
26 become front page news, creating a political maelstrom. Foreign
27 minister, Robin Cook, under attack by the press and the political
28 opposition, has said he will resign if the arms embargo was
29 knowingly violated.

1 On Monday, Prime Minister Tony Blair dismissed the
2 allegations as a lot of hoo-ha and praised the British ambassador
3 in Sierra Leone, Peter Penfold, who reportedly coordinated the
4 Sandline operation, for helping restore the elected President.

10:28:55

5 Today Mr Blair's office released an unprompted letter from
6 Mr Kabbah who said he neither had sought nor was offered arms
7 supported by the British government."

8 Now, given that you're a former President, what does it
9 mean released an "unprompted" letter from Mr Kabbah?

10:29:20

10 A. That's your plausible deniability. You needed - the
11 British needed something from Kabbah to clear them and once it
12 came from Kabbah, they will fall back and say, "Well, you see, we
13 told you. It didn't happen. You see what Kabbah is saying."
14 You asked me about plausible deniability. These are some of the

10:29:46

15 forms that they come in.

16 Q. "Mr Kabbah was restored in March with the help of a
17 Nigerian led African force that ousted the junta. Sandline said
18 it had been asked by Mr Penfold to assist the effort.

10:30:04

19 Last month, the British customs authorities opened an
20 investigation into whether Sandline broke the embargo with the
21 approval of Mr Cook's ministry. In parliament today, Mr Cook
22 vehemently denied that his office had ever received notice that
23 the embargo would be broken. 'I can flatly and firmly make it
24 clear that no papers suggesting the breach of the arms embargo by
25 Sandline or anybody else ever went to my office in March or any
26 time before that', he said.

10:30:24

27 Washington has also sought to play down the affair.

28 In his briefing on Monday, the State Department spokesman,
29 James P Rubin, described Sandline as merely a 'private security

1 firm that protected mining and construction interests in Sierra
2 Leone'.

3 A few Sandline employees remained in Sierra Leone after the
4 coup of last year, and they periodically contacted State
10:30:56 5 Department officials and commented on the situation in Sierra
6 Leone, Mr Rubin said. But we are not aware of - at least I am
7 not aware of - any information provided on possible arms
8 shipments.

9 But Sandline and senior American official tell a different
10:31:16 10 story.

11 In a confidential letter sent to foreign minister Cook on
12 April 24, Sandline's lawyers wrote that Sandline had kept the
13 State Department informed at the highest level. Amongst those
14 briefed, the lawyers said, were the American ambassador in Sierra
10:31:34 15 Leone, John Hirsch, and senior State Department officers. The
16 letter also says the operation which included both personnel and
17 military equipment had the support of the defence department.

18 Speaking on the condition of anonymity, the senior
19 administration official generally confirmed this. 'We were fully
10:31:56 20 aware of what was going on,' he said. He said, 'Washington was
21 pleased that Britain took the lead among western nations in
22 helping oust the junta, and described American support for
23 Sandline's operation as passive, rather than active.'

24 After the coup last May, as the generals turned more brutal
10:32:18 25 and the killing mounted, Washington and other governments were
26 despairing of what to do. The only people willing to do
27 something was Sandline, the official said.

28 As for the State Department's assertion that it knew
29 nothing about the arms shipment, the official said, 'If you

1 believe that, well, I've got some other information to sell you.'

2 In October, when all diplomatic attempts to oust the
3 mutinous generals had failed, the United Nations Security Council
4 imposed an arms embargo on Sierra Leone.

10:32:54 5 Press accounts said weapons for the Sandline operation were
6 purchased in Bulgaria and flown in from the airport at Burgas,
7 Bulgaria.

8 President Kabbah agreed to pay Sandline \$10,000,000 for
9 weapons and training, Sierra Leone's information minister, Julius
10:33:15 10 Spencer, said in Freetown on Monday.

11 Sandline was also awarded diamond concessions in the
12 country.

13 In this regard, Sandline was acting on behalf of a mineral
14 trader, Rakesh Saxena, who underwrote the Sandline operation in
10:33:35 15 Sierra Leone, according to published reports here. The reports
16 include faxes between the head of Sandline, Lieutenant Colonel
17 Tim Spicer and Mr Saxena.

18 Mr Saxena is alleged to have embezzled more than \$10
19 million as an adviser to the Bangkok Bank of Commerce. He fled
10:34:01 20 to Canada where he was arrested and released on \$1 million bail.
21 He is now back in jail, but while on bail, made the arrangements
22 to hire Colonel Spicer according to press accounts in Canada.

23 Sandline was founded in 1995 by Colonel Spicer, a Briton
24 who fought in the Falklands, and was the spokesman for General
10:34:21 25 Michael Rose, the United Nations commander in Bosnia.

26 This is not the first time that Sandline has been at the
27 centre of controversy. Last year the Prime Minister in Papua New
28 Guinea signed a \$36 million contract with Sandline for its
29 services in putting down a rebellion in Bougainville. When news

1 of the hiring of mercenaries became public in Papua New Guinea,
2 rioting broke out, army officers mutinied and the Prime Minister
3 was forced to resign."

4 Now, pausing there, Mr Taylor. Now, there we have an
10:35:03 5 article setting out the activities of that company, Sandline, and
6 appears to be some proof for the suggestions being made about
7 their accusations. And were you aware of this New York Times
8 article?

9 A. I was aware of this article, and I have also seen the
10:35:28 10 letter referred to here that was written by the lawyers for
11 Sandline. I have read that letter and I have copies - I have a
12 copy of that letter that was provided amongst the papers that
13 were included in the investigation of this particular thing. So
14 I have seen more than this, but also the emphatic statement made
10:35:49 15 by the lawyers of Sandline.

16 Q. So when you were making the allegation of United States and
17 British collaboration with Sandline, was there a factual basis
18 for that allegation, Mr Taylor?

19 A. Yes, I would say there is a factual allegation, because
10:36:04 20 when you look at the investigation that they conducted and you
21 look at the lawyers that represented Sandline and the fact that
22 the British government was not able to refute the direct and
23 strong statement made by counsel in this incident, you must know
24 that it's factual. It was tested and it was never overruled. So
10:36:31 25 it is based on that that we made these direct allegations.

26 Q. Now, going back to the other document behind divider 4 -
27 and you recall we were at page 3. Let's go to the penultimate
28 paragraph on that page, please:

29 "Realistically, Liberia is being scapegoated by Britain and

1 America, masking their involvement by using private British firms
2 and secret American military advisers to fuel the war in Sierra
3 Leone. Liberia becomes blameworthy because the new political
4 authority in Monrovia is not dancing to the dictates of
10:37:27 5 Washington and London."

6 What do you mean by that?

7 A. Well, I had been warned that back in what appeared to be
8 Nigeria's own move in the sub-region and backing Sani Abacha in
9 his so-called adventure in Sierra Leone would not yield any good
10:37:51 10 results for me. So I have been warned, and that's what I'm
11 referring to here. I didn't take heed to it, and so I think
12 that's what I'm talking about here.

13 Q. "The British and American desperation was so clearly
14 manifested when they, in a rather ridiculous manner, erroneously
10:38:20 15 accused Liberia of making territorial claims against Sierra
16 Leonean territory."

17 When had that allegation been made?

18 A. That came - it was one of those slingshots. That came out,
19 it had been said that - in fact, they even found someone to talk
10:38:38 20 about it, even - that did not come before this Court, so it's not
21 important. But it was even - I have read statements that have
22 been presented to this Defence by the Prosecution of witnesses
23 that don't really mean much to the Court because they did not
24 come forward of even finding witnesses - and I don't know how
10:38:57 25 they get to find them - that made these kinds of accusations that
26 had been predesigned, that I want to create a Greater Liberia.
27 This is what they said. I wanted to create a Greater Liberia,
28 that certain territories in Sierra Leone I wanted to take back
29 for Liberia. Yes, I had heard that before.

1 Q. "Furthermore intelligence reports from diplomatic quarters
2 speak of a covert plan at foot to destabilise the Government of
3 Guinea and subsequently blame the same on Liberia."

4 Is that true?

10:39:31 5 A. Yes. Long before any problems in Guinea it was being said
6 that Taylor was planning along with some Guinean dissidents to
7 destabilise Guinea. Yes, yes.

8 Q. So at this point in time it was being suggested that you
9 had designs on Sierra Leone and on Guinea?

10:39:55 10 A. Definitely, yes. West Africa. I wanted to dominate West
11 Africa, yes. That was the claim.

12 Q. "Evidently Liberia is a classic victim of a
13 well-coordinated western contrived international conspiracy
14 calculated to internationally and diplomatically isolate and
15 economically stifle the country's national reconstruction
16 programme, hoping that in the final analysis domestic political
17 discontent will ensue which could lead to civil unrest and
18 therefore make the country ungovernable."

19 Were you concerned about that happening, Mr Taylor?

10:40:44 20 A. Yes. Every third world or poor country must be concerned
21 about that. No money coming to the country, economic develop
22 stifled, people are not getting their salaries, they are not
23 getting paid. What's going to happen? The next step will be
24 what? People are going to take to the streets. They're going to
10:41:11 25 start demonstrating. They're going to ruin the country and then
26 the next thing you hear is a failed state. The government has
27 failed. That's how it all starts.

28 Most of these things are prompted by hamstringing the
29 government to the point where the citizens can no longer take the

1 suffering and take to the streets and then they say, well, listen
2 - they come and say, "Look, the best thing we suggest is to step
3 down." That's what they do. This is the typical method that
4 they deploy to destabilise governments.

10:41:49 5 Q. But when we go back to this to complete this paragraph:

6 "The ultimate game plan of the British and the Americans is
7 to install a puppet regime in Liberia that would look after the
8 commercial interests of British and American companies operating
9 in the sub-region should their plan succeed."

10:42:10 10 What are you talking about there, Mr Taylor?

11 A. I am being very tough. My background is in economics, and
12 so by this time we are dealing with some agreements, we are
13 rewriting our laws, we are restructuring our programmes. I'll
14 give you an example. A major American outfit has been operating
10:42:42 15 in Liberia for a number of years. I will still say it's a very
16 good company. I'm referring to the Firestone rubber company that
17 had been operating in Liberia since 1925. That company in 1925
18 did an agreement with the Liberian government for 99 years, 99
19 months, 99 weeks, 99 days, 99 hours, 99 minutes and 99 seconds.

10:43:18 20 I come to office and I say that this is 99 sort of nonsense, and
21 we must renegotiate this agreement and that in fact Firestone
22 have really done nothing for Liberia, and we had renegotiated the
23 agreement to a point where Liberians that had been working for
24 this company would - eventually that Firestone would cede as much
10:43:43 25 as 40 per cent of the country to Liberian ownership.

26 We have a second incident that I was dealing with that gave
27 us a tough time. I was dealing with the Mobil oil company, and
28 documents will be presented in this Court in dealing with that.
29 The Mobil oil company imported jet fuel for Liberia, but Liberia

1 has what we call the Liberian National Petroleum Agency that by
2 law is responsible to import or grant the rights to import all
3 hydrocarbon materials into the country. But Mobil wanted to
4 operate as a company unto itself. I put it a stop to it. In
10:44:44 5 fact, Mobil got closed down until they abide by the laws. We had
6 problems with that. I managed to try to seek the help of a
7 retired United States lieutenant general by the time of General
8 Yerks to talk to state and other American government official
9 officials on that particular matter. We in part got it resolved.
10:45:08 10 Don't forget I mentioned in my evidence, I think last week, my
11 problems that we have with Halliburton where we were also
12 negotiating also tracts with Halliburton. I was just one of
13 those probably new breed of Liberians that I mentioned in my
14 inaugural address that were prepared not to be dictated to and
10:45:35 15 that if it made sense, it would go; if it didn't make sense, it
16 would not go, no matter who said. And this is what I'm referring
17 to.

18 Q. And then you go on then to list practical steps by Liberia
19 to bring peace to Sierra Leone:

10:45:54 20 "In the ECOWAS sub-region, Liberia is the immediate past
21 beneficiary of collective sub-regional initiative politically and
22 military after seven years of brutal civil war. A peace plan
23 brokered by ECOWAS and supported by all parties in the then
24 Liberian crisis used dialogue as the foundation for what later
10:46:13 25 became a politically negotiate settlement of the Liberian
26 problem. Drawing from this experience, Liberia has repeatedly
27 and diplomatically encouraged President Tejan Kabbah to engage
28 the AFRC/RUF rebels in a political dialogue since historically,
29 political problems have been never resolved by military means.

1 In support of Liberia's proposal for dialogue between the
2 Government of Sierra Leone and the AFRC/RUF, the Liberian
3 government proposed, supported, and subsequently participated in
4 at least three regional summits attended by both Presidents
10:46:56 5 Kabbah and Taylor. The first summit was held under the joint
6 auspices of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and ECOWAS Chairman,
7 Nigerian Head of State General Abubakar in Abuja, Nigeria."

8 We dealt with that, didn't we, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Yes, that was in July.

10:47:20 10 Q. Early July 1998?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. "At that summit, both Presidents agreed to work together in
13 finding a politically negotiated solution to the Sierra Leonean
14 problem and signed a joint communique in respect of their
10:47:33 15 collective disposition.

16 Following the Abuja summit, and based on Liberia's urging
17 for the second time, the government of the United States,
18 represented by President Clinton's envoy to Africa, the Reverend
19 Jesse Jackson, convened a second meeting between President Taylor
10:47:58 20 of Liberia and President Kabbah of Sierra Leone in Monrovia."

21 Now remind us, when did that take place?

22 A. That's also around the 26th. That's a little later in
23 July. The 26th.

24 Q. And the 26th?

10:48:13 25 A. Is our Independence celebration.

26 Q. And President Kabbah was present for that?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. "The Monrovia summit was fundamentally intended to achieve
29 two goals: One, to build more confidence between the two

1 Leaders; secondly, to ensure that the focus on resolving the
2 problems in Sierra Leone was not lost in the midst of other
3 sub-regional distractions, as in the case of the Guinea-Bissau
4 crisis. At the Monrovia summit, both Presidents signed another
10:48:48 5 communique reaffirming their respective commitment in bringing
6 peace to Sierra Leone.

7 In continuation of Liberia's efforts towards resolving the
8 problem in Sierra Leone, a third summit was called in Conakry,
9 Guinea, by President Lansana Conte within the framework and
10:49:07 10 spirit of the Mano River Union protocols."

11 Again we dealt with that meeting, didn't we, Mr Taylor?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. In the autumn of 1998?

14 A. That is correct.

10:49:20 15 Q. "At that meeting, President Taylor informed President
16 Kabbah of Liberia's continued disposition to remain actively
17 engaged diplomatically and politically until peace is restored to
18 the brotherly people of Sierra Leone.

19 On the military front, the Liberian border with Sierra
10:49:37 20 Leone was been well fortified so as to prevent any situation
21 where retreating AFRC-RUF rebels could contemplate the use of the
22 Liberian side of the border to launch hit and run military
23 operations in Sierra Leone.

24 Because of this preventive measure, the Liberian side of
10:50:01 25 the border has remained absolutely calm from any military
26 activity."

27 Is that true?

28 A. That is true. Let's look back. If you reflect on the
29 letter that was sent by my ambassador in Guinea as late as August

1 of 1998, you can see that this is a desperate attempt to get in
2 touch. So evidently there is no movement and they are trying to
3 seek a means of really getting in touch. I'm referring to the
4 document of August 1998 sent by my ambassador.

10:50:47 5 Q. "And finally, in an attempt to ensure international
6 verification of Liberian's neutrality in the Sierra Leonean
7 crisis, the Liberian government has invited the United Nations,
8 the OAU and ECOWAS to sent a joint observer mission at the border
9 that would monitor the movement of forces both on the Liberian
10:51:12 10 and Sierra Leonean sides of the border. To this date, such
11 verification team is yet to be put in place."

12 Then you address directly the question:

13 "Are there Liberians fighting in the Sierra Leone war?
14 Unfortunately, yes. There are Liberians fighting on both sides
10:51:38 15 of the military divide; one group on the side of the government,
16 and the other on the side of the AFRC/RUF rebels respectively."

17 Pause there. One side on the part of the government. Who
18 is that?

19 A. When President Kabbah goes into exile, something that has
10:52:09 20 been probably lost in all of this trial, this AFRC junta, we get
21 to find out, is not the entire armed forces of Sierra Leone as
22 the SLA, do you understand? There are some soldiers that remain
23 loyal to President Kabbah, and these are the soldiers referred to
24 in the Sandline document. Do you understand me? It is not the
10:52:36 25 entire SLA that go against Kabbah. There is still a part of that
26 army that remains loyal to Kabbah, okay? Some of them flee to
27 Liberia. They're under the command of ECOMOG, and that's how
28 this whole build-up of training - that training that is referred
29 to in this British document is what? We're talking about those

1 soldiers that remained loyal, okay, and we're talking about the
2 Kamajors. Now --

3 Q. What about the Kamajors?

4 A. Well, these are the Kamajors that are recruited in Liberia
10:53:05 5 that I meet there as of 1997 that are going across the border.
6 Now - so who are these people that are fighting on the part of
7 the government right now? The government - along with these
8 soldiers that remain loyal to Kabbah are some Liberians also, you
9 understand me? That's the Kamajors that now are recruited in
10:53:29 10 Liberia and are being moved from Ricks Institute across the Cape
11 Mount border while others are being flown from Robertsfield into
12 Lungi airport. We've covered that in this trial. These are the
13 ones that are fighting on that side.

14 Then you have the other part of the Sierra Leonean army
10:53:48 15 that - remember, as President Kabbah states in his TRC report
16 when he ordered the chief of defence staff to order these
17 Liberians - these Liberians that do not follow the loyal Kabbah
18 forces end up as a part of the junta. Do you understand me? So
19 these are the people that retreat with the AFRC. So they are
10:54:16 20 fighting on that side, and you have the other Liberians that are
21 fighting from the Sierra Leonean government side that are
22 fighting alongside ECOMOG and are fighting alongside the
23 Kamajors. That's what I'm referring to here.

24 Q. Now, when you talk about "and the other side, on the side
10:54:31 25 of the AFRC/RUF rebels", who are we talking about there?

26 A. That's what is referred to in this Court as the STF, the
27 Special Task Force.

28 Q. "The involvement of mercenary Liberians in Sierra Leone
29 appears to be the only concrete evidence being paraded by Sierra

1 Leone to the international community as constituting proof of
2 Liberia's involvement in the war without explaining how, why,
3 when, and who invited them."

4 Let us pause there. Now, Mr Taylor, how many combatants
10:55:14 5 had there been in the NPFL at its peak?

6 A. I would say as many as 40,000 combatants.

7 Q. What about ULIMO-J?

8 A. ULIMO-J, I would say anywhere between 5,000 to 7,000.

9 Q. ULIMO-K?

10:55:39 10 A. Probably a little higher: 7,000 to 10,000.

11 Q. And LPC?

12 A. Another maybe 3,000 to 5,000.

13 Q. Mr Taylor, adding those together quickly, would you say
14 there was somewhere in the region of 60,000 or so ex-combatants
10:56:08 15 in Liberia by the end of the Liberian civil war?

16 A. Yes, I would say that. I would say that.

17 Q. Now, had the Liberian economy had the capacity to absorb
18 them into meaningful employment?

19 A. No, no, no. We didn't have it, and it could not have
10:56:28 20 worked unless there was some direct and very serious assistance
21 from the international community. It would not work.

22 Q. So help us, Mr Taylor. Explain to this Court how this
23 phenomena of Liberian mercenaries being recruited to fight on all
24 sides in Sierra Leone - what was the economic situation which
10:56:54 25 created that as a possibility?

26 A. Well, on the Sierra Leonean side, for example, they were
27 getting paid. What they did not get paid to do, they probably
28 looted. So from their perspective, there was always an ongoing
29 situation. That's the problem we have with these non-state

1 actors, and it was very dangerous to have that number of
2 ex-combatants just out there doing nothing. So economically I
3 would just say what they could get, why they fought in terms of
4 little payments, and for those that were on the part of the
10:57:38 5 junta, we've seen evidence here that for the little while the
6 junta were in, whatever little money they received, they
7 distributed amongst their people. On the Kabbah side, they got
8 paid and they were well taken care of. As I have mentioned, the
9 exiled government of President Kabbah was very well funded by the
10:58:06 10 British government, and that is documented. And so there was no
11 loss of income, so recruiting non-state actors was very easy
12 because people were looking for means of survival. So it was
13 pretty simple.

14 Q. So were you aware of that situation, Mr Taylor?

10:58:27 15 A. Everybody in West Africa was aware. Even those that are
16 talking about our involvement knew very well. Surely, the
17 British, the Americans, which is a part of their business -
18 intelligence sources knew it. Let's take intelligence. Let's
19 look at factual accounts were there, and everybody knew what was
10:58:51 20 going on. This was what you call an open secret.

21 Q. What could you have done about it to prevent that?

22 A. Absolutely nothing. Absolutely nothing. The people that
23 are involved in this enterprise are not people under my command.
24 These are ULIMO-J, ULIMO-K, former - these are people that fought
10:59:14 25 against me. For some of them, I would guess it could be claimed
26 that it is out of fear, that they were afraid that I would do
27 something to them or the government would arrest them. That's
28 not credible, because those that remained were in senior
29 positions like the Varmuyan Sheriffs of this world and people like

1 those. And so there was nothing credible about what they were
2 saying. But this is something that I had no control over, and I
3 could not have prevented what they were doing. Eventually, we
4 tried to find a way out in working with Tejani Kabbah and ECOWAS
10:59:59 5 in what I do eventually by suggesting amnesty, because they were
6 in violation of our penal code.

7 Q. We'll come to that later. When you're saying at the end of
8 that paragraph "without explaining how, why, when and who," let's
9 deal with how?

11:00:31 10 A. How did they get there? Who took them there? They knew
11 that they went there on their own. They knew that they were
12 there for a purpose, so that's the how. How did these guys get
13 over here? Just looking at how they would have determined: Oh,
14 okay, we know who these guys are, they've been here, and they got
11:00:50 15 here on their own, okay.

16 Q. And the why?

17 A. Well, why would relate to why are they fighting? The why
18 would be who hired them? Is there a reason? They should have
19 known that most of these people had been hired to stay in and do
11:01:13 20 what they were doing.

21 Q. And the when. When had this phenomena started as far as
22 you're aware?

23 A. That when would go all the way back to the Liberian civil
24 war and as far back as the presidency of President Momoh. If
11:01:30 25 they had just investigated that when, they would have seen that
26 Momoh situation that led into Liberians being used to fight the
27 RUF and then Liberians evolving into the two groups: Movement
28 for the Redemption of Muslim, and then the consolidation of those
29 groups into ULIMO. They would have known that that went all the

1 way back to where? What are we talking about? 1991. 1991.

2 They would have known that.

3 Q. "Up to the present, the Government of Sierra Leone has
4 managed to cleverly evade and deliberately avoid any public
11:02:16 5 explanation as to how these mercenary Liberians got involved,
6 why, and who enlisted them into the National Armed Forces of the
7 Republic of Sierra Leone. Absurd as it appears, one wonders if
8 it is normal practice for a sitting government to recruit the
9 nationals of another country into its national security
11:02:46 10 apparatus."

11 Now, let us remind ourselves, Mr Taylor: You are saying
12 these things in 1999, long before President Kabbah gave evidence
13 before the TRC, aren't you?

14 A. That's correct, yes.

11:03:03 15 Q. "During the early days of the RUF incursion into Sierra
16 Leone in 1992, Liberia was already embroiled in a brutal civil
17 war which resulted in massive social dislocation of her citizens
18 into Sierra Leone as refugees. While in Sierra Leone, some of
19 the Liberian refugees organised themselves and formed what later
11:03:28 20 came to be known as ULIMO, one of the factions in the just ended
21 Liberian conflict. It was claimed that these refugees had
22 organised ULIMO as a counterbalance resistance movement to the
23 then NPFL.

24 But as the RUF made significant military advances against
11:03:50 25 government forces in the fields, the constitutional government of
26 President Momoh approved a strategic military engagement plan
27 which, inter alia, envisaged a military partnership between
28 generals of the newly formed ULIMO movement and the Sierra
29 Leonean national army. Operationally, the plan provided for the

1 recruitment and enlistment of some ULIMO generals into the Sierra
2 Leonean armed forces to help prosecute the war against the RUF
3 and, in return, the Momoh administration would give permission to
4 ULIMO for the use of Sierra Leonean territory for training and
11:04:37 5 other military activities into Liberia. Interestingly, all this
6 took place while Sierra Leone was ostensibly, but pretentiously,
7 participating in peacekeeping operations in Liberia within ECOMOG
8 with the view of restoring peace there."

9 What do you mean by that, Mr Taylor?

11:05:02 10 A. Well, there was a Sierra Leonean contingent of ECOMOG based
11 in Liberia during the civil crisis, and it seemed to us that on
12 the one hand, Momoh was there training Liberians that would come
13 and fight in Liberia to perpetuate the war, but on the other
14 hand, he had a Sierra Leonean contingent and amongst the
11:05:30 15 contingent in Liberia, the very Valentine Strasser that overthrew
16 him was a member of the contingent.

17 But let me just point out to the previous paragraph that
18 you went through. For some reason - I have nothing bad to say
19 about Tejan Kabbah in this matter, but I find it a little strange
11:05:50 20 that Tejan Kabbah will say in the truth commission report that up
21 until that day, he did not know that Liberians were being used in
22 Sierra Leone and when we go all the way back to Momoh, we come to
23 Strasser and I think Bio, all the way to him. I find it a little
24 strange - and I don't want to accuse him, but I find it a little
11:06:16 25 strange that he did not know. And if he did not know up until
26 that day, well, he should have known. And so I just want to make
27 that point because, like I said, it was an open secret that
28 Liberians had been operating alongside the Sierra Leonean armed
29 forces for a long time.

1 Q. Let's go over the page then, please:

2 "In the midst of this military pact, President Momoh was
3 overthrown in a military coup by Captain Valentine Strasser, who
4 inherited and gracefully embraced the strategic military
11:07:00 5 engagement plan. Captain Strasser retained the ULIMO-Sierra
6 Leonean army pact and used it for continuous prosecution of the
7 war against the RUF. Captain Strasser, after a few years, also
8 became victim when he was toppled by Maada Bio, who also
9 inherited the situation. And finally, following the election of
11:07:27 10 President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, he also took on the military mess
11 which three of his predecessors created and which ultimately
12 toppled his government and joined forces with the RUF, thereby
13 creating what is now referred to as the AFRC/RUF rebellion.

14 Clearly, Liberians who are fighting in Sierra Leone are
11:07:54 15 there on the account of the Government of Sierra Leone and not on
16 orders of the Liberian government, as is being misleadingly and
17 mischievously floated around the world by the Government of
18 Sierra Leone.

19 The Government of Liberia reaffirms its respect for, and
11:08:21 20 commitment to, respecting all international protocols and
21 conventions to which she is a signatory regarding the conduct of
22 relations between or among sovereign states.

23 The Republic of Liberia recognises the sovereignty of the
24 Republic of Sierra Leone as a member state of the OAU, ECOWAS and
11:08:47 25 the Mano River Union, and the rights of its citizens to self
26 determination.

27 The Liberian government reiterates that it has absolutely
28 no military involvement in supplying arms to the AFRC/RUF rebels
29 fighting the Government of Sierra Leone and has no intention to

1 do so now and in the future.

2 Liberia also calls on Britain and the United States to
3 immediately stop fuelling the war in Sierra Leone through the use
4 of private American and British firms and individuals.

11:09:26 5 As a matter of national sovereignty and integrity, Liberia
6 will not allow herself to be used as the beachhead to macromanage
7 and teleguide the politics and economics of the ECOWAS sub-region
8 in the interest of western multinational corporations.

9 Finally, the Government of Liberia will remain engaged
11:09:52 10 diplomatically and politically in the search for lasting peace in
11 Sierra Leone through dialogue and negotiation as a means of
12 achieving a political settlement of the problem."

13 Now, what are you saying there, Mr Taylor, about
14 "macromanage and teleguide the politics of ECOWAS"? Did you
11:10:24 15 really think that was the objective of the United States and
16 Britain?

17 A. You will be surprised, but I know many across the world
18 listening to this - you'll be surprised at discussions that are
19 held diplomatically. If all of those discussions were to come
11:10:40 20 out, the world would not be at peace. These discussions
21 sometimes are very frank, sometimes they are threatening,
22 indirect threats, they are controlling. If you play ball, you
23 sometimes get what you want. If you don't play ball - and I'm
24 talking about hardball and softball - if you play softball,
11:11:08 25 probably you'll get what you want. If you play hardball, you
26 don't get it. There is a jungle out there dealing with little
27 countries, and maybe that's why I'm here probably. I will talk a
28 lot of it. It's a jungle out there.

29 Look, you're sitting down with some of these big countries

1 and their diplomats, and they come out with very smooth
2 diplomatic words. Look, if somebody says to you, "President
3 Taylor, we realise that you have a lot of problems here. We see
4 a need for a lot that can be done, but we need your cooperation
11:11:43 5 on these lines and I'm afraid if we don't get it, there's very
6 little that we can do. But we want to help." You've already
7 told the man or the woman that "Listen, I can't do this," but
8 he's already told you that "Listen, you will do it or else you're
9 not going to get any help from me." And sometimes it's not in
11:12:03 10 the best interests of your country, but you have to do it or you
11 just don't get it. That's the plain fact out there in dealing
12 with third world and maybe even second world countries. It's a
13 fact of life.

14 So by "micromanaging" we're talking about some of these
11:12:23 15 things people don't - you know, they let you take the - you know,
16 you do the dirty work and, you know, it happens a lot, even in
17 dealing with intelligence. Without getting into specifics,
18 listen, you get a secret piece of information from a major
19 western intelligence source. What little country will tell -
11:12:55 20 will say to a major western intelligence source, "This
21 information is a lie"? You very rarely find that. So you take
22 it and maybe you begin to absorb it. But in the future you may
23 hear that you are being quoted as the source of that information
24 when you are not the source of that information. So the way that
11:13:18 25 this thing goes around in a circle - in diplomatic circles it's
26 very tough. Once this happens, you take a stand and it looks
27 like it is coming from you, but it has been teleguided by
28 somebody else. So you find yourself out front there pronouncing
29 policies that, quite frankly, you disagree with. As simple as

1 that. You disagree with, but you are stuck with it. And so
2 that's the teleguiding I'm talking about, and that's what they do
3 all the time.

11:13:56 4 Q. But Mr Taylor, despite all these protestations, was it the
5 case that the true target was you because of your personal
6 behaviour, rather than Liberia?

7 A. I would agree with that. I think it was me. I came at a
8 time that what they wanted from Liberia, they were not getting.
9 So I was just a pain for them, you know, and I guess that's it.
11:14:22 10 I think it was more me. It was more me than Liberia.

11 Q. Why you?

12 A. Well, I was trained and educated in the United States. I
13 know how to play the ball very well, and I am what I will call a
14 new - I was among the new breed of African leaders that I
11:14:47 15 referred to that were, you know, saying things that had not been
16 said or heard for a long time. And so most of us, you know,
17 we're talking pan-African business and getting trained in Libya
18 during the Cold War and coming down. You are up for real
19 trouble, and that was the whole thing. Then here I am, not one
11:15:11 20 of those uneducated ones, but at least being able to hold my own
21 water, you find difficulties. And I guess you've asked the
22 question here several times, I think, over the past week: Was it
23 wise? Probably it was not wise. Maybe it was prudent. But, you
24 know, for some of us that believe in telling truth to power, they
11:15:33 25 had a lot of that going all the way back with the meeting you
26 asked me about when I met with Madeleine Albright came in in
27 around '95/'96 to talk with us. I have always been one that will
28 stand up, hold my head high, and speak truth to whoever. So I
29 guess this may have been the problem. So I think it was more me

1 than, I think, the country.

2 Q. So what do you say they stood to gain from Liberia?

3 A. What they are gaining right now: The oil now, all the
4 blocks - I think there are some 12, 14 oil blocks that have been
11:16:14 5 given out for virtually nothing. When I said that my great
6 grandchildren will meet the oil before I give it for free to
7 Halliburton, they got the oil. So most of the things that we
8 were restructuring and trying to bring them in line with
9 internationally acceptable regimes are not just there, and I'm
11:16:36 10 not - and I don't want this to be construed that people that are
11 in Liberia right now are not going through the same difficulties.
12 It's a difficult process. I have a lot of - even though Ellen,
13 the present President of Liberia, and I have our differences, but
14 I do think that she's under a lot of pressure too, and I'm sure
11:17:01 15 if she had an opportunity she would talk about pressure. There's
16 a lot of so-called arm twisting out there. So they're getting
17 maybe what they would not have gotten from me under those same
18 conditions.

19 Q. What are these oil blocks that you're talking about?

11:17:16 20 A. My government had done the mapping of our continental
21 shelf, I said before this Court, done by a firm TGS-NOPEC.
22 Liberia, even in a conference in London in dealing with oil, it
23 has been said that Liberia has Kuwait style or type oil deposits.
24 Off the Liberian coast there are major, major deposits that were
11:17:48 25 found, and it was described even in London as Kuwaiti type - I'm
26 talking about the country Kuwait - style oil deposits. And at
27 that time with the map that was shown here, you can see even
28 before my government the type of companies that were dealing out
29 there. We came in and we did the actual survey of the offshore

1 thing, and there are vast, vast reserves of oil and natural gas.
2 And these are some of the things that we also know from the maps
3 that there are vast resources of diamonds, gold, uranium, barite,
4 bauxite that we have. So it's a pretty rich country, just like
11:18:40 5 you will see the Congo and other places that we just did not have
6 the economic means to exploit these resources, but they are
7 there. And that's what we were trying to do, and it will be a
8 problem for a long time, because these resources are capital
9 intensive in terms of exploiting them. And what do I mean?

11:19:14 10 I mean it takes millions and millions to - we are talking
11 about from what was brought before me on the oil, we are talking
12 about 10,000 metres or so water. So you need a lot of very
13 expensive technology. It could cost as much as 300 to 400
14 million dollars or maybe just to drill one major well. So these
11:19:40 15 projects are just so capital intensive that most countries have
16 the resources, but cannot do it. You cannot exploit them because
17 you do not have the means. And so in order to get these
18 multinationals to come in, sometimes you have to really dance to
19 their tunes and these multinationals are also what - interests of
11:20:03 20 major countries. And so this is what I am talking about,
21 counsel.

22 Q. But let me ask you another question regarding this period
23 then, Mr Taylor, because you accepted in an answer a short while
24 ago that you were the target and sought to explain that. So if
11:20:23 25 that's right, why didn't you step down to save Liberia from
26 further pain back in 1999?

27 A. Well, when you look at the desire of an individual to doing
28 something for his people, because one wants to do what's right
29 for his people and he is being pushed to do something less, is

1 that sufficient to step aside and throw up his hands? The whole
2 point of some of us going to great lengths to suffer to educate
3 ourselves - I never had a government scholarship in my life. I
4 worked in factories in the United States in South Boston and
11:21:19 5 other places to educate myself to help my people. I think it
6 would be, to say the least, disingenuous for any African who
7 desires to help his people to throw up his hands and run in the
8 face of some of the people that he sat with in their own
9 institutions. I think it would be in fact cowardly, may I say.
11:21:41 10 So I wouldn't do that.

11 Q. And help us, Mr Taylor, how long before this period,
12 January 1999, was it that you had been elected?

13 A. I was elected in '97, July. So we're talking about a year
14 and a half.

11:21:58 15 Q. A year and a half. Now, can I pause to provide some
16 spellings, your Honours. There was a General Yerks mentioned.
17 Lieutenant General Robert Yerks, Y-E-R-K-S, retired.

18 A. Retired, yes.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Before we move on, could I ask that that
11:22:38 20 document be marked for identification, please, MFI-69. So it's
21 Liberia's response to allegations of her involvement in the
22 Sierra Leone civil war, published London, United Kingdom, 26
23 January 1999.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked for
11:23:05 25 identification MFI-69.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, one of the themes running through that
28 document which we've just looked at is the issue of evidentiary
29 proof, yes?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Now, you mentioned to us that you had spoken to the United
3 Nations Secretary-General's special representative in Liberia
4 about that, yes?

11:23:34 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Just what did you say to him?

7 A. I think he probably got fed up with my frustration. I
8 mean, it beat me and my whole government. I kept saying to him,
9 for God's sake, will the United Nations itself - okay, maybe they
11:23:59 10 do not want to give me this information. Will the United States
11 or will Britain give the information to the United States? Let
12 them give it to them, let us see it. We want to see what these
13 people are talking about. Even they could not get it, and he
14 eventually asked for such information and - in the report that he
11:24:26 15 did, but even the UN could not get this information. Even the
16 UN. Until if it's available today - this is a Chapter 6 court.
17 If it's available, I think the UN - that would be exculpatory -
18 they should bring it. We want to see it. Until today I have not
19 seen it.

11:24:46 20 Q. Which report are you talking about in relation to the
21 special representative?

22 A. Following this document in London that we sent, we sent the
23 minister to Britain inside London to the Foreign Office. The
24 special representative to the Secretary-General did a report
11:25:10 25 again late - very late in January detailing some of the
26 frustration of the United Nations system about this particular
27 issue, of which the government was given a copy of and I kept it
28 in my archives, and the government has copies back there in
29 Monrovia.

1 Q. And what did they report deal with, Mr Taylor?

2 A. It dealt with all the questions and the issues raised by
3 the Government of Liberia, and some of the major things we were
4 asking for was evidentiary proof and apparently that was not
11:25:42 5 there, and so he also, in questioning it, raised the issue of the
6 absence of such evidence.

7 Q. And he did that in this report, did he?

8 A. That is correct. He did.

9 Q. Now, I wonder if the witness could be shown, please, the
11:26:01 10 document behind divider 5 in that same volume. So it's the next
11 document in the folder. Is this the document you're talking
12 about, Mr Taylor?

13 A. Yes, 30 January. Yes, this is it, yes.

14 Q. Now, we see that this is an outgoing code cable from
11:26:53 15 Downes-Thomas, representative of the Secretary-General, Monrovia,
16 dated 30 January 1999. So let us just remind ourselves. This
17 then is four days after the statement made we've just looked at
18 in London, yes?

19 A. That is correct.

11:27:13 20 Q. Now you see it's headed "Reported withdrawal of ECOMOG
21 troops from Liberia"?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now let's just go back. There had been discussions about
24 when ECOMOG would withdraw from Liberia going back for a period
11:27:47 25 of time, hadn't there?

26 A. Yes, there had been.

27 Q. And when was the projected date for their withdrawal as a
28 peacekeeping force and transformation into a capacity building
29 force, which we looked at earlier? When was the date scheduled

1 for that?

2 A. Well, it was more of an open situation where eventually the
3 final withdrawal would have been at the point of the destruction
4 of the arms, but we can see here it is pushed a little forward by
11:28:19 5 virtue of this Sierra Leonean - the 6 January situation. So it
6 is pushed forward.

7 Q. I hear the buzzer, Mr Taylor, so I anticipate we're not
8 going to have time to get into the meat of this. Would be that
9 be a convenient point, Mr President?

11:28:35 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, you've actually got about two
11 minutes, if you can do anything with that. Otherwise we will
12 adjourn now.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: I think it would be easier if we adjourned
14 now.

11:28:45 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. We will take the morning
16 adjournment and resume at 12 o'clock.

17 [Break taken at 11.28 a.m.]

18 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths.

12:02:11 20 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please, your Honours:

21 Q. Mr Taylor, before we adjourned I had just invited your
22 attention to a document behind divider 5 dated 30 January 1999,
23 do you recall that?

24 A. Yes, I do.

12:02:30 25 Q. Now this is a document, as we see, headed "Reported
26 withdrawal of ECOMOG troops from Liberia", do you see that?

27 A. Yes, I do.

28 Q. And we see that it's a response to a request for the
29 writer's comments on a news article dated 15 January 1999 on the

1 withdrawal of ECOMOG contingent for Monrovia, yes?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. As well as his views on the implications of that move on
4 the security situation in Liberia and on the ECOWAS-Liberia

12:03:22 5 relationship. And the writer is also responding to a request for
6 his analysis of the impacts of developments in Sierra Leone on
7 Liberia and on relations between the two countries, yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Now, let's go first of all to paragraph 2, please:

12:03:48 10 "Apart from the fact that the PANA article includes
11 observations by the foreign minister of Nigeria, following his
12 meeting with special representative of the Secretary-General,
13 Okelo" - he is the Secretary-General's special representative in
14 Sierra Leone, that's right, isn't it, Mr Taylor?

12:04:09 15 A. That's right.

16 Q. "It is basically a journalistic precis of the attached
17 statement issued by the Nigerian minister of foreign affairs.
18 The allegations against Liberia that are contained in both the
19 statement and the article have been echoed consistently in other
12:04:26 20 quarters and notably by the ECOWAS ministerial meeting that was
21 held in Abidjan on 28 December 1998."

22 Pause there. Did you attend that meeting, Mr Taylor?

23 A. No, no, this is the foreign ministers meeting and this is
24 the reference to we know the General Shelpidi.

12:04:46 25 Q. Yes. So that's when General Shelpidi makes those
26 allegations at that meeting, yes, which we looked at?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. "The recent frequency of these allegations combined with
29 the apparent confidence with which they have been made would tend

1 to suggest that they are based on material evidence."

2 Then this:

3 "Such evidence, however, is not known or available to UNOL.
4 It is worth noting that those who make these allegations publicly
12:05:21 5 have yet to provide their supporting evidence or justifications
6 publicly."

7 Do you see that, Mr Taylor?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, this is a sentiment being expressed in
12:05:36 10 January 1999. Since that time, have you seen any supporting
11 evidence or justification publicly made?

12 A. I have not seen any. But may I just suggest something,
13 counsel, to the top of this. We've been seeing this Prendergast,
14 Prendergast and maybe we could help the Court in saying who
12:06:01 15 Prendergast is.

16 Q. Who is Prendergast?

17 A. Prendergast is the Undersecretary-General of the
18 United Nations for political affairs.

19 Q. And whilst we are on that, the issue of names and
12:06:17 20 nomenclature, what does PANA stand for, what is PANA, P-A-N-A?

21 A. That's the Pan-African News Agency, PANA.

22 Q. Yes:

23 "It is worth noting that those who make these allegations
24 publicly have yet to provide their supporting evidence or
12:06:41 25 justifications publicly. This is apparent reluctance to furnish
26 incontrovertible evidence of Liberian complicity promises to remain
27 the enigmatic element in this saga of allegations and
28 corresponding denials regarding Liberia's involvement in the
29 Sierra Leonean crisis.

1 In the meantime, the picture of purported RUF supporters is
2 becoming crowded, if not unclear. From various reports on the
3 situation in Sierra Leone, indications are that Burkina Faso,
4 Cote d'Ivoire and Mauritania are in some way linked with the
12:07:32 5 RUF's current operations."

6 Let's pause again. Now, Mr Taylor, were you aware of these
7 allegations being made against other countries in the region?

8 A. Yes, I was aware.

9 Q. So not just Liberia then, but also Burkina Faso,
12:07:52 10 Cote d'Ivoire and Mauritania were said to be implicated. Is that
11 right?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. But out of all the named potential culprits, who was
14 supposed to be the main contender?

12:08:09 15 A. Well, of course, there were two really main contenders at
16 that time, Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire, but it ended up with
17 Liberia alone.

18 Q. Now, we --

19 A. I mean, excuse me, I misspoke. Liberia and Burkina Faso.

12:08:27 20 Q. "Ukrainians, Yugoslavs, Israelis and ICRC" - what's that,
21 Mr Taylor?

22 A. The ICRC that I know of in this form would be the
23 International Committee of the Red Cross.

24 Q. "... have also been reported to be actively supporting the
12:08:50 25 RUF."

26 Now, you recall we looked at a document last week which
27 spoke of white men working with the rebels?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. "Most recently, Sierra Leonean civilians in Freetown have

1 been included in the pro RUF list. According to ECOMOG
2 spokesman, Colonel Okukolade, civilians in Freetown are activity
3 collaborating with insurgents. If allegations about Liberian
4 supply of fighters and war material to RUF are true, then one
12:09:30 5 must conclude that either such supply anti-date the recent events
6 in Sierra Leone, or that the joint ECOMOG-Liberia monitoring of
7 the closed Liberia-Sierra Leone border has been thoroughly
8 ineffective."

9 Let's pause and look at that. "If allegations about
12:09:59 10 Liberian supply of fighters and war material to RUF are true",
11 pausing there. Those are two of the allegations which you were
12 seeking to meet in that statement in London.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And the writer here is saying, "Then one must conclude
12:10:19 15 either that such supply anti date the recent events", that is,
16 that there was such a supply going on from before the Freetown
17 invasion?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we have been at pains to go through all
12:10:40 20 those years from 1992 up until the end of 1998, yes?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. Now, during that period, which anti dates the events in
23 Freetown, did you have that kind of relationship with the RUF?

24 A. Not that kind, no.

12:11:02 25 Q. And then the writer suggests there is one other
26 alternative, and that alternative is that the joint
27 ECOMOG-Liberian monitoring of the closed Liberia-Sierra Leone
28 border had been thoroughly ineffective. What do you say about
29 that?

1 A. Well, I - to a degree ineffective, but it's a very
2 complicated subject. But I would say to a great extent
3 "ineffective" could probably be something I can live with.

4 Q. Why ineffective?

12:11:43 5 A. They were there, and there was cooperation between whoever
6 little securities that we had in ECOMOG and so if arms are going
7 through and they are not interdicting these arm, neither are they
8 reporting that they are seeing arms, either way, they are
9 ineffective. On the firsthand, if arms are going in, they should
12:12:10 10 be able to report faithfully that there are arms, and they are
11 supposed to arrest those arms or stop them.

12 Now, if that is not the case, then either way you look at
13 it they could be ineffective. Even in terms of reporting or
14 interdicting, either way they are ineffective.

12:12:30 15 Q. You recall the joint report which you mentioned in your
16 speech in late December about small quantities going over the
17 border.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Yes?

12:12:44 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. How effectively could such a trickle, as you described it
22 this morning, be indicted by the ECOMOG-Liberia monitors on the
23 border?

24 A. It would be a little difficult. Quite frankly, it would be
12:13:03 25 a little difficult because of the trickle. I mean, if a guy had
26 arms buried someplace and went and dug it up and decided to slip
27 across the border in some shape or form, it's very difficult.
28 But, again, by that first question ineffective, even the
29 information given to Dempsey - Colonel Dempsey, the

1 United Nations and all of them, for them to conclude that there
2 were trickles going across the border that it was not official,
3 they could have prevented this long delay and these accusations
4 if ECOMOG had been reporting that, "Look, we are observing little
12:13:45 5 things going on here, but they are not from the government and we
6 haven't been able to lay our hands on it." So in a way they were
7 not effective by the mere fact that that they did not report it
8 at the time, but they could have given such information to this
9 UN-Liberia-US investigation.

12:14:06 10 Q. Now, this report continues:

11 "As a generalisation" - and he is talking now about, the
12 writer, about the implication of ECOMOG's withdrawal on the
13 security situation in Liberia.

14 "As a generalisation, it is fairly accurate to state that
12:14:27 15 in the wake of ECOMOG's withdrawal, the Liberian population
16 harbours concerns regarding the conduct of Liberian security
17 agents. There are Liberians who hold the view that in the
18 absence of ECOMOG, Liberian security agents may become menacingly
19 unruly."

12:14:48 20 Is that a fair assessment, Mr Taylor?

21 A. Yes. Yes.

22 Q. Do you accept this?

23 A. Yes. The people in that region are ULIMO people, and so
24 they could become unruly, yes.

12:15:00 25 Q. No, no. They are talking about Liberian security agents.

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Becoming menacingly unruly.

28 A. Yes, that's what I am talking about.

29 Q. So security, that's state security agents, isn't it?

1 A. Yes, but there are ULIMO people now, that are - remember
2 now the date we are talking about. Remember the date we are
3 talking about.

4 Q. Mr Taylor, let's have a look at the paragraph.

12:15:25 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. "There are Liberians who hold the view that in the absence
7 of ECOMOG, Liberian security agents may become menacingly
8 unruly."

9 So what the writer is suggesting is once ECOMOG pulls out,
12:15:44 10 your security agents might become menacingly unruly and I'm
11 asking you is that a fair assessment?

12 A. That's what I am saying, yeah. That is fair now. Now, I
13 am trying to describe who some of these security agents are, see?

14 Q. Okay. Go ahead then.

12:16:09 15 A. Who are some of these people we are talking about?
16 Remember, I have said that some of the very people in this
17 particular region - that is in the Lofa region, okay - are what?
18 Are remnants of what? Of ULIMO that are still - that's their
19 whole area. So it's a little lawless up there, okay, and so they
12:16:30 20 could become unruly from time to time.

21 Q. But then it goes on:

22 "They are particularly apprehensive about the overall
23 conduct of members of the Special Security Service, whose modus
24 operandi account for quite a number of human rights violations."

12:16:53 25 Let's pause. The Special Security Services was an arm of
26 your government, wasn't it?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. Its director was Benjamin Yeaten, isn't it?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. And what is being suggested here is that the people of
2 Liberia, the civilian population, were apprehensive about that
3 group headed by Benjamin Yeaten, who were also responsible for
4 human rights violations.

12:17:25 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. So what do you say about that?

7 A. Well, I am saying that they are right about that. Let's
8 get a good picture now of the SSS and let's see who are the SSS.
9 So this is a fair statement.

12:17:44 10 Let's not forget, the Special Security Service is built
11 around all of the warring factions that come into Monrovia in
12 1995; you understand me? If one wonders how did General Varmuyan
13 Sheriff become an assistant director, it is not because of any
14 special secret service training that he had gone to the
12:18:17 15 United States or come to Britain or travelled to do. This
16 particular unit is infested with those that were brought in by
17 the various warring factions - you understand me - and they
18 remained in the service.

19 We have not yet totally cleaned up the SSS, okay, to really
12:18:43 20 retrain them. And we get to see further on, we bring in people
21 and we retrain the SSS and we weed out the bad people. So in the
22 secret service - in the SSS you have ULIMO-J, you have ULIMO-K,
23 you have LPC, you have NPFL; they all form part of this SS. When
24 Varmuyan Sheriff came, he did not come alone. He didn't come
12:19:11 25 alone. There were several hundreds of the ULIMO people that were
26 brought in and left in the service, and some of them, when I
27 become elected as President, instead of keeping them around me,
28 they are pushed out into the counties, into the regions, because
29 I want them far from me and I still don't trust them. Some of

12:19:43 1 them go back to Lofa; some of them go back to Cape Mount. By
2 these I'm talking about counties near the border. So that's why
3 I am saying that this is a fair statement, because the SSS by
4 this time, regardless of who is commanding it, is still infested
5 with ex-combatants that eventually we have to weed out and train.
6 So this is a pretty fair statement.

7 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you have been in office, by the time this
8 observation is being made, for some year and a half. Why hadn't
9 you done something about it?

12:20:00 10 A. It involves - they have kept me very busy in the first
11 place. I am busy trying to prevent war and other things, so
12 trying to begin to weed out - I guess the question could be asked
13 why don't we have an armed forces yet? Because we still - it
14 takes money, funding, to get into this, okay. But that process
15 eventually comes. I don't own have a day straight in my life
16 from that time. I mean, a year and a half in terms of
17 presidential politics, that's short time - very short time.

12:20:21 18 Q. "A sense of insecurity is also felt within certain sections
19 of the international community and definitely by NGOs and by some
12:20:43 20 members of ex patriot population in Liberia.

21 ECOMOG had deployed its personnel primarily in Monrovia,
22 and in that connection more visibly at checkpoints in and along
23 roadways leading to Monrovia. Liberian security officers have
24 successfully taken over the manning of these checkpoints;
12:21:10 25 however, concerns have been raised regarding the ability of
26 government forces to contain organised violence anywhere in the
27 country."

28 I want to pause there. Now, first the writer acknowledges
29 ECOMOG having set up checkpoints in and along roadways leading to

1 Monrovia. Is that true, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So - and in terms of roadways, what are we talking about
4 there?

12:21:50 5 A. Major, major intersections, major highways in and out of
6 Monrovia.

7 Q. As a consequence of that, at this time would it be possible
8 to take a consignment of arms from White Flower to Sierra Leone
9 without ECOMOG being aware of it?

12:22:14 10 A. No, that would not be possible.

11 Q. Why?

12 A. Because ECOMOG is on these roadways and they are still a
13 wart part of the security apparatus, so they would know. They
14 would know.

12:22:26 15 Q. But note, the writer goes on to observe:

16 "Liberian security officers have successfully taken over
17 the manning of these checkpoints", which appears to suggest that
18 by this time in 1999, it's not ECOMOG, but your security forces
19 were manning these security checkpoints, do you see?

12:22:50 20 A. Oh, yes, I do.

21 Q. Now, had you given orders to your security officers at such
22 checkpoints, Mr Taylor, to allow through shipments of arms to
23 Sierra Leone?

24 A. No, but also I do not think - I do not think the writer is
12:23:08 25 suggesting the total absence of ECOMOG from these checkpoints. I
26 don't read it that way. Maybe my understanding is a little
27 different.

28 I see our security people are there. In terms of military
29 pullout, you don't abruptly pack up and go. Okay. So where you

1 may have the majority, where Liberia - let's say Liberia takes
2 over an area, I can give you a typical example of what is
3 happening right now in Iraq. Don't let's forget, the
4 United States has officially - the United States army has
12:23:47 5 officially withdrawn from their positions in and around Iraq. It
6 doesn't mean that they are out of Iraq. They are still there,
7 but they have announced that Iraqi government has taken over.
8 Yes, they are not involved in the front end, but these
9 operational details are not as simple as we may want to describe
12:24:07 10 here.

11 What he is saying here, the Liberian government forces are
12 taking over the checkpoints, but don't forget now this is the
13 movement. ECOMOG has not fully withdrawn yet, but the process of
14 the operational details mean that, yes, the forces are there, but
12:24:25 15 there is still that ongoing arrangement, contacts with them.
16 Just as you have in Iraq right now.

17 If there is a major operation in Iraq right now where Iraqi
18 forces cannot handle, they have the capacity to do what? To ask
19 the United States and they would then act. So we are talking
12:24:44 20 about really operational details on the ground. That's what he
21 may be trying to explain here. I think it's important for the
22 Court to understand.

23 Q. Now, moving on:

24 "However, concerns had been raised regarding the ability of
12:25:01 25 government forces to contain organised violence anywhere in the
26 country. The Camp Johnson Road area, once a volatile section of
27 Monrovia, has remained calm since the incidents of 18th and 19th
28 September 1998. Also, there is a generally shared view among
29 Liberians that organised armed robbery, and other forms of

1 similar criminal activity prevalent at an alarmingly high rate
2 during the latter half of 1997 have been contained and reduced
3 very significantly by the efforts of the government."

4 Is that true?

12:25:44 5 A. Oh, that is true. Yes.

6 Q. And how had that been brought about?

7 A. Well, we were very vigilant. I tell you there is an old
8 saying that we use in Africa, when you get to a village and you
9 have something important to keep and the question is, are you
10 going to have it at the time you are going to leave the village.
11 The first thing you look for is the best known thief in the
12 village and you give him that thing to keep and when you get
13 ready to leave, you will have it because the thief has it
14 already. So he has an obligation to keeping it.

12:26:30 15 So what we did, this is why I just explained in another way
16 round, the very SSS council that you are talking about here like
17 I said contained what, ULIMO-J, ULIMO-K, LPC, it's the same
18 operation we're talking about here. The very security forces
19 that we are talking about here comprise those elements of the
12:26:54 20 factions that we selected. You understand me? So they are
21 securing themselves, okay. Because in the LPC area, you have top
22 commanders of LPC that were in those areas assigned there to make
23 sure there is stability. So anything that's going on in that
24 area, the LPC people would know. The same thing happened in the
12:27:22 25 Lofa area with the ULIMO people.

26 So what we did in effect was to use the combatants, as many
27 was we could use, as security forces. So what you had was that
28 the LPC people during the war knew who were the bad ones, the bad
29 apples, so they could weed them out immediately. The NPFL knew

1 the bad apples, we could weed them out too. So we just did the
2 typical African thing. We gave all baggages that we brought to
3 the thief in the village and told him to keep it for us and
4 that's what happened.

12:27:52 5 Q. "Until now, the transition from ECOMOG provided security to
6 security provided by the Government of Liberia has been
7 uneventful and smooth."

8 Is that true?

9 A. That is true.

12:28:10 10 Q. Now, pausing for a minute, Mr Taylor, just to deal with
11 what you've been saying about the SSS. Are you saying you
12 weren't entirely in control of them?

13 A. No, no, no, no, no. No, I wouldn't say that. If we go
14 realistically, nobody is entirely in control of anything really.

12:28:32 15 If someone wants to do something bad, he will or she will do
16 something bad. What I am trying to say here is that in terms of
17 trying to explain some of the unfortunate things, one can say the
18 level of training at the time and those that were involved in the
19 system in trying to bring about this national reconciliation, we
12:28:55 20 brought good apples, bad apples all into the system. Then we
21 went into the process of trying to weed them out through training
22 and all that kind of stuff. But I am not of the type to not
23 assume responsibility. I would say that we must assume
24 responsibility for them.

12:29:13 25 Q. Are you saying, Mr Taylor, that there may have been
26 elements within the SSS which at this time were acting
27 autonomously?

28 A. Oh definitely. Definitely. Definitely. From the most
29 senior on down, yes.

1 Q. And what do you mean?

2 A. I mean there were things, whether it was Benjamin Yeaten or
3 anybody else, there were things that were going on there. I am
4 busy dealing with diplomatic and political matters. So officers
12:29:42 5 were doing things. I mean, for example --

6 Q. What kind of things?

7 A. Well, we have an example right from the letter. Let's look
8 at the letter written by my ambassador to Conakry who tells me
9 about these RUF people that want to come in and talks about their
12:30:02 10 contact in Monrovia being Varmuyan Sherif. Now God's know I
11 didn't know that that Varmuyan Sherif had contact with the RUF.
12 And so my question will be what did that contact entail? Okay.

13 We know that there are previous contact during the time
14 that ULIMO is on the border, but I don't know the extent of
12:30:23 15 Varmuyan Sherif - and I was shocked to even know that Varmuyan
16 Sherif had had some contacts. So this shows you that a lot of
17 these things, people that joined us, senior generals on that
18 border and others, were still doing things that were quite
19 frankly not with our knowledge, but we had no real control over.

12:30:43 20 Q. So, Mr Taylor, just to pause and examine that in a little
21 more depth, you recall Mr Sherif giving evidence about
22 transporting arms to Sierra Leone, don't you?

23 A. Well, that is correct.

24 Q. Are you saying he is lying about that?

12:31:03 25 A. No, no. I'm not saying that Mr Sherif is lying. And quite
26 frankly, Sherif said he transported arms, I probably believe him.
27 What I am saying is that his actions of transporting arms into
28 Sierra Leone in whatever little quantities based on his
29 explanation were his own programme and without my knowledge

1 and/or consent.

2 That's what I mean by some of these guys could do things
3 without the knowledge and consent, just as he had this contact
4 that I knew nothing about. And Sherif being a senior general
12:31:40 5 with ULIMO that dealt with the RUF at that time still had the
6 ULIMO - your Honours, we did not withdraw all of these combatants
7 from their previous areas that they controlled. So take for
8 example Lofa, I am President but most of the security people in
9 that area are the former ULIMO people. They are there. They are
12:32:09 10 former generals, they still respect. Yes, they are respecting of
11 authorities, but on the ground there I would have never been able
12 to control Lofa as an example unless the former senior people
13 that commanded in that region were on the ground.

14 So for me it's easy for Sherif to move materials across the
12:32:28 15 border. Very easy, okay, just as I did not know that he had this
16 contact and again - and nobody would report it because the people
17 in the area are still now - they no longer carry the name ULIMO,
18 they are now all Government of Liberia but they are still doing
19 their little things in that area, yeah.

12:32:53 20 Q. So did you know about such activities?

21 A. No. That's what I am saying. I did not know. If I had
22 known, I would have stopped it. In fact they would have been
23 arrested. In fact there was something that Varmuyan did later on
24 that he got arrested for. We would not have tolerated that
12:33:13 25 because that would have constituted, what, destabilising
26 Sierra Leone.

27 Q. Going back to this document:

28 "It would not be surprising, however, if in the prevailing
29 security situation within the sub-region, the Government of

1 Liberia is taking steps that would enable it to defend Liberia
2 against externally perpetrated aggression."

3 What is being suggested there, Mr Taylor?

4 A. The cry that we have been making about people were planning
12:33:52 5 to - from Sierra Leone and other places to attack Liberia.

6 Q. Let's look at the sentence carefully, shall we. "Taking
7 steps that would enable it to defend Liberia". Now, pausing
8 there, did you consider that Liberia had the right to
9 self-defence?

12:34:18 10 A. Of course. All nations have that, yes.

11 Q. And did you regard it as your duty and obligation as the
12 leader of that sovereign republic to take steps to protect your
13 country?

14 A. Definitely.

12:34:38 15 Q. Now, let's look again at what the writer is suggesting:
16 "It would not be surprising if the Government of Liberia is
17 taking steps that would enable it to defend Liberia against
18 externally perpetrated aggression."

19 At this time, Mr Taylor, were you taking such steps?

12:35:01 20 A. Yes. We are holding discussions with UN and other
21 diplomatic sources in Monrovia about making possible certain arms
22 that are being held by the international community, making
23 certain useful arms available. These discussions are ongoing and
24 I'm sure this is the reference that he may be making. In fact,
12:35:35 25 subsequently I write a letter to the Secretary-General and there
26 are a lot of exchanges dealing with this matter.

27 Q. "In this connection it is probably useful to note that
28 there is currently a new case load of 13,000 refugees camped in
29 Guiglo, Cote d'Ivoire. This refugee population is reported to be

1 composed basically of Liberians from the Krahn ethnic group. It
2 also includes hundreds of Krahn military personnel who were
3 previously with the Armed Forces of Liberia. There are,
4 therefore, certain uncomfortable similarities between this
12:36:21 5 situation and that of the Rwanda Mudende Camp."

6 Pause again. First of all, Mr Taylor, were you aware that
7 there was this substantial group of refugees in the
8 Cote d'Ivoire?

9 A. Very much, yes.

12:36:41 10 Q. Did you also appreciate that they were composed basically
11 of Krahns?

12 A. Exactly, yes.

13 Q. Did you also know that many of them had been former members
14 of the Armed Forces of Liberia?

12:36:58 15 A. Yes, I knew.

16 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, such a situation had obtained in the early
17 1990s in Sierra Leone, did it not?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Which eventually led to the creation of ULIMO?

12:37:14 20 A. That is correct, yes.

21 Q. Now, did you have concerns about this group of disaffected
22 Krahns, many of them former military people, in the
23 Cote d'Ivoire?

24 A. Yes, yes, yes.

12:37:29 25 Q. What fears did you have about them?

26 A. That they could be regrouping to come in and launch renewed
27 fighting in Liberia. These were all very trained people. In
28 fact, they had moved - this area Guiglo that is being described
29 here - maybe at some point we will get the map - on the other

1 side, that's the region in La Cote d'Ivoire that have Krahn's. So
2 what they did was to move into an area - and that's right across
3 from - on the map we talk about Grand Gedeh. That's where the
4 late President Samuel Doe is from, Grand Gedeh County. So that's
12:38:20 5 across. Just as the Nimba with the Gios across - having Gios on
6 the other side in Zongway and Bin-Houye where I said I stayed on
7 the Ivorian border, lower, further southeastern moving towards
8 the southeast, on the other side are those individuals that are
9 related to the Krahn's also.

12:38:45 10 Q. Mr Taylor, let us just pause for a minute, please, and
11 remind ourselves. Remember we looked at a plan of ethnic groups
12 in Liberia.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Could we just quickly have another look at that map,
12:39:07 15 please. It's the map of language families in Liberia. You
16 remember that one? It's the fifth map in that bundle.

17 Mr Taylor, whilst that's being found, could you just move
18 seats for a minute.

19 A. Yes.

12:40:23 20 Q. Let's just have a look, first of all, at this ethnic
21 grouping map, yes.

22 A. Uh-huh.

23 Q. Yes?

24 A. Yes.

12:40:34 25 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, just point for our assistance, please, as
26 to the area where the Krahn's are primarily located?

27 A. Right in this - excuse me. They are located here in this
28 area, Grand Gedeh. This whole area.

29 Q. That's the light brown coloured area?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. Okay. Which borders - which shares a lengthy border with
3 the Cote d'Ivoire?

4 A. That is correct.

12:41:13 5 Q. Right. Now, can we have a look at the Prosecution map L-1,
6 please. Put that map away, Mr Taylor.

7 Okay. Now, bearing in mind where you had indicated was the
8 area of Krahn settlement, point out Guiglo for us, please?

9 A. If you are looking at the map, right here is Guiglo. Right
12:41:57 10 here.

11 Q. Right. Now, how far is Guiglo from the
12 Liberian-Cote d'Ivoire border?

13 A. Guiglo here - I would say on a straight line, it would not
14 be more than 25 miles from the border.

12:42:25 15 Q. So, Mr Taylor, putting all of that together - can you go
16 back to your seat now, please.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And I am grateful to everyone for helping me with those
19 maps.

12:42:40 20 Now that we have reminded ourselves of the geography
21 involved, we now know the context in which the writer is here
22 saying that:

23 "There is currently a new caseload of 13,000 refugees
24 camped in Guiglo, Cote d'Ivoire. This refugee population is
12:43:04 25 reported to be composed basically of Liberians from the Krahn
26 ethnic group. It also includes hundreds of Krahn's military
27 personnel who were previously with the armed forces of Liberia.
28 There are, therefore, certain uncomfortable similarities between
29 this situation and that of the Rwanda Mudende Camp.

1 The Government of Liberia is being silent on the specific
2 matter of ECOMOG's withdrawal. The reason for this is probably
3 twofold: (1) any publicly expressed regrets about ECOMOG's
4 withdrawal could conceivably constitute a telling statement on
12:43:49 5 the Government of Liberia's capacity to guarantee security in
6 Liberia; and (2) the Government of Liberia has probably come to
7 terms with the reality that it has to shoulder the concomitant
8 responsibilities of being independent and sovereign.

9 Despite these speculations on my part, one can safely
12:44:12 10 assume that for the Government of Liberia, the withdrawal of
11 ECOMOG is an unwelcomed move since the Government of Liberia
12 itself has formally requested some form of ECOMOG's continued
13 presence in Liberia."

14 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

12:44:33 15 A. Yes, to a great extent. This whole problem is not working
16 out as we anticipated. This new reality in Sierra Leone has
17 visited this prompt action on the part of ECOMOG, and we are
18 not - this is not operating according to plans as we had
19 envisaged at the time.

12:45:05 20 Q. But my question is directed to this particular aspect of
21 this. Was the withdrawal of ECOMOG unwelcomed from your
22 government's point of view?

23 A. I am saying yes, in the way it is being done. Liberia - my
24 government's view was moving away from peacekeeping to capacity
12:45:36 25 building. That's my focus. Now we have an unceremonious total
26 withdrawal because of this issue in Sierra Leone that is visited
27 upon us. So in a way, I am not happy with this way it is being
28 done. That's what I am saying.

29 Q. But did you feel that Liberia was - had the capacity to

1 cope in the absence of ECOMOG?

2 A. No, I never felt that way. I always felt that we needed to
3 build capacity before there is a full withdrawal.

12:46:17

4 Q. "Relatedly, it is worth noting that ECOMOG's sudden
5 withdrawal took place at a time when the Government of Liberia
6 and ECOWAS were expected to conclude protocols that were to
7 define the nature of the envisaged new relationship between the
8 Government of Liberia and ECOMOG."

12:46:38

9 Pausing there. What prompted ECOMOG to suddenly withdraw
10 in that unplanned manner, Mr Taylor?

11 A. The situation in Sierra Leone had --

12 Q. What aspect of the situation in Sierra Leone?

12:46:55

13 A. The war. The constant fighting. What period are we
14 talking about here? Let's watch that period. We are through
15 with what? The intervention. There is constant fighting. We
16 now come to the January situation. There is fighting going on.
17 They need sufficient force. They have gone to other countries
18 trying to recruit additional forces. There is a shortage of
19 available forces in Sierra Leone.

12:47:15

20 Now, so, you know, they have to now ramp up their plans for
21 withdrawal. That's what's going on.

22 Q. So the Freetown invasion had led to many ECOMOG troops
23 being transferred from Liberia to Sierra Leone?

24 A. That's what I am saying to you.

12:47:38

25 Q. And you're saying that you were anxious that ECOMOG not
26 leave so suddenly?

27 A. Well, let's use unceremoniously, yes.

28 Q. Because you appreciated that Liberia didn't have the
29 capacity to act on its own?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. So, Mr Taylor, help us, what would be your motivation to
3 support the Freetown invasion if that was a possible consequence?

4 A. I'll have no motive whatsoever to doing anything. None.

12:48:16 5 Q. Why not? Who stood to lose?

6 A. Liberia and I, as President, stood to lose everything.

7 Everything

8 Q. Did you have anything to gain from supporting the Freetown
9 invasion?

12:48:29 10 A. Absolutely nothing. Absolutely nothing.

11 Q. So one consequence of the Freetown invasion was this
12 unwelcomed departure of ECOMOG from Liberia, was it?

13 A. Oh, definitely. Definitely.

14 Q. "Relationship between ECOWAS and Liberia. The relationship
12:48:54 15 between ECOWAS and Liberia is intricate and complex. Any valid
16 generalization of this relationship must be placed within a
17 certain historical perspective and must take into account the
18 nature of the interactions between Liberia and Nigeria, which is
19 a dominant force within ECOWAS. With regard to the historical
12:49:18 20 perspective, the following succinct observations should suffice:

21 (1) Nigeria led the campaign to organise a peacekeeping
22 mission in Liberia. Under the authority of ECOWAS, Taylor
23 opposed intervention ECOWAS/ECOMOG and vowed to resist it.

24 (2) The NPFL fought to stop ECOMOG from landing in Liberia
12:49:48 25 on the 24th of August 1990. In response to the ECOWAS call for a
26 ceasefire, Taylor countered by proposing an all Liberia
27 conference to be held inside Liberia as a precondition to
28 accepting a ceasefire.

29 (3) Taylor rejected the ECOWAS-supported proposal for a

1 triumvirate, an executive with three Presidents, as unrealistic,
2 and proceeded to establish his own government in Gbarnga.

3 (4) Reportedly, President Babangida of Nigeria, together
4 with President Doe, the man Taylor sought to oust, had mutual
12:50:36 5 commercial interests in Liberia. Together, these Presidents
6 owned the Liberian National Petroleum Company."

7 Is that true?

8 A. I think this writer, being a member of the international
9 community, is best placed. From my vantage point, this was
12:50:59 10 information. I cannot say with any complete factual clarity that
11 I have proof to this. But it was something that I heard about.
12 I think he is best placed to do that.

13 Q. So let's just look at that a little closer, shall we. Who
14 was the President of Nigeria when a decision was made to send a
12:51:28 15 military force composed mainly of Nigerians to Liberia?

16 A. The then President was General Abraham Babangida.

17 Q. And, of course, at the time Samuel Doe was President of
18 Liberia?

19 A. That is correct.

12:51:47 20 Q. And according to this, the man who is sending a force to
21 stop you from taking over the country just happens to be in
22 business with the President of that country: Yes?

23 A. That is correct. And don't forget also that even prior to
24 this force being organised, Babangida and Doe were very good
12:52:11 25 friends. Several things had happened. Doe had even named the
26 graduate school, the University of Liberia - the School of Public
27 Administration had named it in honour of Babangida. It's called
28 the Babangida Graduate School of Public Administration at the
29 university. They were close friends, that I know. Everybody

1 knows, and this is factual.

2 The second thing is that Nigeria had aided the armed forces
3 of Liberia at the time with weapons and other military know-how,
4 so those two things are factual. And, yes, this is the same
12:52:50 5 person now that is coming in to send in these forces as a part of
6 ECOMOG.

7 Q. And:

8 "(5) following ECOMOG's successful establishment of a
9 ceasefire and the Yamoussoukro IV agreement, ECOWAS recognised
12:53:11 10 Sawyer as de jure President of Liberia while Taylor was treated
11 as a rebel leader.

12 The implications of the above listed observations have
13 intermittently reflected themselves in the relationship between
14 the Government of Liberia and ECOWAS."

12:53:33 15 Let us pause again, Mr Taylor. Would you accept,
16 Mr Taylor, that that paragraph appears to suggest an underlying
17 tension between you and the Nigerians?

18 A. Oh, definitely, definitely. If my recollection is correct,
19 I have said to this Court that this issue was brought under
12:53:58 20 control during the administration of President Sani Abacha when I
21 flew to Abuja and met with him and that meeting I have mentioned
22 to this Court really caused the end of the Liberian crisis. But
23 up until now, there was real, real bad blood.

24 Q. We are looking at 1999 now, Mr Taylor?

12:54:23 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. And Sani Abacha had died in June of 1998?

27 A. That's what I am saying, yeah.

28 Q. With his passing, was there still tension between you and
29 the Nigerians?

1 A. No, but if you read this, my understanding, and maybe I am
2 wrong - my understanding of this, this writer is giving a
3 historical perspective of what he understood at the time and
4 that's why we are coming into - coming from Babangida and it ends
12:54:55 5 at this time, even though Abacha is dead, but this is historical.

6 Q. I am asking because of what we go on to in paragraph 9. So
7 let's go there:

8 "The implications of the above listed observations have
9 intermittently reflected themselves in the relationship between
12:55:12 10 the Government of Liberia and ECOWAS.

11 In the context of more recent events, it would appear that,
12 with regard to the ECOWAS-Liberia relationship, all is not well.
13 Nigeria, the most powerful member of ECOWAS, led the onslaught of
14 allegations against Liberia in connection with the situation in
12:55:35 15 Sierra Leone. Ghana, a significantly influential member of
16 ECOWAS, is reported to have viewed Liberia's alleged support to
17 the RUF as 'a stab in the back of ECOWAS'. The ministerial
18 meeting of ECOWAS held in Abidjan on 28 December, roundly
19 denounced Liberia for complicity with the RUF. In this light,
12:56:09 20 Liberia appears as a pariah within ECOWAS."

21 Okay. So let's pause and put that together. You've just
22 told us that the tension between yourself and Nigeria, as far as
23 you are aware, ended with your meeting with Sani Abacha in Abuja,
24 yes?

12:56:34 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. Yet what the writer is here saying is that in 1999 it's
27 that same Nigeria who are leading the barrage of accusations
28 against you that you are the person supporting the RUF. That's
29 what the writer is suggesting, which appears to suggest that

1 there had been a deterioration in your relationship with the
2 Nigerians. Is that true?

3 A. Yes, there was a deterioration. In fact, you can see from
4 the mischief that was carried out by General Shelpidi, and I am
12:57:16 5 calling it a mischief because it is unheard of for a general to
6 get up and make an accusation against a country or its leader
7 without I would say at least the tacit approval of somebody up
8 higher. So there is some whatchamacallit here. I would say some
9 misunderstanding and I can understand Ghana's own view at the
12:57:45 10 time. Don't let's forget now, we have a foreign ministers
11 meeting and charges are being thrown across and this is again -
12 this is nothing unusual about what is going on here. Because
13 even before this meeting ends, before this foreign ministers
14 meeting ends, Liberia is called upon right in the meeting,
12:58:10 15 "Liberia, please, okay, Ivory Coast, please pursue this
16 programme". So he is privy to this information. And I guess in
17 briefing his home office, he is giving what's going on. It's a
18 blow by blow description in that room.

19 But, again, it is still not based on the type of factual
12:58:35 20 evidence you bring into a court of law, because before this
21 meeting is out, you are going to see as we go further, Liberia is
22 charged again with do everything that you can, you three
23 countries go back and do this.

24 So you have to look at this, we are in a court of law, but
12:58:49 25 this also has to be looked at from what is usual in these kinds
26 of things. I mean, there are some of these meetings where, as
27 these accusations come out, they can be very hot. And Ghana is
28 right, if it is true it's a stab in the back. What is Ghana
29 saying? "Well, we have Liberia. If Liberia is doing this, this

1 looks bad". So this is the type of discussion that is going on,
2 and it eventually calms down and we continue and we will see as
3 we go further.

12:59:25 4 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, I'm sorry, I have to press you further on
5 this. Do you remember last week telling us with regard to the
6 head of Liberia's mission at the United Nations being summoned by
7 the President of the Security Council in June of 1998 and
8 accusations being made about Liberia meddling in Sierra Leone, do
9 you remember that?

12:59:50 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Do you remember us going through that in some detail?

12 A. I remember that, yes.

13 Q. And do you remember you telling us that it was the
14 United Nations making the allegations at that time and not
15 ECOWAS? You remember telling us that?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, that's June 1998. According to this
18 writer, by beginning of February 1999 it's your own colleagues in
19 ECOWAS, led by Nigeria, who are making these accusations. Do you
13:00:24 20 see the point I make?

21 A. Well, but, again, I mean I read it differently. Let me
22 tell you how I read it. We have to distinguish between foreign
23 ministers meeting, my foreign minister blasting that the
24 Sierra Leonean - let's go back. Who made these accusations at
13:00:51 25 the foreign ministers meeting? There are two individuals. The
26 foreign minister of Sierra Leone, according to evidence here, and
27 who, General Shelpidi at a foreign ministers meeting. So they
28 are yelling and screaming, my foreign minister yelling and
29 screaming, asking them to bring proof because we have this

1 general mistrust going on.

2 This is not a formal accusation from ECOWAS. It is not.
3 This is not even an accusation from Heads of State and it ends at
4 this foreign ministers meeting. So up until now I can still say
13:01:26 5 ECOWAS has not launched any formal accusation. So that's my
6 reading of this, based on my knowledge of what happened at that
7 time.

8 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Would this be 28 December 1998? Would
9 this be the date?

13:01:54 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Of what, your Honour?

11 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: I am referring to the reference in
12 paragraph 9, to the meeting in Abidjan.

13 THE WITNESS: That is correct.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

13:02:05 15 Q. That's the foreign ministers meeting in Abidjan that we
16 discussed --

17 A. 1998, yes.

18 Q. -- last week?

19 A. That is correct.

13:02:14 20 Q. Over the page, paragraph 10:

21 "This notwithstanding, there have been attempts within the
22 sub-regional groups to enlist Liberia in efforts aimed at finding
23 a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Sierra Leone."

24 Now, we have examined that at length, haven't we,

13:02:34 25 Mr Taylor?

26 A. We have.

27 Q. "To this end, it should be noted that immediately following
28 the formal session of the 28 December meeting in Abidjan, ECOWAS
29 convened a very closed, if not secret session where it was

1 reported that: (a) Liberia, along with Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina
2 Faso, was to play a role in connection with the Foday Sankoh
3 aspect in the Sierra Leone problem and (b) the foreign minister
4 of Cote d'Ivoire expressed suspicion about the intentions behind
13:03:13 5 the fact that the request (a) above was not made during the
6 earlier formal session, but done as it were in camera and because
7 of his suspicions he advised that unless he heard directly from
8 the ECOWAS chairman, he would be unable to undertake the
9 assignment. Subsequently, the ECOWAS chairman made contact with
13:03:34 10 the Ivorian foreign minister which led to the ECOWAS peace
11 initiative on Sierra Leone."

12 Pause there. Mr Taylor, this very closed, if not secret
13 session, were you present at that?

14 A. No. This is still, after this yo-yo-yo-yo, they then met.
13:04:00 15 And you can see the reaction of the foreign minister. And what
16 my foreign minister reported to me was the foreign minister at
17 that particular time of La Cote d'Ivoire is a gentleman called
18 Amara Essy. I think that name has been spelt. So what Amara is
19 saying, "No, no, no, we are not going to get in contact with
13:04:20 20 Foday Sankoh before we be accused as Liberia is being accused
21 right now. After you people told Liberia to go and we have been
22 working on this committee, you are now coming saying that Liberia
23 is helping Sierra Leone. So we are not going to do anything
24 until we hear again from the new chairman of ECOWAS who now is
13:04:41 25 Gnassingbe Eyadema about this problem." So it brings to focus
26 how some of these - in the very meeting after this loud talking
27 and different things, people settled down --

28 Q. What loud talking?

29 A. There is big confusion in this meeting. My foreign

1 minister told me he couldn't sit there and hear Shelpidi accusing
2 us or the Sierra Leonean foreign minister and this meeting almost
3 ends up in pandemonium. After they calm down they come right
4 back to say, "Well, listen, gentlemen, we want you to go and do
13:05:13 5 this work. We think you can do it." La Cote d'Ivoire says, "No,
6 we want a new mandate because you will end up accusing La Cote
7 d'Ivoire as you are accusing Liberia."

8 So I am just trying to give you a picture in these meetings
9 what goes on. You have accusations, counter-accusations. The
13:05:31 10 temperature would go high, sometimes it would come low.
11 Eventually reason would prevail before the meeting is out. And
12 this is what happened.

13 Q. Mr Taylor, this is of some importance so I want to be quite
14 clear of what you are telling us. Immediately following the
13:05:48 15 formal session of the 28 December meeting - that's the meeting
16 that Sebutinde just asked about, is that right? It's the foreign
17 ministers meeting in Abidjan, yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. On that same occasion, after the formal session, there was
13:06:06 20 a secret meeting, yes?

21 A. Closed door. What we call a closed door meeting.

22 Q. Right and at that closed door meeting of foreign ministers
23 on 28 December, one decision made was that Liberia was asked to
24 play a role in connection with the Foday Sankoh/RUF aspect?

13:06:28 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. What role?

27 A. Remember I said that I had practically arranged with my
28 colleagues a ceasefire in January. This role now is to continue
29 to press the RUF to put into place and hold this ceasefire and to

1 come to the negotiation table. That's what we are told to keep
2 the pressure on.

13:07:07 3 Q. So, Mr Taylor, help us. If that's the decision that was
4 made behind closed doors, why was it necessary to make that
5 decision behind closed doors? Can you help us?

6 A. Yes. It happens all over the world, all over, from the UN
7 and other places. And let me tell you something. The foreign
8 minister comes to a meeting, he has a delegation of maybe two,
9 three, four persons. He has a special aid, he has some
10 assistants in the meeting. So you will see at a table at these
11 conferences, the foreign minister or the President would be
12 there, but there are other members of the delegation. Those
13 other members are there. And don't forget in this meeting you
14 have military observers there too. Shelpidi is there, the UN
15 military people. So it's a crowded room. You understand me?

16 But those people that are there, all of them, do not have
17 the constituted responsibility for the decisions that would be
18 made finally. So whenever serious decisions have to be made by
19 foreign ministers, they will go into a closed session and put
13:08:14 20 everybody out of the room just as you do right in this courtroom
21 here. When you have a closed session here, you close the
22 courtroom down and nobody outside can hear what's going on.
23 That's a similar situation. So we close the meeting down. Even
24 Heads of State do it. Sometimes there are some meetings that we
13:08:32 25 are with our foreign ministers and advisers, but when Heads of
26 State want to make decisions they put everybody out and the Heads
27 of State meet and come out with a decision. This is what happens
28 here. After this big room of aides and assistance and everybody,
29 they put everybody out and the foreign ministers present here -

1 and this is the Committee of Six by now - they then sit down and
2 come up with a decision, which is the real decision.

3 Q. And from this the foreign minister of the Cote d'Ivoire
4 was, as it's stated, suspicious of such a decision being made
13:09:17 5 behind closed doors?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Why?

8 A. Because Amara didn't want to take any chances. He is
9 saying, "We have been working hard. Liberia is doing her best.

13:09:24 10 We are very, very close to La Cote d'Ivoire. They are a member
11 of the first Committee of Five." La Cote d'Ivoire, don't forget,
12 had hosted the main agreement between RUF and Tejan Kabbah in
13 November 1996. So La Cote d'Ivoire is a major player.

14 So La Cote d'Ivoire is saying "Well, you came to meeting
13:09:47 15 and these people made all these things and we haven't resolved
16 it. We come in this closed meeting and you are asking the same
17 Liberia, you are asking us to go. We are not going to be a part
18 of this until we get some more official thing from the Heads of
19 State" - by the chairman he is talking about - "level before we
13:10:04 20 fall into the same trap that Liberia is in right now of
21 accusations after accusations." And it had to take the chairman
22 of ECOWAS, who speaks for the authority at the time, to call him
23 and say, "No, it is okay. Go ahead." That's what he is talking
24 about here.

13:10:23 25 Q. "Recent pronouncements by senior Government of Liberia
26 officials indicate that Liberia has now adopted a policy of
27 pacification and conciliation towards Nigeria and ECOWAS."

28 True?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. "In its annual message to the third regular session of the
2 51st Legislature convened in joint session at the Capitol
3 Building on 25 January 1999, President Taylor talked about the
4 responsible and forward looking ECOWAS and in that context
13:11:00 5 informed the audience that 'outside influence in ECOWAS states
6 economic union is becoming destructive to the union.' "

7 That's just a repetition of what we have talked about
8 earlier?

9 A. Uh-huh.

13:11:17 10 Q. "Following positive references to his good friend and
11 brother the late General Sani Abacha, he went on to state that
12 during the latter part of 1998 we directed much of our time
13 fostering good relations and closer ties with the new Head of
14 State of Nigeria, Abdulsalami Abubakar, whom we applaud as a
13:11:39 15 progressive leader. "

16 Is that true?

17 A. Yes, he is a very - he is a decent man. He is a decent
18 man.

19 Q. So why were you directing time and effort to fostering good
13:11:46 20 relations if relations had been good since General Sani Abacha?

21 A. Well, don't forget I just told you that there was some
22 deterioration as we went further down and then Abacha dies and
23 Abdulsalami Abubakar comes in and he is a good man. He is a very
24 understanding individual, even though it is a transitional
13:12:11 25 situation.

26 But Abacha dies. I am one of I think one or two Heads of
27 State that go to Nigeria and meet him, try to counsel him and I
28 find him a very good person because I had not dealt with him on a
29 one on one basis because I think at the time he was chief of

1 defence staff and vice-president. And normally Heads of State it
2 is not - it is out of protocol to be so close to other officials
3 in the government. You want to be close to your colleague. But
4 when he died - when Abacha died - and I met Abdulsalami Abubakar,
13:12:51 5 I found him to be a very good person and a very calm, very
6 understanding man and so we decided to rebuild that deterioration
7 in relationship that had obtained over the months before the
8 death of Abacha.

9 Q. "All subsequent public statements by President Taylor, be
13:13:18 10 they formal or informal gatherings, have to date included
11 positive variations of this pro-Nigeria ECOWAS theme. Similar
12 sentiments were expressed by Foreign Minister Captan at his
13 ministry's annual reception for diplomats where he stated that
14 Liberia would not engage in acts which would threaten or
13:13:42 15 undermine the continued existence of ECOMOG. Clearly there is an
16 expressed determination on the part of the Government of Liberia
17 to ensure that current developments do not cause permanent damage
18 to Liberia's relationship with either ECOWAS or Nigeria."

19 Then this:

13:14:02 20 "Impact of latest developments in Sierra Leone on Liberia:
21 President Taylor has acknowledged that problems between
22 Sierra Leone and Liberia have their genesis in the antagonistic
23 relationship which existed between himself and former President
24 Momoh."

13:14:21 25 Pause there. Is that true?

26 A. Yes, in these documents he doesn't get into details. Momoh
27 and I were very good friends, but Momoh had been pushed to arm
28 ULIMO and then that caused some strain in our friendship.

29 Q. Strain, or antagonism?

1 A. Well, we can qualify antagonism because we were virtually
2 at war. He had armed ULIMO. They were fighting in Liberia. So,
3 yeah, you can say antagonistic. That's his word. I prefer being
4 a little more diplomatic about it by saying that the relationship
13:15:09 5 was strained. He is saying antagonistic. While I do not
6 disagree, but I prefer strained.

7 Q. "That he maintains is history and has sought to mend fences
8 with President Kabbah. In this regard, the Abuja mini summit of
9 26/27 October 198 and the Mano River Union summit of the 12
13:15:37 10 November 1998" - we have dealt with that, haven't we?

11 A. Yes, we have.

12 Q. "... appeared promising. However, relations between
13 Liberia and Sierra Leone began to show signs of deterioration
14 with the emergence of accusations and counter accusations by one
13:16:06 15 towards the other."

16 Again we have dealt with that, haven't we?

17 A. Yes, we have.

18 Q. Five thousand troops amassed on border and allegations by
19 you that similar numbers in Zimmi. We have gone through all of
13:16:19 20 that, haven't we?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. And is it right that that had caused the strain on your
23 relationship with President Kabbah --

24 A. Yes, yes.

13:16:27 25 Q. -- in the latter part of 1998?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. "Most recently, the Government of Liberia justified its
28 closing of the border with Sierra Leone as a measure aimed at
29 precluding the operationalisation of what it claimed to be a

1 planned infiltration of fighters from Sierra Leone to destabilise
2 Liberia. This was the clearest indication that the latest
3 development in Sierra Leone has adversely affected
4 Sierra Leone-Liberia relationship."

13:17:01 5 Now the latest development in Sierra Leone is what,
6 Mr Taylor?

7 A. I am sure he must be referring to the 6 January situation.

8 Q. And he is saying that that "has adversely affected
9 Sierra Leone-Liberia relationship". Again I ask you, was that a
10 state of events which you wanted to bring into being?

11 A. No, not at all. Not at all.

12 Q. What would you have gained from creating a situation which
13 adversely affected Sierra Leone-Liberia relationship?

14 A. Nothing. Nothing.

13:17:43 15 Q. "Following accusation of Liberia's complicity with the RUF,
16 relations between the two countries can best be described as
17 strained. The mood and sentiments in Sierra Leone are
18 indisputably anti-Taylor and anti-Liberia. It is also quite
19 apparent that President Kabbah's stance regarding negotiations is
13:18:10 20 hardening in the wake of what appears to be a successful ECOMOG
21 operation to drive the RUF out of Freetown."

22 Pause there. "President Kabbah's stance regarding
23 negotiations is hardening". What's that a reference to?

24 A. Well, we have managed to push him into the direction of
13:18:36 25 getting this ceasefire and reopening negotiations, but after he
26 was told by ECOMOG and had been told by I'm sure others that
27 there could be an outright military victory he started hardening
28 up a little bit, but it did not last very long.

29 And may I just mention why I am saying that relationship

1 was strained, it did not mean that communication was cut off
2 between us. There are so many - Kabbah and I were talking
3 frequently and so, you know, amongst nations you can have
4 strained relationships, but still there are certain things that
13:19:29 5 must go on.

6 So that's what I mean by the hardening, because of - I
7 think anyone, a President, with responsibilities as Kabbah or I
8 had following the 6 January situation, would necessarily be a
9 little upset. In fact, upset may be a simple word. And it would
13:19:56 10 take some time to understand the realities of things.

11 And knowing that there is a force on the ground, if you
12 look at a press release that was read here in evidence of General
13 Shelpidi saying that, "Don't be afraid. Things are under
14 control. Stay at home if you" - I mean he was convinced. I mean
13:20:21 15 this is a man desperate and so he was convinced that militarily
16 he could win and so I can say that he would harden his position
17 and he did.

18 Q. Now, let's skip the first three lines of the next
19 paragraph. No, before we do that, let's conclude:

13:20:44 20 "Thus it would not be surprising if relations between the
21 two countries were to remain chilly for a fairly long period of
22 time."

23 Let's skip three lines and pick it up in paragraph 15 at
24 the sentence beginning:

13:20:59 25 "In addition to that, UNOL has placed emphasis on its basic
26 mandate that is to assist in mobilising international support for
27 international assistance to Liberia" - was such assistance
28 forthcoming, Mr Taylor?

29 A. No, it was not.

1 Q. "... to support and facilitate the work of the UN system in
2 developing an integrated approach to the peace building
3 programmes of the Government of Liberia, to facilitate the
4 provision of technical assistance and support by the UN for
13:21:33 5 reconciliation efforts and the establishment of democratic
6 institutions and to facilitate communication between the
7 Government of Liberia and the United Nations on matters related
8 to peace building.

9 To this end, UNOL has attempted to sensitise donors on the
13:21:54 10 increasing need for assistance."

11 Let's ignore the rest of that paragraph:

12 "As to the strategy UNOL intends to pursue in the future, I
13 wish to indicate that we intend to adopt a dual track approach.
14 While UNOL will continue to ensure that the government respects
13:22:13 15 human rights and maintain harmonious relations with civil
16 society, pursued policies of good neighbourliness and take
17 constitutional measures that reflect" and I think that should be
18 "credibility and accountability it is our intention to ensure
19 that the UN system in Liberia utilises its resources to also
13:22:39 20 strengthen the capacity of all peace orientated civil society
21 organisations so they can play a crucial role in the
22 consolidation of peace."

23 Now, in the next paragraph there is an attempt to clarify
24 what militia units means. Did you have a militia in Liberia at
13:23:09 25 this time, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Everyone that - all ex-combatants were called militias.

27 Q. And then we come then to paragraph 18, "Observations":

28 "In assessing the various elements that constitute
29 potential sources of tension in the sub-region, the issue of the

1 prevalence of demobilised combatants who are yet to be
2 rehabilitated and reintegrated into the society warrants special
3 and focused attention. This is an issue on which I placed
4 emphasis when I met with donors in America and in Europe prior to
13:23:57 5 my assumption of duties in Monrovia. I continue to maintain that
6 neglect of ex-combatants would pose serious security problems at
7 both national and sub-regional levels. In this connection, and
8 until this matter is addressed satisfactorily, Liberia will
9 remain a source of mercenaries."

13:24:22 10 Pause there. And your country was a source of mercenaries,
11 wasn't it, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Yes, yes.

13 Q. And, Mr Taylor, so to say that Liberia as opposed to
14 President Taylor had a hand in what was going on in Sierra Leone,
13:24:49 15 in fact that was true, wasn't it?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Because Liberian mercenaries on both sides were causing
18 difficulties in Sierra Leone, weren't they?

19 A. They were.

13:25:08 20 Q. And was that because you were unable to control these
21 60,000 or so former combatants in Liberia, which we've talked
22 about earlier?

23 A. I would say yes, yes. Control is another qualification
24 that I really want to tread gingerly on. But the whole idea that
13:25:41 25 you have this war, and this is the picture I think we need to be
26 very careful with here. Here is a picture of a country that has
27 come out of war. There are some 60,000 individuals that have
28 participated. A lot of them are already involved in external
29 operations outside of Liberia on their own accord. Some of them

1 have been hired and have been influenced into coming in as we
2 referred to ULIMO-J, K and ex-fighters. So it is a very
3 difficult problem. But then we have no control because, number
4 one, they don't have jobs. They have nothing to do. So it's a
13:26:32 5 very difficult problem.

6 Now, how it's interpreted in legal language as to what
7 control is is another matter. In fact, we never had any real
8 control over those that were there. And even if we wanted to
9 control them, we didn't have - we could not have controlled them
13:26:52 10 because they were not a part of our operation. And in fact, to
11 make it appear a little better, they changed it. We introduced
12 the word mercenaries when we threatened them, okay, but they
13 called them non-state actors.

14 Q. Now, did you acknowledge of their involvement, Mr Taylor?

13:27:13 15 A. When you say knowledge of their involvement, are you
16 referring --

17 Q. Did you know that Liberian mercenaries were operating in
18 Sierra Leone?

19 A. Yes, I knew.

13:27:24 20 Q. Were they operating there with your consent?

21 A. Not at all. They were hired by that government without my
22 consent. At all.

23 Q. Well, let's look at it in a different context then,
24 Mr Taylor. You launch a revolution in Liberia in December 1989
13:27:45 25 which by the time of its resolution in 1996/'97 leaves this huge
26 band of unemployed and potentially unemployable non-combatants
27 roaming Liberia looking for a job. And then they later have a
28 role to play in Sierra Leone. Somebody might say this is a
29 situation you created. Do you follow me?

1 A. Yeah, but then that scenario - I would not go along with
2 that scenario. It has to be looked at in a different light.
3 Okay. It has to be looked at in a different light. That
4 scenario, of course people would say that, but we must understand
13:28:31 5 it is not the 60,000 ex-combatants that we now have calculated at
6 the end of the war in 1997 that are the source of the problems
7 just in Sierra Leone. We have to go back.

8 We have to go back to 1991 when we are saying that
9 Liberians fleeing the war are beginning to be, what,
13:29:00 10 institutionalised in that system. So we have - we must separate
11 those Liberians that started off and submitted themselves to the
12 process of being mercenaries verses the rest of the Liberians
13 that at the end of the war are calculated as 60,000.

14 So even before the end of the war in 1997, so to speak, you
13:29:29 15 have already operating in Sierra Leone, hired by the government,
16 and let's not forget we are saying that the first Liberians that
17 were hired were done by whom? President Momoh. Valentine
18 Strasser comes into power, he carries on. Maada Bio comes to
19 power, he continues. Tejani Kabbah comes to power and he
13:29:52 20 continues. So that's a separate scenario from the end process.

21 So I want to divide it into two. You have Liberians that
22 are involved all along the years with every succeeding government
23 in Sierra Leone with their acquiescence, full acquiescence,
24 verses the end of the process that even add more insult to
13:30:14 25 injury. So I really want to describe it in this light, because
26 if I can approximate a number, by the time the combat - by the
27 time of my elections in 1997, I am putting - in fact, it's in one
28 of our security briefings. The number of Liberians that are in
29 Sierra Leone, former AFL, those that may have been trained as

1 refugees and used, former ULIMO-J, former ULIMO-K, former LPC and
2 even some former NPFL that had left, I would put the number to
3 5,000 to 6,000 Liberians are involved in Sierra Leone. I would
4 put it to at least that number of Liberians that are operating
13:30:59 5 there between 1991 all the way through.

6 Q. I have some more serious questions to ask you about this,
7 but I note the time, Mr President.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, thank you, Mr Griffiths. We will
9 take the lunch break now and resume at 2.30.

13:31:30 10 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

11 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, your Honours, can I first of
14 all announce a change in representation. Mr Silas Chekera has
14:32:00 15 left us and we're joined by Mr Terry Munyard of counsel.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. Mr Taylor, before we adjourned for lunch, we were looking
19 at paragraph 18 of the document behind our divider 5. Do you
14:32:29 20 have it now before you, paragraph 18?

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. Now in the context of that paragraph and the mention of
23 Liberia remaining a source of mercenaries you told us that it was
24 important to distinguish two groups, is that right?

14:33:00 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. The first group are those who had been present in
27 Sierra Leone since on or about 1990, is that right?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. Who had, through successive regimes in Sierra Leone, served

1 as an integral part of the Sierra Leonean army?

2 A. Uh-huh.

3 Q. Yes?

4 A. Yes.

14:33:26 5 Q. Taking orders within the structure of that army, yes?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Now dealing first of all with them, did you at any stage
8 ever have control over those individuals?

9 A. None whatsoever. These were arch enemies of myself and the
14:33:50 10 government. These are people that fought, ran away, joined,

11 fought, came back. No, these were enemies of the Liberian state.

12 Q. Did you know that from or about 1990 there had been
13 incorporated into the Sierra Leonean military regime such a
14 force? Did you know?

14:34:16 15 A. I would say yes. I got to know, I would say, more like
16 during the administration of Valentine Strasser. Before then
17 with Momoh, I mean, we had ideas, but as a part of the military
18 structure of the armed forces of Sierra Leone I got to know
19 during the administration of Valentine Strasser.

14:34:51 20 Q. Now did you ever give orders to that particular group,
21 Mr Taylor?

22 A. What, to come and kill me? These people are - they are
23 fighting me. If any orders had to be given to them by me, it
24 would have been probably to come and get me. I mean, come on,

14:35:10 25 these are enemies of the Liberian state. These are former Armed
26 Forces of Liberia personnel that were fighting against me. They
27 fought against me with Doe. Some of them fought against me with
28 ULIMO. No, these were enemies. How do you order your enemy to -
29 except to come and get you?

1 Q. Now you say there was a second group, former combatants
2 from the civil war in Liberia?

3 A. Yes.

14:35:44

4 Q. Now so far as they are concerned, how do they come to be
5 involved in the Sierra Leonean conflict?

14:36:16

6 A. Now this second group - following my election as President
7 of Liberia, the first group exists in Sierra Leone as we
8 described. Following my election as President, there are still
9 ULIMO, there are still LPCs - and by ULIMO I mean J and K in
10 Liberia. There is this group that becomes what they call
11 frightened and they decide to leave immediately after my being
12 elected as President, but there are still ULIMO, there are still
13 some of the AFL and others that flee. They join the first group
14 in Sierra Leone.

14:36:37

15 Some of them are, let's say, joined - even the RUF, for
16 example, like this boy that came here, this gentleman, Abu Keita,
17 is this - is one of these types that - some of them went on and
18 joined their colleagues with the armed forces of Sierra Leone.
19 Some of them joined the RUF and the other junta people depending
20 on their friendship. That's that group of people.

14:37:03

21 Then there is in that subgroup those that are just
22 lingering and just whatever action comes about, they join it. We
23 see an example of this even in another crisis where people are
24 just floating around. What we say, idle brains is the devil's
25 workshop. There is nothing to do and these people are just
26 moving about. We first have a wave of crime in the country and
27 they are just floating from one place to the other. They don't
28 have money. They don't have food. They don't have means. I
29 have no control over them. These are - this - instead of saying

1 "these", this is the consequence of war. In every war situation
2 across the world, there will always be people left out of the
3 loop and are just out there for the taking and this is what I'm
4 describing.

14:38:05 5 Q. Now, did you as President of Liberia do anything to stop
6 those individuals crossing the border to become involved in the
7 conflicts in Sierra Leone?

8 A. Yes, in a way we - you know, we tried to open - we had to
9 do indirect things. Let's clarify that the 60,000 figure we used
14:38:32 10 here are not NPFL. These are all combatants from all sides, so
11 to a great extent we don't have control over a large amount of
12 these people.

13 Q. I'm still going to press you, Mr Taylor, because I reminded
14 you a while back of a speech you made following your election in
14:38:52 15 which you said, "I am not just President of NPFL. I'm President
16 of ULIMO." Do you remember it?

17 A. Oh, yes.

18 Q. Okay, so help us. What could you have done to stop that
19 migration across the border now that you were President of all of
14:39:11 20 Liberia?

21 A. The only thing I could have done was to continue to seek
22 international assistance to open more schools, help to provide
23 jobs and help to retrain them, the type of assistance I was not
24 getting. When you have combatants amassed as that, the only
14:39:30 25 thing you can really do and the only thing that any nation would
26 do, you have to engage the international community for assistance
27 to begin to train, retrain, educate, try to get them into the
28 jobs market. Without that, you really cannot do anything. It's
29 the type of involuntary around about control, okay. But you have

1 to engage in projects that would eventually move them into
2 becoming productive citizens. That's the only thing any
3 President can do.

14:40:11 4 But to say to have a command type control as you're dealing
5 with, you know, combatants, that's not possible and when I say
6 I'm President of all Liberia, of course after the war we come
7 together, we begin to move. I can no longer think NPFL. I must
8 think about the Liberian nation and its people. And so that -
9 that statement is geared toward assuring and reassuring those
14:40:37 10 that want to stay in Liberia that it will be for all Liberians
11 and not just for one set of Liberians.

12 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, those unemployed former combatants who
13 drifted over the border, once they were over the border did you
14 have the power to discipline or punish them?

14:41:00 15 A. No, no. In order to punish, you must have command of the
16 individual and you must have control of the individual in order
17 to punish. How do you punish someone that is not under your
18 control? It's as if we are seeing now that - let's take any
19 combat situation anywhere in the world right now. Remember when
14:41:34 20 we get into what they call extraordinary rendition that we have
21 in the war - you cannot be responsible for people that are not
22 under your direct command and in fact you must have knowledge of
23 and you must have command of in order to control.

24 Now, I don't have command of these people. In fact, no one
14:41:58 25 in Liberia really can boast of having command of these
26 individuals. So how do you discipline people that you do not
27 have command and control over? That's impossible.

28 Q. On this same topic, you will recall, won't you, evidence
29 including your own account regarding Hinga Norman and ECOMOG's

1 recruitment of Liberians to fight alongside the Kamajors, yes?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Did you have any ability to prevent such recruitment,
4 Mr Taylor, in practical terms?

14:42:37 5 A. No. There was no way to prevent them in any practical
6 terms. That's why I complained so bitterly in my letter to the
7 late General Sani Abacha that in fact I couldn't do it. No one
8 consulted me and this was one at the crux of the problem in
9 trying to insist - and let me remove that word "trying".

14:43:06 10 Insisting that the mandate of ECOMOG be changed from peacekeeping
11 to capacity building, because as long as ECOMOG was operating
12 under its so-called peacekeeping mandate it acted as a state unto
13 itself. And so I have no control over who they picked up.

14 Imagine they are flying people out of the international
14:43:29 15 airport, okay, and remember the press statement that was done
16 here that we read of the ECOMOG spokesman when the officer at the
17 airport Martina Johnson protested, he described militarily of
18 bringing her into line if she had not ceased from her activities.
19 So no one had control. We didn't have the guns and they were
14:43:55 20 still in that mode of "we're in charge". I had no control over
21 that process. That's why I protested directly to Sani Abacha
22 over and again and finally had to write him officially to put it
23 on record.

24 Q. Now, those Liberians who were recruited to assist the
14:44:18 25 Kamajors, did you ever any control over them?

26 A. None whatsoever.

27 Q. Could you, for example, discipline or punish them for
28 wrongdoing?

29 A. I could not. I didn't know all of them. I didn't know who

1 they were being - who - how they had - I knew how they had been
2 taken, ECOMOG had taken them, but they were not under my command
3 so I could not discipline.

14:44:48 4 Q. Tell us, Mr Taylor, in conclusion on this topic, of all the
5 various groups of Liberians who were operating in whatever
6 capacity within Sierra Leone during the period under
7 consideration, did you have any control over any of them?

8 A. None whatsoever.

14:45:13 9 Q. Did you have the ability to curb their behaviour through
10 punishment or any other means?

11 A. No ability. No other means. They were not under my
12 control, so I could not punish. They were hired. They were
13 employees of another government. They were under the - if we
14 talk about command and control, I'm sure if you read Tejan
14:45:33 15 Kabbah's statement he will tell you they were in the employ of
16 that government and its military services. I had absolutely no
17 control.

18 And to add a little bit to that, one of the methods that we
19 used before to even get people to stop somewhere later, we
14:45:53 20 threatened them with prosecution. And we get to know that these
21 Mano River Union meetings that were held, one of the things if we
22 got into some of the details of those meetings, they had to do
23 with invoking certain parts of those agreements where what we
24 call the high contracting state would itself arrest the
14:46:23 25 individual. We were trying to say, "Well, okay, Kabbah, if you
26 arrest them, because they are in your country under your control
27 and you send them to us, we will prosecute them under our
28 mercenarism law". That never happened.

29 Then subsequently we had to change and say, okay, when the

1 peace process got going and the new discussion came up and said
2 they are scared to come home because they are going to be
3 prosecuted, then we extended a general amnesty by saying that we
4 will not invoke our laws of mercenarism. So we had no control.

14:47:01 5 If anyone actually had control of those men it was the Government
6 of Sierra Leone at the time.

7 Q. And help us, at any stage did you ever issue orders to any
8 Liberians acting in whatever capacity in Sierra Leone?

9 A. No, no. Not one. And I don't think any one of them has
14:47:24 10 come before this Court and said, "While I was in Sierra Leone
11 President Taylor ordered me to do X, Y, Z", whether it is Abu
12 Keita who claimed what - no, none whatsoever.

13 Q. Did you seek at any stage to incite them to commit
14 offences?

14:47:43 15 A. I had no contact with them to be able to incite them. I
16 had no control over them to incite and/or encourage. There was
17 just absolutely no contact and no control and there is no one
18 that can faithfully tell these judges that I ordered him or her
19 in Sierra Leone. That is not true.

14:48:06 20 Q. Did you aid or abet any of them, Mr Taylor?

21 A. How could I aid and abet them when I did not have control?
22 No, I did not in any way.

23 Q. Very well. Let's go back to paragraph 19, shall we:

24 "Another issue of concern is Liberia's relationship with
14:48:25 25 Nigeria and ECOMOG. Even if there is no love lost between the
26 NPP led government and ECOMOG, the Government of Liberia would
27 have wanted to see a scaled down ECOMOG presence as opposed to
28 its sudden and massive withdrawal. All the same, ECOMOG has
29 withdrawn its troops with the notable exception of one

1 company-size team which is to guard the weapons in the joint
2 custody of the UN and ECOWAS. With the peacekeeping force having
3 been withdrawn at a period when relations between ECOWAS and
4 Liberia appears to have reached a low point, it will be essential
14:49:10 5 to take all possible measures to encourage the re-establishment
6 of cordial relations between the two.

7 At the end of it all, what seems quite clear is that the
8 problem of Liberia and Sierra Leone, and indeed Guinea, are
9 interrelated. The circulation of former combatants and their
14:49:34 10 recycling within the countries of Mano River Union, combined with
11 the exchange of accusations among these neighbouring countries,
12 suggests that one should move from isolated assessments of
13 individual countries to a bold attempt to grapple with the
14 current problems in these countries."

14:50:02 15 Do you agree with that, Mr Taylor?

16 A. I fully do. Yes, I do.

17 Q. And what is it that you are agreeing with, Mr Taylor? Tell
18 us in your own words.

19 A. Well, you've got ULIMO that formed out of Guinea, K, and J
14:50:34 20 out of Sierra Leone. While ULIMO is fighting in Liberia there
21 are Guineans also that are involved, Guinean nationals, because
22 they are predominantly the Mandingo ethnic group. So they fight.
23 Alhaji Kromah brings them by their thousands out of Guinea.
24 After the war a lot of them go back into Guinea. You've got a
14:51:03 25 problem there and he should have extended this to La Cote
26 d'Ivoire. After the war the thousands of Krahn's that do not feel
27 comfortable in Guinea or in Sierra Leone that go into where? La
28 Cote d'Ivoire. Into Guiglo. They are there.

29 There are these other individuals that have their jobs in

1 Sierra Leone, thousands of them are working with the Sierra
2 Leonean army. Their families move over there. So here you have
3 of this so-called 60,000 group of combatants that went through
4 and let's clarify this, we are not talking about - we are talking
14:51:52 5 about the number 60,000 represents the total number of combatants
6 that went through the war, not necessarily the number of
7 combatants that disarmed at the end of the war. Now I want to
8 draw that distinction. So by the end of the war there are less
9 than that 60,000. The 60,000 marked the total number of
14:52:17 10 combatants, just to say it.

11 So you have ex-combatants in Guinea. You have
12 ex-combatants in Liberia. You have ex-combatants in
13 Sierra Leone. You have ex-combatants in La Cote d'Ivoire. Idle
14 minds. No work, no jobs, nothing to do. They are just there for
14:52:37 15 whoever comes and asks for a service. That's the problem. So in
16 looking at it, we have to address it as a regional matter, take
17 it at the subset level of the Mano River Union, where you have to
18 begin the proper demobilisation of these ex-combatants. That
19 really never happened. By proper demobilisation I mean
14:53:09 20 identifying each combatant, getting to know his or his interests,
21 getting them a job or training or retraining them or getting them
22 involved in a structured manner that they can move their lives
23 forward. It never happens.

24 So to go and solve the problem in Liberia and leave
14:53:33 25 Sierra Leone and Guinea, you haven't solved it. To solve it in
26 Sierra Leone and leave Liberia and Guinea you haven't solved it,
27 so it was better to look at it as a whole. At some point it
28 would have involved La Cote d'Ivoire and, in fact, it did involve
29 La Cote d'Ivoire, because by the time the crisis in La Cote

1 d'Ivoire started a lot of those that were available, most people
2 what do you want to do? Most people want to use what they will
3 call experienced fighters.

14:54:06 4 So the first thing when the conflict erupted in la Cote
5 d'Ivoire they came into Liberia to recruit, okay, and people -
6 when I say came into, let me qualify that. Not that people came
7 across the border and said, "We want you", but I mean the word
8 gets out and I reverse that and instead of came into they went
9 into la Cote d'Ivoire and offered their services.

14:54:22 10 So, in effect, for me I see it as the four countries having
11 to solve that problem even today. Look, those of us that are
12 getting older now and passing, we must understand that in every
13 region, whether it is in East Africa or whatever, at the end of
14 these wars these non-state actors, the ex-combatants and their
14:54:49 15 quantities, whether you deal with Congo now or some of the other
16 wars, will be a long, long-term problem. It is not resolved by
17 just ending the war and say, "You hold an election." You have to
18 deal with the ex-combatants from the war - and I mean deal with
19 them - and making them to become productive citizens again. If
14:55:15 20 not, you will have problems.

21 And I say this now, whether it's in Liberia or whether it's
22 in Sierra Leone or whether it's in Guinea, that risk remains
23 today. Today those players are still out there. Some of them
24 are still not in school. Some of them still do not have jobs.
14:55:34 25 Some of them still have not been retrained. They are still
26 available for service.

27 At the flick of a problem, they will rush for this
28 particular incident. This is why I'm agreeing with this, because
29 it points out that this has to be holistic. This is not a

1 situation - like right now, let me tell you all something right
2 now before this Court. This trial in Sierra Leone, this trial of
3 Charles Taylor, whatever, will not cause a total end to that
4 little problem in those regions just by holding a court trial.

14:56:08 5 You've got to go back and deal with the root cause of these
6 problems and get these people - these minds occupied.

7 No court trial will say, "This marks the end of the Sierra
8 Leonean problem or marks the end of the Liberian problem or marks
9 the end of the Congolese problems." These problems are resolved
14:56:27 10 when the participants in the crisis are trained, retrain, put to
11 work, reconciliation. That's what brings it about. There is -
12 if not, the soul continues to fester. So I agree with what he
13 says here because of what I've just said.

14 Q. And to complete it, "This should" - over the page, finally
14:56:50 15 - "be done in a manner which would allow for the search and
16 provision of comprehensive solutions."

17 A. That's it.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: Now could I ask that that document be marked
19 for identification, Mr President. So it's a code cable by some
14:57:11 20 --

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just one moment, please, Mr Griffiths.
22 Yes, Ms Hollis.

23 MS HOLLIS: Yes, we note that the pagination indicates that
24 this is a nine page document and we would ask that we be given
14:57:24 25 pages 8 and 9. If you look at the top of the document, it has
26 page 1 through 7/9 and so we would ask that we be provided with
27 those two additional pages.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: What do you say, Mr Griffiths? Do you
29 have the other --

1 MR GRIFFITHS: We have never had the additional pages in
2 our possession and, if you note, earlier in the document it makes
3 clear that it attached a document to this. I'm trying to find a
4 reference to that. It's quite clear that so far as this part is
14:57:59 5 concerned, with the best regards, this is a complete copy of the
6 cable sent by Felix Downes-Thomas. What is missing is an
7 attachment, which I've never seen.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: We're just marking it at this stage.
9 I'll note what you've said, Ms Hollis, and if the matter is not
14:58:23 10 sorted out when the time comes to tender it, perhaps it can be
11 argued then.

12 MS HOLLIS: Thank you.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: But we're just identifying it at this
14 stage.

14:58:32 15 MR GRIFFITHS: So it's a code cable from Felix
16 Downes-Thomas, special representative of the Secretary-General,
17 dated 30 January 1999, entitled "Reported Withdrawal of ECOMOG
18 Troops in Liberia", MFI-70, please.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-70 for
14:58:58 20 identification.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, the observations made by the special
23 representatives on 30 January 1999, were those the sole comments
24 made by the special representative on the situation in the
14:59:16 25 sub-region at this time?

26 A. Well so far these are the - these are his comments, but
27 that is not the end of the problem because while that is going on
28 we are fighting, trying to get the ceasefire to hold. And then
29 we have - the United Nations is trying to put together a set of

1 their own suggestions as to how we could move forward and I've
2 been point to this. That document was sent to me. Some senior
3 officials at the UN developed certain points, some points of how
4 they see things can continue, what they call the five-point plan,
15:00:14 5 and it is floated to members of the committee. I get a copy and
6 I'm sure the others got theirs to solicit our own comments on
7 some of the ideas that were coming up as to how to proceed and
8 help and go forward.

9 Q. So the United Nations brings forth a five-point plan, you
15:00:33 10 say, yes?

11 A. Well when I say United Nations now it's senior officials
12 down there, because that's a general term because when we talk
13 about the United Nations that will have to go a little further,
14 but senior political officers advanced - what they do in these
15:00:50 15 cases is they do what they call float ideas and get comments back
16 before they become a UN decision. Ideas are floated for some
17 time and so these are points that are floated to see as to
18 whether they can get some general agreement as to how to proceed.

19 Q. Did you discuss this five-point plan with the
15:01:16 20 Secretary-General's representative in Monrovia?

21 A. Definitely. In fact, he brought the document. The
22 document did not originate just from him. It originated from UN
23 headquarters to - and he was informed and apparently instructed,
24 because he brought it to us to discuss these proposals that were
15:01:35 25 coming from UN headquarters as to some ideas that they had
26 regarding contacts and what to do and what the UN would be
27 prepared to do, what was expected of the committee of the member
28 states.

29 Q. And did any record come out of that process of discussion

1 with the special representative?

2 A. Yes, after we had some - after we received those documents
3 we gave him a feedback, and then he subsequently reported back to
4 UN headquarters after that commenting on the points and some of
15:02:17 5 the feedback that he had received from his area of assignment.

6 Q. Is that a report you've seen?

7 A. Oh, yes, I've seen both the document that originated from
8 UN headquarters and his own report back to UN headquarters and
9 his comments. These are two separate documents.

15:02:36 10 Q. Can you help us with the date of that report back?

11 A. The first - the five-point plan could have been somewhere
12 very early, I would say about the first week, in March, 5, 6, 7,
13 somewhere. About the 5th or 6th of March, I would think.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Could the witness please be shown the
15:03:00 15 document behind our divider 7, please.

16 THE WITNESS: Yes, this is the document that originated
17 from UN headquarters, not from Thomas.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Right. Have you seen this document before, Mr Taylor?

15:03:37 20 A. Oh, yes, this is the issue regarding the five-point that
21 came from the special representative who was a senior official to
22 - came from New York to him and, in fact, Thomas was informed.
23 This is about the plan that they are thinking about.

24 Q. As we see this is entitled, "Your five-point plan and next
15:04:08 25 steps". Do you see that?

26 A. Yes, I do.

27 Q. It's dated 5 February 1999 and it provides as follows:

28 "Please refer to your fax messages dated 25 January 1999
29 concerning meetings in Ghana and in Togo to your fax dated 26

1 January on your meeting in Cote d'Ivoire and to your code cables
2 of 28-29 January and 1 February on your meeting with President
3 Kabbah and the meeting of the Heads of State of the three
4 troop-contributing countries to ECOMOG in Conakry on 29 January.

15:04:55 5 The initiatives you have taken in conceiving the five-point
6 plan and securing support for it among the leaders of the
7 sub-region are highly commendable. You have kept the United
8 Nations at the centre of the diplomatic process, while helping to
9 avert a split among the members of ECOWAS. We fully concur in
10 all your actions and encourage you to proceed further along the
11 same lines as you see fit.

12 We agree that your round of visits has been helpful in
13 revitalising support for joint efforts along both tracks of the
14 dual-track policy. We, therefore, concur in principle with the
15:05:38 15 proposal that you made in your fax dated 26 January to visit
16 Monrovia and Ouagadougou."

17 Now did Mr Okelo in due course visit you in Monrovia,
18 Mr Taylor?

19 A. Yes, to the best of my recollection, he did stop by.

15:06:01 20 Q. "You would presumably wish to consult with President Kabbah
21 and with Mr Kouyate and/or ECOMOG beforehand to inform them in
22 general terms of your intentions and secure their concurrence.
23 We would appreciate your assessment of what might be achieved as
24 a result of such meetings. In addition to briefing the Heads of
15:06:26 25 State/foreign ministers of Liberia and Burkina Faso concerning
26 the latest situation in Sierra Leone, your own recent diplomatic
27 activities and other United Nations activities including
28 humanitarian and human rights, you may wish to make the following
29 points:

1 The full cooperation of the Organisation of African Unity
2 and ECOWAS with the United Nations is vital to any resolution of
3 the conflict in Sierra Leone;

15:07:01

4 It is equally important that these organisations should
5 adopt a united position with regard to the resolution of the
6 conflict, especially in their relations with the Security Council
7 and the international donor community;

15:07:22

8 The international community hopes that the Governments of
9 Liberia and Burkina Faso will do their utmost to contribute
10 positively towards a resolution of the conflict;

15:07:55

11 In the case of Liberia, the United Nations, though aware of
12 allegations of Government of Liberia involvement with the rebels,
13 has no direct evidence of such involvement. The United Nations
14 welcomes reports that the Liberian Senate is considering
15 investigating allegations of Government of Liberia involvement" -
16 "... has no direct evidence of such involvement."

17 Now help us, Mr Taylor. For how long had representatives
18 of the United Nations been present in Liberia?

15:08:23

19 A. Oh, they have been present now for about a year, but they
20 were involved before that time.

21 Q. Yes. And they are also involved over the border in
22 Sierra Leone, aren't they?

23 A. Definitely.

15:08:39

24 Q. And so we have this situation where on 5 February 1999, so
25 a month after the Freetown invasion, the United Nations is saying
26 they have no direct evidence of such involvement. Is that right,
27 Mr Taylor?

28 A. That is right.

29 Q. And now let us just return to the frontis - the front page

1 to remind ourselves, please, that this is an outgoing code cable
2 and so it's going from the United Nations to Okelo in Freetown
3 and Downes-Thomas in Monrovia. Do you see that?

15:09:21

4 A. No. Well at this time Okelo represents Freetown, but he's
5 still in Conakry.

6 Q. He is in Conakry?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. But it's the direction of the cable that I'm interested in.

9 A. That is correct.

15:09:27

10 Q. Where is it coming from, Mr Taylor?

11 A. It's coming from New York, UN headquarters.

12 Q. So UN headquarters are saying they have no direct evidence
13 of such involvement in early February 1999. Is that correct?

14 A. That is correct.

15:09:45

15 Q. And then:

16 "The United Nations would also welcome the exercise of any
17 influence President Taylor could bring to bear on the rebels to
18 reach an accommodation with the Government of Sierra Leone,
19 including a ceasefire which would permit the delivery of
20 humanitarian assistance and provide a basis for further
21 discussion."

15:10:12

22 Now, Mr Taylor, you may have to interpret this diplomatic
23 language for us:

24 "The United Nations would also welcome the exercise of any
25 influence President Taylor could bring to bear on the rebels."

15:10:31

26 Unravel that for us, please.

27 A. Well, in simple terms all they are saying here is that we
28 hope that President Taylor, working along with what he's been
29 doing, will continue his good work and that this - the ceasefire

1 - that there will be a ceasefire that will hold. All this
2 diplomatic English - remember I informed this Court that by about
3 12 January we had announced that we had obtained a ceasefire. So
4 everybody is working and they are aware of the work that I'm
15:11:15 5 doing.

6 As a reminder, let's go back. We said that in 1998 we see
7 in August this letter from my ambassador in Guinea. By September
8 my colleagues are informed. They acquiesce. Sam Bockarie visits
9 Liberia once. He visits twice. The third time he goes through
15:11:44 10 to meet the chairman of the OAU. So they know that we are
11 working. We have this 6 January situation.

12 This is not just a Sierra Leonean matter. All members of
13 ECOWAS are involved in cross telephones. This is a hot issue
14 from the morning of the 6th, the 7th we are all talking and I
15:12:14 15 just said to this Court Kabbah - Tejan Kabbah met by the 7th with
16 the RUF official Foday Sankoh. And so what they are saying here
17 in short is that, "Look, we now see that there is some progress
18 so we want for President Taylor to continue". That's all. This
19 is basically in simple English what they are talking about.

15:12:39 20 Please continue.

21 Q. So, Mr Taylor, help us. Did you take this as an
22 endorsement of what you had done or a caution not to, to borrow a
23 phrase, meddle in Sierra Leonean affairs? How did you interpret
24 it?

15:12:54 25 A. Quite to the contrary. I looked at this as an endorsement
26 of what I was - I had done and was doing and what they expected
27 me to continue doing.

28 Q. And, Mr Taylor, let us just remind ourselves, please, at
29 the historical junction we've now reached, we're in February

1 1999. We have just passed that important watershed, the 6
2 January invasion of Freetown, yes?

3 A. Yes.

15:13:34

4 Q. And we have the United Nations at this stage saying no
5 direct evidence of involvement and, secondly, endorsing your
6 involvement with the rebels. That's the position, isn't it?

7 A. That is correct.

15:14:02

8 Q. And so thereafter when you continued your efforts so far as
9 the guesthouse in Monrovia and so on were concerned, did you
10 consider that to be with the approval of the United Nations, that
11 world body?

15:14:21

12 A. Definitely, but I bring it to the first instance. I see it
13 as an approval of ECOWAS, I see it as an approval from the OAU
14 before it even gets to the United Nations. Africa and our
15 brothers have proved this. They acquiesce. They are thanking -
16 not just me. I mean what I'm doing, I just don't want to take
17 credit alone for it because everybody is aware on that Committee
18 of Six and they are endorsing what I'm doing so when - I don't
19 want to waste time, but I just have to go through this.

15:14:43

20 When in this international community you hear statements
21 like this coming from let's say as far as the United Nations,
22 this is nothing that the United Nations starts on its own. This
23 simply means that they have seen and have investigated and this
24 is with the acquiescence of even the organisation on the ground.

15:15:09

25 So this statement that the UN is making, it's not in isolation of
26 what ECOWAS or the OAU believe at that particular time.

27 The United Nations would not be saying one thing and ECOWAS
28 saying another thing here in West Africa and the OAU saying
29 another thing. No, no, no, no, no. In these diplomatic circles

1 these things don't work that way. When you hear a profound
2 statement being made at the UN, that means that the other
3 auxiliary organisations agree. That's how it works. I just
4 wanted to point that out.

15:15:43 5 Q. "In his 9 June 1998 report, the Secretary-General responded
6 positively in principle to calls by the Government of Liberia to
7 deploy United Nations personnel at the border between Liberia and
8 Sierra Leone. In practice, however, this has proved impossible
9 in view of the absence of any ECOMOG deployment to provide
10 security.

11 In the spirit of the Secretary-General's initiative in
12 Abuja in July 1998 and of the Conakry mini summit of November
13 1998 the United Nations would welcome further face-to-face
14 meetings between President Taylor and President Kabbah with the
15 possible participation of President Conte which could consider a
16 solution within the context of the Mano River Union agreement.
17 The special representative of the Secretary-General for
18 Sierra Leone and the representative of the Secretary-General for
19 Liberia should be prepared to facilitate such a meeting.

15:17:05 20 In the case of Burkina Faso, the United Nations would
21 welcome any announcement by the government of an investigation
22 into allegations of government of Burkina Faso support for the
23 rebels."

24 Now, that topic, possible Burkina Faso support for the
15:17:24 25 rebels, was something mentioned in that earlier report from
26 Mr Felix Downes-Thomas dated 30 January, wasn't it?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. "The United Nations would also welcome the exercise of any
29 influence President Compaore could bring to bear on the rebels in

1 his capacity as chairman of the OAU for the purposes outlined
2 above. We are pleased to note that a small human rights team is
3 now in Freetown to assess the situation and look forward to
4 receiving its report as soon as possible and regular reports on
15:18:08 5 the human rights situation thereafter. We hope soon to receive
6 more details about the proposed ECOWAS summit and the subsequent
7 visit of the Committee of Six to New York to brief the Security
8 Council later this month and look forward to seeing you at that
9 time."

15:18:26 10 Now that meeting in New York which is mentioned, Mr Taylor,
11 was there a representative of the Republic of Liberia at that
12 meeting?

13 A. Definitely.

14 Q. Who was that?

15:18:39 15 A. You see the Committee of Six. That would be the foreign
16 minister.

17 Q. Now, you mentioned earlier discussing this five-point plan
18 with Mr Downes-Thomas?

19 A. That is correct.

15:18:52 20 Q. And that there had been a report about it, yes?

21 A. Yes, he filed a report back to headquarters, yes.

22 Q. Can you help us with the rough timing of that response?

23 A. That had to be within a day - a couple of days. Because
24 this was a very hot topic, so he responded almost immediately
15:19:15 25 because we got a copy almost I would say a day or two. Not more
26 than two or three days I would put it to.

27 Q. Okay. Before we move on, can I ask that this code cable --

28 A. Excuse me, counsel. May I just ask you a question? Based
29 on the issue raised by the Prosecution, the numbering of this

1 page 7 of 9 and 8 of 9, could this be the addition to the
2 document that the Prosecution raised an issue for? Maybe we
3 could look at it later.

15:20:08 4 Q. Well, in relation to that issue, what we could quickly do
5 is if we turn behind divider 6, just to clarify this point about
6 numbering, do you see in the top right-hand corner 5 of 9,
7 CLN-113, do you see that?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Behind divider 6, do you see right at the top, 5 of 9?

15:20:34 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Go over to page 6 of 9, yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Go behind divider 7. Seven of 9?

14 A. Yes.

15:20:44 15 Q. Eight of 9?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. The next page, 9 of 9?

18 A. Yes.

15:20:55 19 Q. Do you see that? So it appears to suggest that this was at
20 one time one document and that it constituted various attachments
21 to a document?

22 A. That's what I thought.

23 Q. Do you see that?

24 A. That's what I thought, so we probably could take a look at
15:21:12 25 it.

26 JUDGE DOHERTY: The dates don't tally.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: The dates might not tally, but it appears
28 that the numbering at the top, which all appears to be in the
29 same hand, does follow from 5 through to 9.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think Ms Hollis's original observation
2 was on the document behind divider 5. If you look at that, the
3 numbers do not follow.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: The numbers do not follow, but it does
15:21:54 5 appear that the - at least those behind 6 and 7, that the number
6 does follow in that instance. That's the point I'm making. But
7 it doesn't follow on from the document behind divider 5.

8 JUDGE DOHERTY: I think you may have a point about 7 and 8
9 because they are both CLN-046.

15:22:21 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes. And CLN-113. But I accept that it
11 doesn't answer the query raised by my learned friend in relation
12 to the document behind divider 5. I appreciate that there's a
13 discontinuity between those two dividers:

14 Q. Now, Mr Taylor --

15:22:49 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: In any event, I think you were in the
16 process of marking that.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: I would like to have that document, "Your
18 five-point plan and next steps", dated 5 February 1999, our
19 application is for that to be marked MFI-71.

15:23:09 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-71 for
21 identification.

22 MR GRIFFITHS:

23 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor. So you were telling us that there was a
24 further report, was there, of your discussions with Mr Felix
15:23:40 25 Downes-Thomas regarding this five-point plan?

26 A. Yes and this is his response back. After the headquarters
27 sent him this to make his observation, he responds after this.

28 Q. Let's look behind divider 6, please. Yes?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. And we see this is now dated 9 February 1999 and it's from
2 Mr Downes-Thomas to Mr Prendergast at the United Nations in
3 New York?

4 A. Yes.

15:24:18 5 Q. We see that again it's follow-up steps on the five-point
6 plan in Sierra Leone?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. It says, "I bring to your attention the attached
9 self-explanatory code cable of 5 February which was copied to
10 me", which is the document behind divider 7?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Which as we note, if we just flick over, it was also copied
15 to him from the heading behind divider 7. Do you see that?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. "You will note that the matters referred to in indents
18 four, five and six of paragraph three" - which are the items that
19 we looked at in some detail, yes?

15:25:08 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. "... four, five and seven of paragraph three touch upon
22 issues that were raised in the letters from President Taylor to
23 the Secretary-General transmitted to headquarters with my code
24 cables of 12 May 1998 and 20 December 1998 respectively."

15:25:33 25 Now, Mr Taylor, in order to understand the significance of
26 what is being said there, what we need to do is to turn back
27 behind divider 7, keeping open divider 6, yes?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. And then when we look at the second page of the document

1 behind divider 7, yes?

2 A. Uh-huh.

3 Q. If we count down the bullet points we'll see that there are
4 seven such bullet points, yes?

15:26:12 5 A. Yes, yes.

6 Q. So when he is saying, "You will note that the matters
7 referred to in indents four" - indent four is, "In the case of
8 Liberia, the United Nations, though aware of allegation of
9 Government of Liberia involvement with the rebels, has no direct
10 evidence of such involvement," yes?

11 A. Absolutely, yes.

12 Q. Indent five is the one after, "The United Nations would
13 also welcome the exercise of any influence ...", yes?

14 A. Yes.

15:26:44 15 Q. And indent 6 to which he is now referring is, "The
16 Secretary-General responded positively in principle to the calls
17 by the Government of Liberia to deploy United Nations personnel"?

18 A. Uh-huh.

19 Q. And do you see there's a reference in that to a report on 9
15:27:03 20 June 1998, do you see that?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Now, let's go back then to behind divider 6. So now we
23 know what Mr Downes-Thomas is talking about in his code cable
24 dated the 9th, which is four days later. Do you follow me?

15:27:23 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. "... transmitted to headquarters were raised in the letters
27 from President Taylor to the Secretary-General, transmitted to
28 headquarters ... 12 May 1998 and 20 December 1998 respectively",
29 yes?

1 A. Yes, 20 December.

2 Q. "20 December respectively". So putting that together, you
3 had told him as long ago as May of 1998, yes?

4 A. Yes.

15:27:58 5 Q. About the matters we had looked at at page 2 behind divider
6 7?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. No direct evidence, yes?

9 A. Yes.

15:28:10 10 Q. And that there should be observers in principle and also
11 assistance?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. So you had been talking to him about those things for as
14 long ago as May 1998, yes?

15:28:26 15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. "These issues were also raised in President Taylor's letter
17 of 6 January 1999 to the President of the Security Council", yes?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Now that is a letter which we've already looked at, isn't
15:28:41 20 it?

21 A. Yes, we have. Yes.

22 Q. That is the letter, if we want to write down a reference,
23 which is behind divider 3, tab 3 in this bundle. So that letter
24 referred to is tab 3 in this bundle:

15:29:05 25 "I refer to these communications only to seek advice as to
26 whether or not indents four, five and six should or could be
27 regarded as partial or complete responses to the related matters
28 which President Taylor has raised formally with the
29 Secretary-General."

1 Okay?

2 A. Uh-huh.

3 Q. Now let's unpack what he is saying there, shall we? So we
4 have this outgoing cable from New York on 5 February --

15:29:41 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- setting out the matters which we've looked at behind
7 divider 7?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And would it be fair to say that what Downes-Thomas is now
15:29:52 10 asking on the ground as a recipient of that code cable is whether
11 or not that is the position of headquarters?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. Yes?

14 A. Yes.

15:30:01 15 Q. Whether that's the official position of the United Nations,
16 yes?

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. That's what he is asking?

19 A. Yes.

15:30:08 20 Q. "I am completely in the dark concerning the 'intentions'
21 referred to in paragraph three of the attached cable and for
22 which it would appear that ECOWAS/ECOMOG's concurrence would be
23 required. Should they have any bearing on UN/Liberia relations,
24 I would be glad to receive any light that could be shed on them.

15:30:29 25 Similarly, if the 'five point plan' relates in any way to
26 Liberia, it would be useful to receive some information about it.

27 In the meantime, I will share with you some very general
28 thoughts on the attachment. Within the context of sub-regional
29 stability and of Sierra Leone/Liberia relations, much could be

1 gained from a face-to-face meeting between Presidents Taylor and
2 Kabbah with the participation of President Conte. Among other
3 things, such a meeting could carry the added value of another
4 attempt to resuscitate the dormant Mano River Union and would
15:31:12 5 also be a worthwhile enterprise with which the United Nations
6 should be associated. UNOL is ready to work hand in glove with
7 UNOMSIL to facilitate such a meeting."

8 Mr Taylor, was the dormant Mano River Union brought back to
9 life?

15:31:32 10 A. Oh, yes, we brought it back to life.

11 Q. "Before we move in that direction, however, it would be
12 useful to determine what we need to obtain from such a meeting,
13 even if it were to be 'unstructured'. I realise that for now and
14 as a preliminary step one could float the idea of this meeting
15:31:55 15 simply to gain from all concerned an agreement in principle to
16 it. Nevertheless, in the process of seeking such an agreement,
17 it is very likely that one would be confronted with certain
18 pertinent questions for which any sensible answers would have to
19 include not only the objective(s) of such a meeting but also some
15:32:17 20 clear ideas about our choices with respect to a convener and
21 venue for it. Unless we are already fairly clear about these
22 matters, this good idea of a face-to-face meeting could usefully
23 be broached with the concerned parties in an exploratory manner,
24 not as a firm proposal."

25 Now this:

26 "Given my extremely limited official involvement with
27 Sierra Leonean matters, I am suggesting with much hesitation that
28 it would perhaps be good to re-examine this matter of, on the one
29 hand, soliciting the cooperation of the Government of Burkina

1 Faso in rekindling the negotiation process in Sierra Leone and,
2 on the other hand, encouraging that government to investigate
3 allegations of its own support for the RUF. In this connection,
4 it would be useful to consider whether or not the announcement
15:33:20 5 of, or an actual, investigation by the Government of Burkina Faso
6 into its alleged support for the RUF would engender the necessary
7 goodwill on the part of the government to play a meaningful role
8 in advancing the course of dialogue in Sierra Leone. In this
9 regard, it is perhaps worth noting that the Government of Burkina
15:33:46 10 Faso has not been as confidently strident as Liberia in its
11 denial of these allegations. While one must not read too much
12 into that, it nevertheless remains an aspect that should be kept
13 in mind in making decisions and proposals regarding the
14 involvement of the Government of Burkina Faso and the form that
15:34:16 15 takes in this particular matter. It might therefore be better
16 for the United Nations to determine, on the basis of its own
17 interests in this matter, what is more relevant: The Government
18 of Burkina Faso's investigation of allegations against it or the
19 Government of Burkina Faso's cooperation in the context of
15:34:36 20 dialogue in Sierra Leone. "

21 Let us pause there. Now, Mr Taylor, you tell us that late
22 in 1998 you were aware that Sam Bockarie was passing through
23 Liberia on his way to Burkina Faso, yes?

24 A. That is correct.

15:34:57 25 Q. Did you know what the purpose of that meeting - of that
26 visit - was?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. What was it?

29 A. The purpose of that visit from my understanding, what I was

1 told, was to speak to the chairman of the OAU in furtherance of
2 the peace process in Sierra Leone.

3 Q. Who told you that?

4 A. Bockarie.

15:35:19 5 Q. Did you speak to your friend Blaise Compaore about the
6 visit?

7 A. Oh, yes, Blaise I spoke to him. He expected Bockarie and,
8 like we had said before, many members of ECOWAS and the
9 international community knew that Bockarie was travelling through
10 to go to Burkina Faso.

15:35:37

11 Q. Are you aware of any deal that was made about arms between
12 Burkina Faso and the RUF at or about that time in late 1998?

13 A. I'm not aware of what transpired over there. No, I'm not.

14 Q. When here it is being suggested that the Government of
15:36:05 15 Burkina Faso was providing support to the RUF, a suggestion
16 earlier made in that document dated 30 January which we looked
17 at, what do you know about that, Mr Taylor?

18 A. I know nothing about it and, as a matter of fact, I don't
19 think that the - that Blaise Compaore, as chairman of the OAU at
15:36:31 20 that time, would have been foolish or just inconsiderate in
21 supplying arms to the rebels. That's my own take on it, but I do
22 not know. He was the chairman of the OAU, but my own assessment
23 would be it would have been silly for him to do that and I don't
24 think that he would be involved in any such thing directly.

15:36:54 25 Q. So what are these suggestions here about then, Mr Taylor?
26 Can you help us?

27 A. I'm afraid not. I guess as I see this, I think the point
28 here that the special representative is making is that we are
29 fighting tooth and nail to really get this monkey off our backs -

1 by monkey I mean these accusations. Blaise doesn't share a
2 border with Sierra Leone, so I guess he just, you know, would
3 say, "Well, you know, let them believe what they want to believe
4 and just forget about it", I think, but that's for him to account
15:37:36 5 for. But I would just put this to the same type of things that
6 you hear things, but sometimes you don't - you don't put a lot to
7 it. Sometimes it's not exactly as people are explaining. I
8 would hate to be, you know, put in a position where I would have
9 to account for him. I really, really don't know, but I don't
15:38:02 10 think - I think it would have been silly for him to do that.

11 Q. Well the reason I'm asking, Mr Taylor, is this. You've
12 told us in the past of a friendship which existed between
13 yourself and Blaise Compaore, yes?

14 A. Yes.

15:38:16 15 Q. Here you are now in the early months of 1999, both of you
16 accused of assisting the RUF. Surely in those circumstances the
17 obvious thing to do is pick up the phone, call your friend and
18 say, "Blaise, what is going on here?" Do you follow me?

19 A. Oh, yes.

15:38:36 20 Q. Did you do that?

21 A. Oh, we talked. We talked about the accusations and
22 everything. Blaise really didn't care. He said, "I know it's
23 not true and so they can believe whatever they want to believe.
24 I mean, I don't share a border with them. How do they expect me
15:38:50 25 to do what they say I'm doing?" He really didn't take it
26 seriously. And, quite frankly, if I didn't share a border with -
27 if I didn't share a border with Sierra Leone I don't think this
28 would have continued because I can tell you I would just have
29 said, "I don't have to be involved in this. I don't have to be

1 involved in this. I'm off this committee. Bye. That's it." I
2 would have just walked away from this.

3 But for me this is one of those situations where you are
4 stuck. I was just stuck with Sierra Leone. I've got hundreds of
15:39:30 5 thousands of refugees in Liberia. They have in Sierra Leone. We
6 share borders. They have a conflict over there. I can't get
7 anything going. The accusations are flying left and right. I
8 was just stuck.

9 If I was in one - I if I was one country more away from
15:39:48 10 there I would have never stayed on this committee. I would have
11 said, "Away with this". I didn't need this headache every day
12 and you are Superman. You know, you are making the impossible
13 possible. You don't have arms in your country, but you are
14 supplying arms. All this nonsense. I would have walked away
15:40:08 15 from it and I guess Blaise had the luxury of just ignoring this
16 because he was far away. I didn't.

17 Q. "Finally it would be good for Mr Okelo to visit Liberia.
18 By briefing the appropriate government authorities on his
19 initiatives and related activities, he would also be conveying
15:40:28 20 the message that in the eyes of the United Nations the Government
21 of Liberia does have a role to play in the scheme of things. His
22 envisaged meetings in Liberia, the substance of which could
23 usefully be confined to Sierra Leone-Liberia relations, would
24 also give him the opportunity to learn first-hand about the
15:40:54 25 Government of Liberia's views and positions on the various
26 aspects of Sierra Leone-Liberia relations."

27 Now, Mr Taylor, by this stage in February of 1999, had you
28 met Mr Okelo?

29 A. No.

1 Q. No?

2 A. No, that's why Okelo could write all these things. I
3 didn't really know Okelo, no.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Now I wonder if we could have this document
15:41:25 5 outgoing code cable, dated 9 February 1999, entitled "Follow-up
6 steps on the five-point plan on Sierra Leone", could it be marked
7 for identification, please, MFI-72.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-72.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:41:54 10 Q. Now, that's 9 February, Mr Taylor. At or about that time,
11 did your government issue a further statement about the situation
12 in Sierra Leone?

13 A. Yes. It's a never-ending situation with this Sierra Leone.
14 The government put together a full statement again, similar to
15:42:31 15 what we had just done in November of '98 - I mean December.
16 Around 29 December. Now there's an official statement released
17 by my minister of foreign affairs that goes one step further.

18 Q. And what's that further step?

19 A. Well, now we deal with the issue of granting amnesty,
15:43:01 20 trying to encourage people to step back from the fear of
21 prosecution. It's an extended statement that we make. I think
22 that's just - just close to the mid - not much longer than this.
23 About maybe four or five days following all of these exchanges of
24 ideas, but a little before the 15th or thereabouts we - I think
15:43:33 25 it may be a little later that we issue a full statement from the
26 ministry of foreign affairs detailing again our non-involvement
27 and then stating all the actions that we want to take hereafter
28 to help the problem in Sierra Leone, including the granting of
29 amnesty and spelling out in broad - in very serious details, not

1 broad, but specific details, the time that they had to take
2 advantage of the amnesty period and if they did not take
3 advantage of that period, that it could no longer be beneficial
4 to them. And so it's a very broad and very, very tough statement

15:44:22 5 I think to further let the international community know that we
6 are very serious about peace and that we are doing our best.

7 Q. Could the witness please be shown the document behind
8 divider 8, please. We see that this document is headed "Republic
9 of Liberia, ministry of foreign affairs, Monrovia, Liberia".

15:45:29 10 Then it goes on:

11 "Official statement of the Government of Liberia on the
12 Sierra Leonean crisis, Friday, February 19, 1999.

13 The ongoing fighting in the sister Republic of Sierra Leone
14 is hurting the sub-region politically, economically, and
15:45:56 15 diplomatically. As a founding member of the United Nations, the
16 Organisation of African Unity, the Economic Community of West
17 African States and the Mano River Union, Liberia values its
18 historic role in world affairs, especially in African
19 emancipation, independence and conflict resolution. This role
15:46:26 20 places a compelling responsibility on the government and people
21 of Liberia to continue working for a final resolution of the
22 Sierra Leonean conflict.

23 Liberia is sensitive to the international concerns that
24 have been expressed regarding its alleged complicity in the
15:46:47 25 Sierra Leonean crisis. The Government of Liberia is cognisant of
26 the adverse effect that this state of affairs is having on the
27 maintenance of peace, unity, stability and progress in Liberia,
28 the ECOWAS sub-region, and the larger international community.

29 At the same time, the government is outraged by the nature

1 and level of atrocities attending the war in Sierra Leone. The
2 use of children as soldiers and the maiming of fellow Sierra
3 Leoneans are unconscionable. This malevolent human tragedy must
4 be stopped."

15:47:33 5 Pause there. Mr Taylor, did you have sight of this
6 document before it was made public?

7 A. At the foreign ministers - yes, I had sight of it.

8 Q. Now when it says that the government is outraged by the
9 level and nature of atrocities attending the war in Sierra Leone,
10 you appreciate of course that the suggestion is you were the one
11 directing and controlling that. You know that, don't you?

12 A. Yes, I do. Yes, I do.

13 Q. And you know that so far as that Prosecution is concerned,
14 where you say that you are outraged by the use of children as
15 child soldiers, that's precisely what you had been doing during
16 the Liberian civil war, wasn't it?

17 A. But that's not what we did in Liberia. We did not do that.
18 We didn't cut off hands in Liberia. There are no evidence in
19 Liberia of any of this mayhem and maiming after the civil war
15:48:46 20 today, yesterday, as it was, no.

21 Q. "The Liberian government recognises the efforts of ECOWAS
22 to restore and maintain peace in the sub-region and as a member
23 of the Committee of Six wishes to re-state its support for the
24 ECOWAS peace plan for Sierra Leone.

15:49:07 25 In this regard the Government of Liberia reaffirms its
26 recognition of the elected government of President Ahmad Tejan
27 Kabbah as the legitimate Government of Sierra Leone. The
28 Government of Liberia states further that it has not, and will
29 not, support nor be a party to any attempt to destabilise the

1 Republic of Sierra Leone or any other country.

2 As a democratically elected government, the Government of
3 Liberia has not, and will not, support any attempt by insurgents,
4 including the Revolutionary United Front and the Armed Forces
15:49:54 5 Revolutionary Council or other armed dissidents to destabilise or
6 remove the legitimate Government of Sierra Leone from office.

7 The Liberian government has consistently maintained that
8 the war in Sierra Leone is internal and, relying on its
9 experiences, believes and hopes that the conflict in Sierra Leone
15:50:19 10 can and should be resolved through dialogue and negotiations.

11 This approach remains a constructive path to sustainable peace
12 and national reconciliation in the Republic of Sierra Leone.

13 The Government of Liberia has consistently argued that
14 Liberian citizens have been used as mercenaries in the Sierra
15:50:45 15 Leonean conflict by successive governments of Sierra Leone, the
16 RUF/AFRC, the Kamajors and ECOMOG".

17 Pause there. So you are saying that (1) Sierra Leone
18 government, (2) RUF/AFRC, (3) Kamajors, (4) ECOMOG, have all used
19 Liberians as mercenaries in Sierra Leone, Mr Taylor, yes?

15:51:18 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. We need not go back to that argument because we have looked
22 at it ad nauseam.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. "The Government of Liberia notes the existence of legal
15:51:29 25 instruments that prohibit its nationals from serving as
26 mercenaries. These instruments include international conventions
27 and protocols, particularly the non-aggression and security
28 cooperation treaty between countries comprising the Mano River
29 Union."

1 Do you remember mentioning that to us?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. "Most importantly Chapter 11 of the Liberian penal code,
4 subsection 11.13 on mercenaries, provides for life imprisonment
15:52:03 5 or the death penalty for convicted mercenaries."

6 Is that right, Mr Taylor?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. We'll have cause in due course - no, we might as well deal
9 with the matter now. So it's Chapter 11 of the Liberian penal
15:52:37 10 code, is it?

11 A. Yes.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Whilst we're on that topic, could I invite
13 everyone's attention to behind divider 71, which is the second
14 smaller volume for week 32:

15:53:03 15 Q. What are we looking at here, Mr Taylor?

16 A. Chapter - we should be looking for Chapter 11, subsection
17 11.13.

18 Q. Of what?

19 A. Of the Liberian penal code dealing with mercenarism.

15:54:16 20 Q. Now, if we go over to the, yes, fourth page of this chapter
21 of the Liberian penal code, yes?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Do we see 11.13?

24 A. Yes.

15:54:35 25 Q. Mercenarism?

26 A. Uh-huh.

27 Q. Do we see that, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Now, let's just look at what offence is created by this

1 chapter:

2 "The crime of mercenarism is committed: A felony of the
3 first degree by an individual, a group, an association,
4 representative or representatives of a state and the state itself
15:55:07 5 with the intent of opposing by armed violence, a process of
6 self-determination or the territorial integrity of another state
7 when the following acts are perpetrated:

8 (a) the sheltering, organising, financing, assisting,
9 equipping, training, promoting, supporting, or employing armed
15:55:36 10 forces partially or wholly and consisting of persons not
11 nationals of the country being invaded or attempting to invade
12 and merely or solely for money, personal gain, material or other
13 reward; or

14 (b) the enlisting, enrolling or attempting to enrol in the
15:56:05 15 said armed forces; or

16 (c) the allowing of the activities referred to in
17 subsection (1)(a) to be carried out in any territory under the
18 jurisdiction of another state or in any place under its control;
19 or.

15:56:22 20 (d) affording of facilities for transit, transportation or
21 other operations for the armed forces and activities referred to
22 in subsection 1(a).

23 Mercenaries shall not in this republic enjoy the status of
24 combatants and shall not be entitled to the prisoners of war
15:56:45 25 status. Assuming command over or giving orders to mercenaries
26 shall be considered an aggravating circumstance: If the act of
27 mercenarism results in the death of any nonparticipant in such
28 mercenarism other than a mercenary, the person convicted may be
29 sentenced to death or life imprisonment as provided by section

1 50.5 and 51.3. In the case of a state, such an act of
2 mercenarism shall be regarded as a declaration of war against the
3 Republic of Liberia."

4 Now, let us try and deconstruct the legal language here to
15:57:38 5 see what this means. So the crime of mercenarism, if we go back
6 to subsection (a), "the sheltering, organising, financing,
7 assisting, equipping, training, promoting, supporting or
8 employing armed forces partially or wholly and consisting of
9 persons not nationals in the country being invaded or attempting
15:58:08 10 to invade and merely or solely for money, personal gain, material
11 or other reward."

12 So, Mr Taylor, if what the Sierra Leonean government and
13 what ECOMOG had done in recruiting Liberian nationals, that was,
14 in fact, an offence under Liberian law, wasn't it?

15:58:40 15 A. Definitely. Definitely.

16 Q. Next, subsection 2: "Assuming command over or giving
17 orders to mercenaries shall be considered as an aggravating
18 circumstance."

19 Does that mean, Mr Taylor, that as President of Liberia, if
15:59:12 20 you were giving orders to Liberians working as mercenaries in
21 Sierra Leone, you were breaking the laws of your own country?

22 A. That's true.

23 Q. And that would have been an aggravating feature so far as
24 your criminal liability was concerned, yes? So if, as suggested,
15:59:36 25 you were giving such orders, you were nothing but a common
26 criminal, weren't you, Mr Taylor, liable to be executed by the
27 Republic of Liberia?

28 A. That is true and that is why the Senate did launch a full
29 investigation into the allegation - the Senate of the Republic of

1 Liberia, to see if the President - in fact, that would have,
2 first of all, subjected me to being impeached as President of the
3 Republic and tried by the Liberian Senate. And so the Senate
4 launched an investigation with the knowledge of the United
16:00:18 5 Nations and they welcomed it.

6 Q. We've seen mention of it already.

7 A. Exactly, yes.

8 MR. GRIFFITHS: Before we go back to the other document in
9 the other volume, Mr President, could I ask that this Chapter 11
16:00:30 10 of the Liberian penal code be marked for identification, MFI-73.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Said document is marked MFI-73 for
12 identification.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Now, we can put that volume away now, please, now that we
16:01:00 15 know what we were talking about in the other paragraph. And can
16 we go back to, please, behind divider 8. Yes, Mr Taylor?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So we now understand what is being said where in the
19 penultimate paragraph it provides: "Most importantly, Chapter 11
16:01:33 20 of the Liberian penal code, subsection 11.13 on mercenaries,
21 provides for life imprisonment or the death penalty for convicted
22 mercenaries.

23 In view of this notation, the Government of Liberia has
24 repeatedly called on its citizens to disengage from the conflict
16:01:56 25 in Sierra Leone and return home. In furtherance of the efforts
26 of the Government of Liberia to discourage Liberian citizens from
27 complicating the crisis in Sierra Leone and to ensure compliance
28 with the laws and conventions relating to mercenaries, the
29 Government of Liberia undertakes the following: (1) renews its

1 call on the Government of Sierra Leone and all parties to the
2 conflict in that country to abolish the use of Liberians as
3 mercenaries."

4 Yes?

16:02:34 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. As a matter of interest and in passing, help us: Do you
7 know what the situation was under Sierra Leonean law regarding
8 the employment of mercenaries?

9 A. No, I really do not know, counsel.

16:02:57 10 Q. "As a matter of urgency, the Government of Liberia requests
11 the United Nations to assist the Governments of Sierra Leone and
12 Liberia in identifying, documenting and processing Liberians
13 fighting in Sierra Leone for an organised repatriation. Amnesty
14 will be granted to those Liberians involved in the Sierra Leonean
16:03:27 15 conflict who will cooperate with the voluntary repatriation
16 programme. This amnesty takes immediate effect and will expire
17 within 45 days from the date of this statement."

18 What was the purpose behind that?

19 A. We are trying to help in whatever way we can to get these
16:03:54 20 Liberians out of Sierra Leone. Remember in the first instance
21 we've called for the Sierra Leonean government, which must be the
22 first party, to release them. Those that they have in their
23 employ, let these people go. The purpose of getting the UN
24 involved is going to call for money and the process of
16:04:15 25 demobilisation where we will get the international community to
26 come together and help both Sierra Leone and Liberia to
27 demobilise these people and send them.

28 As a reminder, we know that Liberians are being held in
29 prison. Quite a few of these people are being held in prison,

1 and this is why all the way back, when Okelo writes his memo, he
2 states that majority are Liberians and it is stated that
3 Liberians are arrested. And from the best of my recollection,
4 right in this Court, some of those people appeared here. So -
16:05:01 5 and I'm sure if I had sent them, they would have told this Court,
6 "I was there, your Honour, but the gentleman sitting over there,
7 Mr Taylor, sent me." That was not the case. I was trying to get
8 him first to release them, get the UN involved. By this, the
9 fear would be taken away and we would get them out of
16:05:24 10 Sierra Leone and that would help to bring peace.

11 Q. "At the end of the voluntary repatriation exercise, the
12 Government of Liberia, working with the Government of
13 Sierra Leone, will arrest and prosecute to the full extent of the
14 law any Liberian citizen found to still be engaged in the ongoing
16:05:44 15 armed conflict in Sierra Leone.

16 In order to support the productive reintegration of
17 ex-combatants and returnees and to prevent their cycling into
18 lawlessness and violent activities anywhere, the Government of
19 Liberia hereby appeals for assistance from the Government of the
16:06:08 20 United States of America and countries of the European Union.

21 Liberia also appeals for assistance from the United Nations
22 system, particularly UNICEF, UNHCR, FAO, UNDP and WFP.

23 The Government of Liberia hereby calls for the immediate
24 appointment of members of the joint security liaison committee
16:06:47 25 provided for in the Mano River Union non-aggression and security
26 cooperation treaty between Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. In
27 order to enhance security and confidence within the Mano River
28 Union, the Government of Liberia hereby requests the convening of
29 a summit of the Mano River Union.

1 The Government of Liberia renews its request to the
2 Government of Sierra Leone to accept the joint patrol and
3 monitoring of the Liberian-Sierra Leonean border. The Government
4 of Liberia again solicits assistance from the United States and
16:07:24 5 the European Union to facilitate this joint border patrol to
6 ensure compliance with all existing resolutions on Sierra Leone.

7 To this end, the Government of Liberia renews its requests
8 to the United Nations Security Council to approve deployment of
9 United Nations monitors along with ECOMOG forces at the
16:08:01 10 Liberia-Sierra Leonean border.

11 The Government of Liberia shall relocate all refugee camps
12 further inland to discourage any attempt to use those camps for
13 subversive activities against the Government of Sierra Leone. To
14 this end, the Liberian government again calls on the UNHCR to
16:08:26 15 assist in the inland transfer of all refugees from near its
16 borders with Sierra Leone.

17 The Government of Liberia reinforces its directives to all
18 its security forces to be on maximum alert with specific
19 instructions to vigorously patrol the borders and to further
16:08:48 20 intensify customs and immigration procedures at all sea and
21 airports as well as other points of entry. The national security
22 agencies are further mandated to continue to ensure that no
23 cross-border movement of arms takes place and that there be no
24 transshipment of arms and ammunition through Liberian territory."

16:09:13 25 Now, Mr Taylor, to whom was this official statement
26 directed?

27 A. Everyone. United Nations, Sierra Leone, everyone. We are
28 trying to leave it crystal clear what our position is on this
29 matter and trying to help in whatever way that we could to not

1 just get ceasefires going, but also internally trying to help to
2 control the situation on the ground.

3 Q. Now, we will note that, amongst other things, you mentioned
4 the non-aggression and security cooperation treaty between
16:09:57 5 countries comprising the Mano River Union?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Conventions and protocols?

16:10:05 10 A. Uh-huh.

11 Q. Now, following this official statement, did you have cause
12 to write to either President Kabbah or President Conte regarding
13 these matters?

14 A. Yes, I wrote to in fact three groups; President Kabbah,
16:10:24 15 President Conte and the Secretary-General again.

16 Q. What about?

17 A. In the case of Kabbah and Conte, we cited certain protocols
18 and what could be done. We invoked certain protocols under the
19 non-aggression treaty in those letters and what we expected and
16:10:50 20 what to do. These are just attempts to really solidify whatever
21 gains were in the making.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Before we come to look at those letters
23 could I ask, please, that this official statement of the
24 Government of Liberia on the Sierra Leone crisis dated 19
16:11:15 25 February 1999 be marked for identification MFI-74.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-74.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

28 Q. Now, the letter to Tejan Kabbah, can we look behind divider
29 10, please. Mr Taylor, let us just orientate ourselves. The

1 statement we've just looked at was dated 19 February, yes?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. A couple of days later on 22 February you write to
4 President Tejan Kabbah in the following terms, do you not:

16:12:17 5 "My dear friend and brother. I present my compliments and,
6 in consideration of our mutual desire to find a common and
7 permanent solution to the problems besetting the peace and
8 security in our sub-region, hasten to seize this opportunity to
9 bring to your urgent attention the 1986 non-aggression and
16:12:44 10 security cooperation treaty between member states of the Mano
11 River Union which, inter alia, obliges them in principle and
12 substance to be their brother's keeper and to cooperate in mutual
13 security interest of each other. The relevant articles of the
14 treaty which are operative in the current subregional
16:13:13 15 circumstances are Articles V, VI, VIII and IX.

16 In this connection I wish to refer to Article VIII which
17 provides that any member of the military or paramilitary forces
18 found within the territory of a high contracting party without
19 proper leave of absence, prior clearance, entry permit, and
16:13:45 20 travel document shall be arrested and kept in custody. Further,
21 the government concerned shall be immediately notified."

22 Pause. Now, when it says "any member of the military or
23 paramilitary forces found within the territory of a high
24 contracting party without proper leave of absence, prior
16:14:19 25 clearance, entry permit or travel document", who are we referring
26 to?

27 A. Member states and ex-combatants.

28 Q. I just want to make sure I understand what it is you are
29 telling us. If a Liberian is found on Sierra Leonean soil and

1 that person is a member of a paramilitary group or the
2 military and that person is there without any leave of absence,
3 prior clearance or entry permit, that person can be arrested and
4 detained by the security forces of that state?

16:15:00 5 A. Yes, and the other high contracting party notified, yes.

6 Q. Right. So consequently it follows if there are Liberians
7 operating in Sierra Leone under these circumstances, President
8 Kabbah or indeed ECOMOG in Sierra Leone had the power to arrest
9 and detain them and thereafter notify the Liberian government?

16:15:27 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. And is that why the Liberian government had extended that
12 amnesty under Chapter 11.13?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. To permit the return of such individuals?

16:15:41 15 A. Exactly.

16 Q. And to take out of that equation any fear on the part of
17 the combatant that he might be executed if returned to Liberia?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Now help us, Mr Taylor. Why did you find it necessary to
16:15:58 20 be reminding your brother President Kabbah of the terms of this
21 treaty dating back as far as 1986?

22 A. Well, you know, I would not say that he did not know of it.
23 This reminder is just another attempt on my part to push this
24 process further and to help clear up the mess as I can put it.

16:16:31 25 And so, like in most cases, some countries do not invoke certain
26 treaties until it is necessary. In my case this has become a
27 necessity to invoke these provisions of these protocols.

28 Now, probably he didn't see any need. He could have
29 advised me. But because we are anxious to doing whatever we can

1 to resolve this problem, we invoked this, remind him, hoping that
2 he can act because in the first place in the back of my mind I'm
3 aware of Liberians that are in custody in Freetown. There are so
4 many of them that are being held. But if we know what happens
16:17:23 5 subsequently, they are tried in Sierra Leone, they are convicted
6 in Sierra Leone, Liberians that came to this Court. So we have a
7 situation I'm trying to remind him that, "Look, let's help each
8 other. We'll put this thing out and in 45 days if we do not get
9 them, listen we will get the UN, UNHCR, other people involved.
16:17:43 10 You arrest them, you send them over here, we will try them" and
11 this is just - I guess I can just put it to trying to build -
12 it's a confidence building measure that I'm putting into place
13 again just to assure him that we mean business as far as helping
14 to bring peace.

16:18:04 15 Q. It continues:

16 "According to Article IX, the establishment of a joint
17 security liaison committee consisting of three representatives
18 from each high contracting party shall have the responsibility to
19 liaise on the subject of fugitive criminals, dissidents, as well
16:18:30 20 as subversive activities of citizens of their respective
21 countries in the territory of each other, exchange information,
22 investigate reports affecting the security of the high
23 contracting parties with a view to maintaining the desired
24 peaceful coexistence.

16:18:50 25 In view of the above, and in order to bring about an
26 amicable solution to the problems which beset our sub-region, I
27 propose that the ministers of foreign affairs, defence and
28 national security of the Mano River Union meet in Monrovia on
29 March 3, 1999, to work out implementation of the non-aggression

1 and security cooperation treaty and the appropriate security
2 measures. "

3 Pause there. Do you recall, Mr Taylor, in a previous
4 communication we noted between Mr Downes-Thomas and the United
16:19:36 5 Nations reference to the Mano River Union having become dormant?

6 A. Uh-huh.

7 Q. Are you trying to resurrect it here?

8 A. I can say yes, but not to leave my colleagues out. They
9 are - they participate fully, so I don't intend to take any

16:20:08 10 direct credit for having done it alone. We are all working
11 together, but I'm doing my best on my - you know, on my side as a
12 Liberian.

13 Q. Now, this meeting, did it take place on 3 March?

14 A. To the best of my recollection, it did take place.

16:20:33 15 Q. "... to work out implementation of the non-aggression and
16 security cooperation treaty and the appropriate security
17 measures. Meanwhile consistent with our desire to have this
18 matter speedily resolved, the Government of Liberia also calls
19 for the immediate activation of the joint security liaison
16:20:59 20 committee as provided for in the non-aggression and security
21 cooperation treaty. We have also undertaken to relocate all
22 refugee camps further inland to discourage any attempt to use
23 these camps for subversive activities against neighbouring
24 governments. "

16:21:32 25 Now, what would be the effect of the immediate activation
26 of the joint security liaison committee, Mr Taylor?

27 A. That will put into place a mechanism. Once they met,
28 people would be - security personnel and intelligence people
29 would have a free movement in and out of these countries. They

1 can recruit informants. A lot can happen once this committee is
2 put into place. And that's why I begin immediately and it caused
3 some questions, but we did it anyway to move the people back from
4 the borders to give people an opportunity to be able to be clear
16:22:14 5 with their work.

6 Q. Now let's go to the next paragraph:

7 "Moreover, my government is prepared to act immediately to
8 arrest and keep in custody, pending prosecution or extradition,
9 any and all persons or dissidents found in violation of the
16:22:33 10 non-aggression and security cooperation treaty and of the penal
11 code of Liberia relative to mercenaries. As you are aware, I
12 informed you, both in Conakry" - when was Conakry?

13 A. That's October/November.

14 Q. "And Monrovia" - when was Monrovia?

16:23:04 15 A. Monrovia was - in fact we had several Monrovia. We had
16 July there was Monrovia. There was at least July.

17 Q. "As you are aware, I informed you". Who are you writing to
18 here, Mr Taylor?

19 A. This is Tejani. This is Tejani.

16:23:27 20 Q. "I informed you, Tejan Kabbah, both in Conakry and Monrovia
21 of the many Liberians that were both unlawfully engaged in
22 fighting and military training in Sierra Leone."

23 Had you told him that --

24 A. Oh, yes.

16:23:42 25 Q. -- from the previous year?

26 A. Yes. And he never said to me he knew about them. And he
27 knew.

28 Q. And did he say to you, "Well, you're controlling these
29 people, my dear brother." Did you say that?

1 A. No, he couldn't and he didn't.

2 Q. Why were you anxious to tell him from as long beforehand as
3 Monrovia and Conakry about this?

4 A. Because in fact, you know, to be frank about it, I wanted
16:24:16 5 him to know that I knew what was going on and that he was in fact
6 partly responsible for it. So I said to him I said, "Listen,
7 there are people - Liberians - that are fighting and training
8 over there. They are doing it unlawfully. It has to be stopped.
9 We have to do whatever we can to stop it." He said, "Oh, yes, my
16:24:33 10 brother. You're right. You're right."

11 Q. But help me with two further matters in this regard and the
12 first is this. If, as is suggested, you were in charge of these
13 Liberians, why were you informing President Kabbah about their
14 presence? Can you help me?

16:24:53 15 A. Because I was not involved with them, that's why.

16 Q. Secondly, at the time you were informing your brother
17 president of this, Mr Taylor, back in 1998 no less, were you
18 aware that a decade later you would be on trial on these
19 allegations --

16:25:15 20 A. No.

21 Q. -- so you were, in effect, setting up a prior defence?

22 A. No, I had no idea in my wildest dream that I would be
23 sitting here.

24 Q. "I informed you both in Conakry and Monrovia of the many
16:25:35 25 Liberians that were unlawfully engaged in fighting and military
26 training in Sierra Leone. I am also prepared to grant amnesty to
27 those Liberians found fighting in any Mano River Union state,
28 particularly Sierra Leone, who would surrender to the United
29 Nations within 45 days or prosecute those who fail to do so.

1 My dear friend and brother, I entreat you to consider my
2 proposal of convening the ministerial meeting of the Mano River
3 Union so as to enable us to continue our quest for peace,
4 security and good neighbourliness in our sub-region."

16:26:21 5 Then we have the normal salutation, yes?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, whilst we're at it, can we have a look at
8 the letter you also sent to General Lansana Conte. Before we
9 move on, can I ask that this letter to President Kabbah dated 22
10 February 1999 be marked for identification MFI-75, please?

16:26:45

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked for
12 identification MFI-75. I'll notify you, Mr Griffiths, you've got
13 about - something less than four minutes of tape left.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: I think it's sufficient time for us to get
15 started on this other letter though.

16:27:16

16 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, before you move on, I note
17 that the heading of that MFI-75 is "Draft 1". Is that the final
18 document that went to President Kabbah?

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, I'll ask the witness.

16:27:32

20 Q. Mr Taylor, you'll see that the document we have in front of
21 us is headed "Draft 1". Can you help us now as to whether this
22 was the final version?

23 A. This is the final version. After this draft, then the
24 letter is done exactly as this. There's no change.

16:27:49

25 Q. So the letter which President Kabbah received was identical
26 to this, was it?

27 A. Identical. Exactly as this.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well when the witness says "identical", I
29 take it that the letter that President Kabbah received did not

1 have "Draft 1" written on it?

2 THE WITNESS: No, your Honour, it didn't.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: And did not have "yours" crossed out on
4 the second page?

16:28:18 5 THE WITNESS: No, your Honour.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, was the letter to Lansana Conte in almost
9 identical terms?

16:28:37 10 A. Yes, but some little - some different nuances for Lansana
11 Conte.

12 Q. Now just before we conclude today, can I invite your
13 attention to this fact. The letter behind divider 9 - behind
14 divider 9, do you have it? To Lansana Conte, yes?

16:29:15 15 A. Yes, but it's not the whole document though.

16 Q. Is that document complete, Mr Taylor?

17 A. No, I don't see the second page of it.

18 Q. But if we just keep our finger in divider 10 so that we can
19 conclude with this document tonight, the paragraphs are all

16:29:44 20 identical, aren't they? If you just hold it like this,

21 Mr Taylor, you see, and just flick backwards and forwards?

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. They are identical, aren't they?

24 A. They are just about identical, but I would want to make

16:30:03 25 sure that the second page - I think it's important to see the
26 second page, because as I'm telling Tejani I told you about this
27 the first page of the document would be exactly the same, but the
28 second page could have some slight nuances - differences.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: If I could interrupt, the tape has just

1 about run out, Mr Griffiths.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think we'll have to adjourn at this
4 point, Mr Taylor, and I'll remind you of the normal caution that
16:30:40 5 you're not permitted to discuss your evidence with any other
6 person.

7 We'll adjourn now until 9.30 tomorrow morning.

8 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.

9 to be reconvened on Tuesday, 11 August 2009 at
16:31:15 10 9.30 a.m.]

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I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	26269
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	26269